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EDITORIAL

LAURINCE W. WOOD

This issue of the Asbury Theological Journal honors one of our recently retired
professors, Dr. Robert Lyon, who was a professor of New Testament Studies for
more than 30 years. His influence on students has been remarkable. These
essays are written by his students and admirers who have learned from him as a
scholar and as a friend. Dr. Lyon has been particularly gifted in challenging students to be serious scholars, and as a result many of his students were motivated
to do further studies. This collection of essays is a sampling of those whom he
inspired to pursue a Ph. D. degree in some aspects of religious thought.
One of Dr. Lyon's well-known ministries among students was the formation
of a student organization in the 70s known as the "Loyal Opposition." This association reflects Dr. Lyon's vision to get students involved socially and politically
in contemporary practical affairs . In Bob's communications with them, he customarily signs off with "Peace- and Towels!" The authors of these essays pay
tribute to Dr. Lyon's success in influencing them in this regard-to be both serious scholars and community-minded believers whose primary responsibility is to
be a faithful and loyal witness concerning the difference that Jesus makes for the
whole world in every aspect of life.
It is with highest respect for Dr. Lyon and the cause of Christ for which he
has embraced throughout the course of his long career at Asbury Theological
Seminary that we offer these contributions in his honor.
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THE DEUTERONOMISTS AS
LOYAL OPPOSITION

JOEL

I.

H.

HUNT

INTRODUCTION

One could cite a plethora of Pentateuchal passages that suggest "Loyal
Opposition" in the Torah. ! These passages counter what appear to have been commonly held ideas of the time. A narrative telling of a younger brother surpassing the
eldest son, as in the case of Jacob and Esau, allows the reversal of apparently normal
inheritance rights for the larger purposes of God. The traditions of Exodus, in which
slaves are freed from terrible bondage and consequently formed into a nation,
bespeak a view of life that centers on hope for hopeless people to find a new existence in relationship with God. Even the legal corpora of the Torah, with, for example, their emerging concern for the status of women, suggest the stirrings of basic
principles of fairness by which faithful people express commitment to Cod and solidarity with persons.
We will narrow our purview considerably, however, and examine two related
themes of the Torah: love of God and love of persons. Perhaps there is no more
natural place to focus than Deuteronomy, a book that, in ways similar to the connotation of the phrase "Loyal Opposition," uses political rhetoric to express religious
obligations. If the twin ideas of love of God and love of persons are central to the
identity and mission of the Church, as this symposium suggests, then it is fruitful to
consider again this document as foundational for the Loyal Opposition.
The covenantal language of Deuteronomy clearly declares the correlating concepts of love of God and love of persons. Deuteronomy understands Israel's identity
as inextricably bound to the nation's exclusive devotion to Yahweh. Deuteronomy
also requires that Israel demonstrate covenantal solidarity with others. Within the
expression of these companion concepts one may recognize the early stirrings of a
Loyal Opposition understanding of Christian obligation, for life within the Kingdom
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of God entails both whole-hearted allegiance to God and whole-hearted affection for others.
At least two additional features of Deuteronomy suggest that this text is applicable for
an understanding of Christian discipleship along the lines of Loyal Opposition. First, the
rhetorical features of the Deuteronomic sermons contemporize the message for its hearers. This technique requires faithful readers of the text in any age to draw near to listen to
these ancient, and yet appropriate, demands for exclusive devotion to God and for compassionate living among people. As if it is being uttered for the first time, Deuteronomy
addresses "us, "today' and "now' to respond to its demands for an unswerving love of
God and an unstinting love of others 2
As an example of this contemporizing movement, note the emphasis on "today" in
Deuteronomy 5:3. The verse reads:

nK·ti}

T

K''?

;'''-K
This verse may be translated rather woodenly, "Not with our ancestors did Yahweh
cut this covenant, but with us, we, these ones here today, all of us alive."J As Patrick Miller
comments in reading this verse,
The text uses seven words heaped one upon another to stress the contemporary
claim of the covenant. The effect is clear. The hortatory character of the chapter
and the book combines with the actualizing language of this verse to cut across all
the generations and renew the covenant afresh with all hearers of these words. 4
In addition to this contemporizing rhetoric, the development of Deuteronomy itself
also suggests that there may be points of contact between Deuteronomy and a view of
Christian discipleship as Opposition. The Deuteronomic writers or editors, as outlined by
Weinfeld and others, stood apart within a plurality of religious expressions in their own
day 5 In like manner, the contemporary Loyal Follower of God may at times stand over
against both the so-called secular views of life and the prevailing, and comfortably familiar,
patterns of religious thinking. Thus, we suggest that in the promulgation of the book of
Deuteronomy one may see an incipient Loyal Opposition party, a group asserting the distinctive ideas of the love of Yahweh alone and of the love of others despite competing
concepts. We will review briefly these twin mandates to love as they occur in
Deuteronomy.6

II.

COVENANT LOVE OF GOD IN DEUTERONOMY

It is well known that Deuteronomy resembles Ancient Near Eastern treaties in general
and the Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon (VTE) in particular. By means of these Vassal
Treaties, dated to 672 Be, Esarhaddon imposed loyalty oaths on his vassals to assure their
continued fidelity to Esarhaddon's successor Assurbanipal. Significantly, both VTE and
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Deuteronomy demand wholehearted devotion to the suzerain? Of course, Deuteronomy
stretches the model of these fealty oaths by extracting a pledge to Yahweh as suzerain
and by placing the stipulations of the agreement in the category of divine law.
Clearly a political model was pressed into service to express religious ideology, a
proposition familiar to those who would discuss Christian life in terms of a Loyal
Opposition Society. Weinfeld affirms this connection, and its peculiar appropriateness for
ancient Israel, when he writes,
The pattern that served a political need in the ancient Near East came to serve a
religious need in Israel. The religious use of this pattem was especially possible in
Israel, for only the religion of Israel demanded exclusive loyalty to the God of Israel,
a jealous God, who would suffer no rival. The religion of Israel therefore precluded
the possibility of dual or multiple loyalties, such as were permitted in other religions
in which the believer was bound in diverse relationships to many gods. So the stipulation in political treaties demanding exclusive loyalty to one king corresponds strikingly to the religious belief in one single, exclusive Deity.8
Such an unrivaled loyalty to God, a loyalty precluding other potential commitments,
appears to be the point of Christian discipleship as well. As in the case of the
Deuteronomists in ancient Israel, this loyalty may even place the modern believer in conflict with prevailing religious practice as well.
Deuteronomy reflects a change in the spiritual life of ancient Israel in the seventh century BC 9 Deuteronomy achieved a new status during the reforms of losiah (2 Kings 2223). The ancient Loyal Opposition gained enough power with the Josianic Reform and
"discovery' of the "book of the law' to institute its vision of religious life. With losiah, the
Reform Movement received the royal imprimatur and this led to the execution of the
ideals of DeuteronomyW
As an aside, the question of the changing dynamics when the Opposition becomes the
Govemment, as in the case of Josiah's reforms, is beyond the immediate scope of this paper.
In light of texts describing the conduct of Holy War or the coercive imposition of the
Deuteronomic reforms, one must consider how the Opposition, as Government, can or
should wield power in a righteous manner when the opportunity is presented. Our purpose
here is to look at the losianic Reform as indicative of the kinds of concerns the
Deuteronomic authors had and the implications of these concems for Christian discipleship.
The impact of losiah's promulgation of Deuteronomy is seen most clearly in the narrowing of the Israelite cult." With centralization, and the requisite elimination of provincial cult centers, the Reformers institute the Opposition's idea that Yahweh alone should
be worshipped in the manner and in the place of Yahweh's choosing. This cult restriction
coincided with the development of the "name theology" combating the idea of God actually dwelling in any shrine, even the divinely appointed place from among the tribes. This
emphasis on the spiritual dwelling of Yahweh, which perhaps lessened the importance of
cui tic performance, was joined by an enlargement of humanistic expression within the
covenant, a matter that we shall take up later in this paper.
For the moment, we wish to focus on the requirement of complete loyalty to Yahweh.
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In this regard, the adaptation of a treaty structure for Deuteronomy is decisive. The YTE
included strong words regarding loyalty to the suzerain followed by stipulations outlining
the responsibilities of the loyal subject. In Deuteronomy, where the sovereign is Yahweh,
some of the stipulations deal with proper worship and religious observances as issues
reflecting loyalty to the divine suzerain. These loyalty stipulations are joined by concerns
for the treatment of human beings.
As an example of the basic stipulation of allegiance to Yahweh, let us consider briefly
the Shema, a familiar segment dealing with loyalty. The section 4:44- 1 I :32 begins with a
review of the Ten Words, principles that center on the primary relationship to Yahweh
alone and on proper relationships within the community.
Deuteronomy 6:4-9, the Shema, expounds upon this first idea, the fundamental relationship with Yahweh. These verses read,
Hear, 0 Israel: The LORD is our Cod, the LORD alone. You shall love the LORD
your Cod w ith all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might. Keep
these words that I am commanding you today in your heart. Recite them to your
children and talk about them when you are at home and when you are away,
when you lie down and when you rise. Bind them as a sign o n your hand, fix them
as an emblem o n your forehead, and write them on the doorposts of your house
and on your gates.
These verses place at the forefront one of the main concerns of Deuteronomy and,
derivatively, of the Loyal Opposition. The first matter is a strong reiteration of the principle that there should be no gods but Yahweh. The people of Cod find their identity in
their attachment to this deity alone and this commitment shapes the way in which they
are to live in the world.' 2 The Shema is a positive restatement of the first commandment
against the worship of other gods. This affirmation will set the inner compass of the individual and guide daily conduct in the world. Thus, for the faithful person in ancient Israel,
as with the Loyal Opposition today, the challenge becomes the reapplication of the primary loyalty to Cod in ever-new situations in life.'l
The connection of the Shema to the ba sic concerns e nun ciated in the Ten
Commandments in particular and Deuteronomy in general provides a starting place for
life in the Kingdom. As Miller suggests,
Focusing on the Creat Commandment and the Decalogue identifies a center
around w hich other things revolve. It enables a reduction of the whole to its most
important point, spelling it out in specifics and implications. A theological structure
is thereby given to the covenantal community, one that continues throughout its
life. It operates on two axes: the relation of faith and love o r obedience, as succinctly set forth in the Shema, and the relationship to Cod and others as embodied in
the Ten Commandments. Readers of the Book of Deuteronomy, therefore, are
constantly being given clues to what matters most for those who live under and
with this Cod.'4
The Shema expresses the requirement of allegiance to Yahweh, which echoes the first

The Deuteronomists as Loyal Opposition

II

commandment, after affirming Yahweh's uniqueness and unity. A syntactic connection joins
the command to "hear" (sm<) the declaration of Yahweh's uniqueness in verse 4 and the
verb requiring the faithful person to "love' (w)hbt) Yahweh uniquely in verse 5. ' 5 The unity
of Yahweh requires an undivided love from Yahweh's subjects; Yahweh is "one" therefore
you shall love Yahweh "with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might."
This whole-hearted love excludes any rival for the affections of the Beloved One. In VTE,
Esarhaddon entreats his vassals to love the king as one loves oneself, or, in other words, to
be completely loyal to the suzerain. ' 6 Though it is possible, albeit highly unlikely, that the vassal could have had a measure of affection for the sovereign, the primary usage of the term
"love," rdamu in VTE and )hb in Deuteronomy, has to do with the faithful expression of
loyalty by means of obedience to the covenant stipulations. In fact, to make the connection
between the political and spiritual arenas, the treaty language used in Deuteronomy 6:5
"contains all of the elements found in the treaties: devotion with all the heart, with all the
soul (i.e., readiness to give one's life), and provision of might and force when necessary" 17
The following verses of the Shema, Deuteronomy 6:6-9, complement this call to
unmitigated fidelity, Verse 6 demands that the faithful take "these words" to heart as a
constant companion reminding one of the need for loyalty. '8 Verse 7 requires the inculcation (wesinnantam) of the next generation by means of constant recitation of "these
words." This theme, the education of the children, reappears in 6:20-25 to end this segment. Verses 8-9 prescribe the use of external anchors to complement and strengthen the
internal reminders of verse 6-7.
The Shema's theme of total fidelity continues in Deuteronomy 6: I 0-25, These verses
demanding allegiance are particularly applicable to our concern for the Loyal Opposition.
Deuteronomy 6: 10-19 recognizes that Israel has received freely a fully appointed residence. This grant of plenty, contrasting with a past of poverty, should cause the Israelite to
remain always faithful to Yahweh, According to 6: 13- 15, the people must serve Yahweh,
a jealous Deity, with steady devotion and guard against faltering fealty. One notes that the
abundance of material blessing provides a challenge for the faithful to remain faithful and
not to test the limits of the Suzerain's patience.
These warnings against complacency in the face of promised plenty indicate that
Deuteronomy understands that comfort may conflict with the performance of the injunction to love Cod and love persons. This warning provides a parallel for Christian ethics
today, for the Loyal Opposition may need to live against a tide of material blessing, ignoring the inducements of enjoyment and excess, if good fortune leads to vacillation. 19
The evidence could be multiplied many times over to demonstrate that Deuteronomy
attempts to foist upon Israel a restricted reverence for the one Yahweh. The existence of
this program, coupled with other biblical and extrabiblical evidence, indicates that the religious climate of ancient Israel was more pluralistic than the writers of Deuteronomy sanctioned. 2o In such a climate, those who held to the ideas of Deuteronomy appear to have
been an opposition party asserting their brand of monotheistic and Yahwistic faith upon
the people.
This Deuteronomic ideal, the stipulation of undivided allegiance to God in a time of
pluralism, forms an interesting link to the concept of Christian ethics as Opposition. The
notion of love of Cod in Deuteronomy arises out of the political climate of the Ancient
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Near East, in w hich the term "love" in the covenants generally denotes uncompromising
loyalty to the suzerain by means of severing all other ties and by abiding by the specific
stipulations of the loyalty oath 21 In this vein, the political idea "Loyal Opposition' may be
a useful way to express a view of Christian ethics in which the believer adheres exclusively to God as Sovereign, even in the face of competing loyalties.

III.

COVENANT LOVE OF PERSONS IN DEUTERONOMY

Beside the love of God, the love of persons forms a corollary issue of life in the
Kingdom of God. Generally speaking, chapters 12-26 of Deuteronomy take up this topic.
One notes, however, that, despite the humanistic emphasis of Deuteronomy 12-26, care
for others is a subsidiary theme to loyalty to Yahweh. The first of the stipulations outlined
in these chapters has to do with the proper worship of Yahweh. This placement of the
topic forces one to recognize again the primacy of this issue for Deuteronomy and for the
faithfu l reader today.
Having noticed the continued emphasis on the proper regard for Yahweh, the reader
also notes the peculiar tone of Deuteronomy in its stipulations for daily life. Predictably,
the ethical demands of Deuteronomy 12-26 deviate from the politically oriented stipulations of the vassal treaties, w hich have much to do with the preservation of the dynasty22
Deuteronomy uncompromisingly demands the faithful to love all, including disenfranchised persons on the fringe of society, such as the poor, the outsiders and the w idows.
This ethical demand to love others entails doing the right thing for others. One notices
this particular humanistic tendency of Deuteronomy when comparing the social laws of
Deuteronomy with parallel injunctions in Exodus.23
For example, note the change in the law regarding the relationship between an
Israelite and a stranger. Exodus 22:20 (Eng. 22:21) reads, "You shall not wrong or
oppress (l6' - toneh wel6' til!:ta?ennUl a resident alien, for you were aliens in the land of
Egypt." Similarly, Exodus 23:9 records, "You shall not oppress (16'
a resident alien;
you know the heart of an alien, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt." Both of these
verses prohibit the Israelite from wronging or afflicting the stranger. The memory of the
affliction of former bondage serves as the motivation.
In contrast to these two laws prohibiting wrongful action, Deuteronomy 10: 19 exhorts
the Israelite to a more difficult response toward the stranger. Once again, the experience
of slavery is to motivate the action of the Israelite. The verse reads, "You shall also love
(wa'ahabtem) the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt."
This shift from preventing male volence to prescribing beneficence displays the
inchoate humanism of Deuteronomy. The loya l subject of Yahweh will exceed the
requirement not to harm another and, reflecting the character of the suzerain described in
Deuteronomy 10: 17-18, love the resident alien by actively seeking the alien's welfare in
matters such as provision, inclusion and justice. 24
A particularly clear case revealing the distinctive flavor of Deuteronomy is the law concerning the release of slaves. These laws deal with those who have been subjected to
servitude due to economic misfortune beyond the help a loan could provide. 25 The material of Deuteronomy IS: 12- 18, when compared w ith the similar material in the
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Covenant Code (Exodus 21 :2- 11), reveals some of the distinctives of Deuteronomy.
Both passages begin with a statement of the setting. Both Exodus 2 1:2 and
Deuteronomy 15: 12 declare that a Hebrew slave must be freed in the seventh year.
Deuteronomy surpasses Exodus by including a female slave in this requirement for
release. 26 Essentially the initial point of the laws is the same: Hebrew slaves must be
released in their sabbatical year.
The humanitarian nature of Deuteronomy, in contrast to Exodus, is displayed in the
respective descriptions of the status of the individual about to be released. In Exodus
2 I :3-6, the freed slave reverts to his original state before he was enslaved. Specifically, if a
previously single male was given a wife while in servitude, he faces a difficult choice. He
may gain freedom, in which case he must leave his wife and any children behind, or he
may choose to stay with his family and in slavery for life. Deuteronomy I 5: I 6 does not
deal with the matter of the slave's marital status, but suggests that a slave may freely
choose to remain in the master's household out of a sense of love or loyalty.
The manner of manumission also declares the contrast between Exodus and
Deuteronomy. According to Exodus 2 I :2, the slave is released in the seventh year, without debt (hinnaml. Deuteronomy 15: 13- 14 expands this injunction by requiring that the
master not send out the freed slave empty-handed (reqam), but that the master would
provide liberally (ha<''lneq ta'anlq) from his bounty27 The master must adorn the slave
with hands full of the necessities for starting a new life, with provisions from flock, field
and vineyard. In this regard, the master recognizes the contribution made to his household by the slave during six years of service. 28
In addition to its appearance in the socio-moral laws, the humanistic vein of
Deuteronomy emerges in its cui tic ordinances. The law of cult centralization in
Deuteronomy 12 is punctuated with exhortations regarding the Levite, the slave, and the
maidservant (v 12, 18, 19)29 The legislation on the first fruit offering in Deuteronomy
26: I-II expands the requirement from Exodus 23: 19 in two ways. Deuteronomy 26: II I includes a historical liturgy or Credo (vv 5- 10) and appends a prescription to include
the Levites and aliens in sharing the feast of God's bounty (v II). The law of the tithe,
which follows the first fruit legislation in Deuteronomy 26: 12-15, specifies that the
Levites, aliens, orphans and widows should be the beneficiaries of the giving of the tithe.
Such concern for persons on the fringes of society is presented as a fitting link between
the proper worship of God and the everyday life of God's people.30
Regardless of the precise o'rigin of this incipient humanism, it is clear that
Deuteronomy reflects an advance over earlier legislation in the area of ethical development. Deuteronomy, despite some passages exhibiting a programmatic zeal, moves
beyond its predecessors in promoting an expansive ethic to complement its restrictive theology. Since all persons are under the one God, so all persons are to be the recipients of
covenant care. This kind of inclusive concern provides a model for the Loyal Opposition
in the Church.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have considered the contribution of Deuteronomy to an understanding of Christian ethics as Loyal Opposition. Since the writers of Deuteronomy adapted a
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political document, one which demanded an exclusive allegiance on the part of a vassal
to a king, to express a vision of loyal service to Yahweh, we suggested that Deuteronomy
is formative for the Loyal Opposition. The use of political terminology, such as Covenant,
Love and Opposition, suggests points of contact between the views of Deuteronomy and
those of modem believers.
Additionally, the authors of Deuteronomy modified the treaty format in decisive ways
to present the book as a mosaic of sermons that speak to both ancient and modem hearers. Major sections and smaller segments of the book contain calls for obedience to
Torah. This demand corresponds to the point of a good sermon, namely, to lead to a life
changing response on the part of the hearer.' Deuteronomy seeks to motivate the hearer
to remain loyal to Yahweh and to portray such a commitment within the community.
These are themes fitting for believers of any age.
We noted two themes of Deuteronomy, love for God and love for others, and suggested that these two ideas are the heart of Christian ethics. To be sure, the first matter,
loyalty to God, is the consuming passion of Deuteronomy. Faithful people are called to
affirm an unswerving loyalty to the God who has graciously entered into a covenant relationship with them.
The second matter, loyalty within the community, forms a secondary theme within
Deuteronomy. The Deuteronomic additions to previous laws, for instance, attest to an
emerging humanism. To be sure, the viewpoint of Deuteronomy leaves room for further
development. In this regard, the sermonic reapplication of texts reveals not only the views
of the writers of Deuteronomy, but also provides a model of what faithful communities
must do, reinterpret the message of God's grace for each new generation.
For the Loyal Opposition, one notes that a past authoritative word may not prove to
provide the final word for a later generation. Contemporary issues require the reappropriation of earlier ideas. The function of the Opposition may be to challenge the Church to
evaluate its theology and praxis in order to determine their appropriateness for current
issues. By means of its persuasive, not coercive, power, the Loyal Opposition calls the
Church to loyalty to God and commitment to persons.
I

NOTES

I.
It is a privilege to write this article to honor Bob Lyon. Since o ur first meeting at Asbury
Theological Seminary, Bob has challenged me to grow as a student and as a servant. I shall always
be grateful for the surprises of grace that have come as a result of following Bob's model of strong
commitment to God and to people.
2.
For instance, the phrase hayy6m occurs in Deuteronomy I: I 0, 39; 2: 18, 25; 4:4, 8, 26,
39,40;5:1,3;6:6;7:1 1;8:1, II , 19;9:1,3; 10:13; 11:2,8, 13,26,27,28,32; 12:8; 13:19; ISS,
15; 19:9; 20:3; 263, 17, 18; 27:1, 4, 10; 28:1,13,14,15; 29:9, II , 12, 14 2, 17; 30:2, 8, I 1, 15,
16, 18, 19; 31 :2, 2 I, 27; 32:46. Variations of this phrase, such as hayy6m hazzeh, 'ad hayy6m
hazzeh, and kayy6m hazzeh could also be noted. The term we(atta, occurring, for example, in 2: 13;
4: I; 5:25; 10: 12, 22; 12:9; 26: I 0; 31: 19; 32:39, complements the contemporary focus of the document by imagining the reader as hearing the words of Moses.
3.
Author's translation. Other biblical quotes, unless indicated, are from the NRSV.
4.
Patrick D. Miller Jr., Deuteronomy. Interpretation. A Bible Commentary for Teaching and
Preaching (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1990), p. 67.

The Deuteronomists as Loyal Opposition

15

5.
For extended discussions about these matters, see Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- II,
Anchor Bible, 5 (New York, NY: Doubleday, 199 J) and Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the
Deuteronomic School (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992).
6.
Besides calling people to a deep devotion to Yahweh, Deuteronomy may also indicate
some deeper levels of contrast with Israelite society in general. For instance, the development of
Israelite monotheism stands in stark contrast to the general polytheistic or monolatrous concepts
that held sway for a time in Israel. Israel's emerging monotheism challenged the prevailing religious
structures of its day and formed a new center from which to encourage ethical decision-making.
Ultimately, this viewpoint left its stamp on the Hebrew Bible in general and the Torah in particular
as the dominant perspective, but this precedence was gained over time.
7.
As a significant point of comparison, the order of the curses in VTE parallels the order of
the curses in Deuteronomy 28:23-35 . It is clear that the pattern in Deuteronomy is derivative, having been borrowed from a list such as the one in VTE, which organizes the curses, by the hierarchy
of the gods. See Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- II , p. 7.
8.
Ibid., p. 8.
9.
'The transition from Torah as a specific instruction to the sacred "book of the Torah" of
the josianic period marked a turning point in Israel's spiritual life. The ritual instructions, which had
been kept in priestly esoteric circles, were now written by scribes and wise men (cf. jer 8:8) and
became part of the national lore." Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- I I, p. 18.
10.
Religious leaders in sympathy with the views expressed by Deuteronomy guided young
King josiah in his reign. Since these advisors trained up josiah in the ways he should go, it should
not appear as a surprise that josiah would support their overwhelming reform movement when he
became an adult. From a conversation with Dr. j. Edward Wright.
II.
Regarding this issue, see Weinfeld's section entitled, "Deuteronomy As Turning Point in
Israelite Religion" (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- II, pp. 37-44).
12. Miller, Deuteronomy, p. 98.
13.
Miller points out the repetition of this theme in Deuteronomy 6: 12-15; 7:8-10; 16b, 19b;
8 :11,15,19; 9:1 ; 10:12- 13; 11:1 , 13, 16, 18-22, 28b; 13:2-5, 6, 10,13; 18:9; 26:16- 17; 29:26;
30:2b, 6, 8, 10, 16-17 (Miller, Deuteronomy, p. 98).
14. Miller, Deuteronomy, pp. 15-16.
I 5 . Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1- I I, p. 35 I .
16.
"As indicated above, love with all the heart means sole recognition of the beloved to the
exclusion of any rival. Indeed, "love" in the ancient Near East connotes loyalty. Thus, when the
suzerain demands loyalty from his vassal, he adjures him that he shall love (ra'cemu) the king as he
loves himself (VTE, lines 266-68)." Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1- 11, p. 351.
17.
Ibid., p. 351.
18. It does not appear necessary for our purpose here to determine whether the phrase
"these words" (haddebarim hii'elleh) refers to the preceding proclamation of Yahweh's uniqueness,
to the Ten Commandments, or to the general parenetic discourse of Deuteronomy.
19.
Deuteronomy 6: 16 warns against testing God as at Massah. This reference provides an
interesting contrast to the inducements of wealth, though the basic concern is the same. At Massah,
the Israelites tested Yahweh by wondering whether Yahweh could supply their needs. In Canaan,
the Israelites are warned against testing God when God has provided more than needed. In either
situation, want or excess, the main matter is obedience to the divine commands.
20.
Evidence, such as that from Kuntillet Ajrud, may indicate the identification of Yahweh
with a variety of sites and of Yahweh with Asherah. This would indicate non-centralized worship
and, perhaps, the worship of deities other than Yahweh in ancient Israel. For an inscriptional example, note brkt 'tkm Iyhwh fJmm wlfJrth (Zeev Meshel, KuntJ11et 'Ajrud. A Religious Centre From The Time
Of The judaean Monarchy On The Border Of Sinai. Cat. No. 175. The Israel Museum, jerusalem.
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Spertus Hall. Spring 1978. no pagel. For discussion and extensive bibliography regarding Yahweh
and other deities, see Mark S. Smith, The Early History of Cod. Yahweh and Other Deities in Ancient
Israel (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1990>.
21.
Dennis ). Wiseman, "The Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon.' Iraq 20 (1 958H 268; see also
Weinfeld, Deuteronomic School, p. 81.
22. We infeld quotes the vassal treaty of Esarhaddon concluded durin g Ass urbanipa J's
enthro nement ceremony. Much has to do with homage to the king, but the text incl udes instructive
clauses commanding the people actively to oppose all acts of rebell ion and assassination attempts
and to preserve the dynasty (ibid., p. 891.
23. In this regard, see, for example, Weinfeld, Deuteronomic School, p. 282. He also notes the
exa mple of the slave law in Deuteronomy 15:12-18 I I Exodus 21:2- 11 which we will review
below.
24.
The texts indicate that the care for the well being of the stranger should include such
items as material provision, inclusion in the community and insuring justice. Provision is mentioned
in the giving of meat not to be consumed by the covenant community (14 :2 1), the sharing of the
tithe every third year (14:29) and in the requirement to leave a portion of the harvest (2 4 : 19)' The
communi ty should include the disenfranchised in some of its festivals (16: I I, 14), The person on
the fringe of society should receive faimess in legal matters (24: I 71.
25.
For the laws of loans, see Deuteronomy 15: I- II.
26. Exodus 2 I I I I takes up the matter of a female slave. However, the Covenant Code legislation does not treat the woman in an equal way to the later Deuteronomic law. Exodus 2 1:7
states explicitly that the fema le slave is not to be released as the males are, but is treated like the
concubine of the master. In this case, one notices that Deuteronomy 15 : 17b contradicts Exodus
21:7 by explicitly including the female slave in the possibility of manumission.
27.
According to Deuteronomy 16: 16, the Israelite males must appea r before Yah weh at the
specified spot three times annually. They must, however, not appear empty-handed (reqa m), but
bring gifts according to the bounty God has provided. It seems that just as it would have been inappropriate for the faithful to make a pilgrimage without a gift, it is inappropriate to release a slave
witho ut some grant.
28.
See Deuteronomy 15 : 18.
29. Weinfeld, Deuteronomic School, p. 290.
30.
Weinfeld also notes that Deuteronomy displays a new concern for wome n in society. He
writes, "The book of Deuteronomy shows a particularly humanistic attitude towa rds women. We
have already noted the lack of distinction in its law between male a nd female slaves a nd its
approach to the law of the seduced maiden. There are also a number of laws pertaining to conjugal
life which have no counterpart in any other of the Pentateuchal books. They deal w ith such matters
as the inheritance rights of an unloved woman's son (21: 15- 17); the protection of a wife's honor
and reputation as articulated in the law of conjugal slander (22: 13- 19); consideratio n fo r a woman's
intimate feelings (24:5: 'he shall gladden his wife whom he has taken'); and the law of the female
captive (2 1: 10- 14). Though the laws themselves may be quite ancient, the fact that the author of
Deuteronomy chose to incorporate them in his code attests to his humanisti c orientation. ' see ibid.,
p. 291.
3 I . On the matter of Deuteronomy as "proper preaching:' see Miller, Deuteronomy, p. 12.

IN BUT NOT OF THE WORLD: THE
CONFLUENCE OF WISDOM AND TORAH
IN THE SOLOMON STORY (1 KINGS 1-11)

FRANK ANTHONY SPINA

1.

INTRODUCTION

I Kings I- I I portrays King Solomon in the most lavish of terms. ' Israel was awed
when their monarch adjudicated a seemingly insoluable dispute between two prostitutes (I Kgs 3: 16-28). The number of his official entourage far exceeded that of other
kings (I Kgs 4:1-19; 9:23; see also I Sam 14:47-51; 2 Sam 8:15-18; 20:23-26).2 In
his time, Israel's population was beyond counting (I Kgs 3:8), the country was content
and secure (4:20, 25), the realm extended from the Euphrates to Egypt (5: I, 4 [RSV
4:21 , 24]), and success in foreign policy was illustrated by the immense tribute
received (5: I [RSV 4:211; 10: I 0, 25) as well as by relationships with Hiram King of
Tyre and the Queen of Sheba (5:15-25 [RSV 5:1-111;9:10-14; 10:1 - 10). This king
built a palace and a temple (I Kings 6-8), had a fleet (9:26) and a harem of one thousand women (I I :3). Given all this, it is virtually predictable that Solomon's wisdom (I
Kgs 5:9- 14 [RSV 4:29-341; 10:1 - 10, 23-24; 11:41), wealth (3:13; 5:2-8 [RSV 4:22281; 9:26-28; 10: 14-22), and fame (10:24) would be judged to be incomparable.
While Solomon's incredible accomplishments and resultant reputation are not
presented solely as a function of his vaunted wisdom, it is arguably the most decisive
factor. God offered Solomon wealth and honor only after he requested wisdom (I
Kgs 3: I 0-1 3). Thus, it is no accident that just as Moses is conventionally associated
with Torah, and David with the Psalms, so Solomon is with wisdom. In addition to
the emphasis in I Kings I- II (see 2 Chr 1:7-13; 9: 1-9, 22-23), Solomon is also
associated with Proverbs, Qoheleth and the Song of Songs, which is sometimes
regarded as a wisdom genre (Prov I: I; Qoh 1: I; Cant I: I). Regardless of the variety of wisdom in view, the canonical tradition relates Solomon to it in one way or
another. 3 In I Kings I- I I it is hardly a stretch to say that virtually all of Solomon's
successes are connected directly or indirectly to his God-given wisdom.
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In turn, Solomon's wisdom makes him Israel's "worldliest" king. That is, I Kings I- II
portrays Solomon as the Israelite king most recognized and ad mired by the surrounding
nations and their leaders. As David is the ideal or messianic king (I Sam I: I 0; 16: 1-2
Sam 24 [the "ideal David" is in view in 2 Samuel 21-24]) and Josiah is the reformer king
par excellence (2 Kgs 22: 1-23 :30; see 23 :25), Solomon is Israel's wisest, wealthiest,
grandest and most famous king4 Not surprisingly, scholars have inferred from I Kings II I that Israel in the Solomonic era was unprecedentedly urbane and sophisticated. This
was nothing short of Israel's 'golden age' or" enlightenment."1 Even if one does not take
the account at face historical value, Israel under Solomon seems to have been at its acme
in terms of economic strength, political power, and international involvement. 6 Solomon's
wisdom carried Israel to the pinnacle of the world's social and political scene.
However, regardless of the king's impressive wisdom and the heights to which he was
able to bring Israel as a result of it, a prior question needs to be asked: How should
Solomon's wisdom be understood when I Kings I- I I is taken seriously as Scripture? In other
words, what are the theological implications of the way the Solo monic regnum has been
rendered? More specifically, what happens when this passage is regarded not primarily as a
source for reconstructing the history of Israel, but as a witness to Cod's involvement in the
life of Israel as the people of Cod?7ln my view, it makes a great deal of difference how one
approaches this material. Instead of taking a position outside" the text to make ostensive
objective judgments about this ruler's successes and failures, I want to attend to the way
Solomon is presented as one whose role is to be evaluated by criteria rooted in the canon's
witness to Cod's will for the king and the people for whom he was responsible 8
Some scholars whose goal is historical reconstruction contend that I Kings I- I I functioned to legitimate a king who had introduced a centralized, hierarchical political structure that was both fo reign and inimical to what the community had formerly experienced
and affirmed as quintessentially Israelite 9 Put more sharply, Israel's pre-monarchic social
structures reflected its genuine beliefs and values, while the monarchy was an aberration.
Even if there is a modicum of truth to this assessment-kingship is scarcely an unmixed
blessing in the biblical witness (see 1 Samuel S)- it still does not take seriously enough the
theological complexity and nuances of the canonical testimony.
For instance, under the rubric of this Festschrift, for many biblical scholars the "loyal
opposition' would most readily be identified with those stalwarts of truth and justice who
denounce the king, denigrate the royal establishment, with its oppressive, bloated, selfserving bureaucracy, and all the power, wealth and status that are derivative of such social
arrangements. The Solo monic kingship becomes then a symbol of any political, social, or
ecclesiastical establishment that has lost sight of its mission, operated out of cynical selfinterest and against the legitimate claims of common or disenfranchised folk, prostituted
social ideals for personal or corporate aggrandizement, and cavalierly used religion to justify itself at the expense of a prophetic, revolutionary, and egalitarian moral agenda.
But seen from a canonical perspective, any "loyal opposition' should be rooted in the
Bible's witness to the totality of Cod's involvements with the community of faith. The biblical testimony brings a corrective word to bear on all human causes and agendas, no matter how noble. Unless the whole witness is taken seriously, the biblical material will
inevitably be read ideologically, neutralizing and domesticating the Word of Cod. We
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who treasure the Old Testament as Holy Scripture are not obligated to find in the text
analogues to contemporary situations with which we can self-righteously identify or alternately which we can berate from an assumed superior moral vantage point. We must first
and foremost hear the text as Cod's word to Cod's people, trying under the Holy Spirit to
appropriate all the elements of a message which has been designed to provide a theologically and ethically decisive word in our present condition of being simultaneously disengaged from and hopelessly entangled in the world.
In this light, it is instructive to approach I Kings I- I I as a witness to how Solomon and
Israel were supposed to be in but not of the world. While we can only touch on the high
points of the theological implications of this rendering of the Solomon story in the brief
scope of this essay, it is to be hoped that the text's potential for further theological and
ethical reflection will be evident.

2.

1-2)
I Kings 1-2 recounts the last days of David leading up to Solomon's accession. The
palpable tension in the story is a function of two factors. From an internal perspective,
characters side with either Adonijah or Solomon as they maneuver to take the place of
their father, who has become literally and metaphorically impotent (I Kgs I: 1-6), From
an external perspective, the reader puzzles over which of the king's sons YHWH wanted
to be king. All we know about Solomon up to this point is that the Lord loved him and
on the occasion of his birth delivered a message concerning him via Nathan the prophet
(2 Sam 12:24-25), But Adonijah was David's oldest living son and presumably under normal circumstances the heir apparent (2 Sam 3:2-5; I Kgs 1:6; 2:22).
The problem is that there is no explicit confirmation that Solomon was YHWH s choice.
David's recalling that he had promised the throne to Solomon appears to have been
prompted by the manipulative strategy of Nathan and Bath-Sheba (J Kgs I: 11-37). The
episode is further complicated by YHWH's absence, which contrasts greatly to the intimate
divine role in the selections of Saul and David (I Sam 9: 15-17; 10: I; 16: 1-13). Curiously,
Adonijah was the first one who mentioned that his failure to retain the kingship was Cod's
doing (I Kgs 2: 15), but it is not certain that this is the narrator's viewpoint.
Perhaps the divine word to David in 2 Sam 7: 12-13 is key in that it states that the son
who follows David will in fact be the one whom YHWH has raised up. Such a promise is
not vitiated merely because Solomon's takeover involved conventional or dubious means.
YHWH's will could be brought about even by questionable practices. This would be akin
to YHWH's word to Rebekah that her younger son would be pre-eminent over the elder,
even though no instructions were forthcoming as to how this should come about (Cen
25:23), We discover later that it was a result of Jacob's and Rebekah's exploitation and
deception (Cen 25:29-34; 27: 1-40). Similarly, Cod's protection of Jacob's family and
future was made possible by the evil of brothers selling a brother into slavery and by the
courageous though highly suspect actions of a Canaanite woman named Tamar (Cen
37: \-36; 38; 45:5; 50:20). Likewise, Solomon fulfilled God's will by assuming the kingship in David's stead though neither he nor those who supported him necessarily knew
or were concerned to follow Cod's will, or used ethical means when they inadvertently
accomplished it.'o
SOLOMON'S "EARLY WISDOM" (1 KINGS
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Solomon is largely passive in the events leading up to his enthronement (I Kgs I: I 148l. Afterwards, his initial actions focus on his defeated rival Adonijah and men who had
been David's antagonists. The way this is recounted is important. Once he proscribes
Adonijah's movements (I Kgs I :49-53), Solomon receives deathbed instructions from his
father. David first invoked the Mosaic Torah (I Kgs 2:1 -4), making his words consonant
with those found throughout Deuteronomy and Former Prophets which are grounded in
God's promises to and requirements for Israel. Thus, Solomon is enjoined to keep Torah,
something for which the ideal David was known (2 Sam 22:21 -25; I Kgs 3: 14; 9:4;
11:4, 33-34, 38l. In David's echoing Torah, and therefore speaking as it were in the
name of YHWH or Moses, he stresses (along with the narrator?) that Solomon's kingship
also is to be governed by Torah (see Deut 17: 14-20l. The "unconditional" covenant with
David's dynastic house (2 Sam 7: I- I 7) is also subject to the Torah under which Israel was
to live (see Josh I :7-8l.
However, after emphasizing Torah, David does an abrupt turn-about when broaching
the matter of his enemies (I Kqs 2:5-9). The use of wisdom vocabulary in this context is
striking. When David urges Solomon to assassinate Joab, he counsels his son to "act according to your wisdom' (v6; wEi<;lsTta kehokmatekal . As for Shimei, David reminds Solomon
)attah
that 'you are a wise man and will know what to do to him' (v 9; ki lis
weyada(ta let \3ser ta\'iseh-16). Yet, in spite of this appeal to wisdom, David specifies each
course of action. Evidently, Solomon was to use his wisdom to decide the best way to
carry out the instructions rather than to decide whether to carry them out. Analogous uses
of wisdom are found elsewhere (2 Sam 14: 1-21; 16:20-17:23; 20: 14-22).
David's appeal to wisdom in this setting contrasts sharply with the role of wisdom in 2
Samuel 21 -24. Sheppard calls attention to the fact that this section separates the previous
account, which focuses on the succession to David's throne, from its continuation in I
Kings 1-2. Instead of succession, this material centers on David, describing the ideal attributes of Israel's ruler in terms of righteousness and the fear of God, which is a wisdom
motif (see Prov 1:7; 16: 12; 29:4, 14). The use of wisdom language in 2 Samuel 22 and
23: 1-7 enables these texts to exercise a hermeneutical function in interpreting the previous material. Wisdom provides a theological evaluation of Israel's religious and moral reality, it is not merely an anthropological phenomenon. The ideals of wisdom and the ideals
of life under Torah are combined. I I Wisdom and Torah belong together (see Deut 4: 1-8,
especially v 6).
In light of the combination of wisdom and Torah in 2 Samuel 21 -24, David's apparent
appeal to w isdom independently of Torah in I Kgs 2:5-9 is put into bold relief. The point is
not that David's enemies should not have been punished. It is rather that there is no
effort made to mete out that punishment according to Torah, let alone any attempt to
consult the Lord directly or through prophetic or priestly mediators (compare Joshua 7l.
Regardless of David's previous admonition about the importance of Torah for Solomon,
wisdom that is unqualified by Torah has become decisive when dealing w ith adversaries.
That this use of wisdom is sandwiched between 2 Samuel 21 -24, where wisdom and
Torah are inextricably related, and I Kgs 3 :3-9, where wisdom is a gift of God and likewise connected with Torah (as we shall see), should caution us from disguising the role of
"Torah-less" wisdom here with translations like "'clever'" or ·'crafty".1 2 Nor should we too
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hastily conclude that the wisdom being referred to by David is neutral just because he first
called attention to Torah. Is it only a coincidence that Solomon's use of wisdom as
encouraged by his father led to death and possibly a liturgical violation (murder at the
altar), whereas the king's use of divinely given wisdom led to life and appropriate ritual
acts (I Kgs 2:28, 34, 46; 3: 15, 27)?13 This material has been shaped to show that Torah
and Wisdom are to be combined; serious problems arise when that is not the case.

3.

DIVINELY GIVEN WISDOM

(I

KINGS

3)

Scholars have tended to divide I Kings 3 into three components: (I) editorial remarks
in vv 1-2; (2) material related on form critical grounds to certain ancient Near Eastern
royal texts, or perhaps a dream form which has been reworked (w 3- 15); (3) a folklore
element featuring a dispute between prostitutes (w 16-28) .1 4 However these genetic
issues are resolved, I want to attend to the present canonical shaping to ascertain how to
evaluate this phase of Solomon's kingship. To that end, the role of chap. 3 in I Kings II I will also have to be considered.
In light of the introductory statements, it is difficult not to be somewhat ambivalent
from the outset about Solomon's kingship. There is a negative cast in the note that
Solomon entered into a marriage alliance with the Pharaoh and brought the latter's
daughter into the royal city (I Kgs 3: I). Israelites were expressly forbidden to marry foreign women because of the prospect of idolatry. In two key texts where Moses and
Joshua respectively warn Israel about the temptation to idolatry (Deut 7:3; Josh 23: 12),
Further, if the king was
the very same term as that found here is present:
not to return to Egypt to acquire horses-as stipulated by the "law of the king' (Deut
17: I 6)-doing so to acquire a foreign wife was surely a more serious offense.
Unfortunately, this first marriage of Solomon after his kingship was ., established" (I Kgs
2 :46) adumbrates his later numerous marriages which are given as the main reason for
his precipitous collapse (I Kgs I I : 1-8lIt is less clear how one is to assess the information about the cultic activities (I Kgs 3:23), which were being carried out at "high places." These may refer to pagan worship centers.15 Perhaps the fact that the temple had not yet been built meant that such practices
were at least temporarily licit. Still, it should not escape our notice that the statement,
"Now Solomon loved YHWH, walking in the statutes of David his father," is bracketed by
two qualifying sentences beginning with "only' (raq). First we are told that the people
were sacrificing (zbh) at the high places, then that Solomon sacrificed and burned incense
(qtr) there. When we discover later that Solomon's many wives were sacrificing (zbq) and
burning incense
as well, the repetition of vocabulary recalls this text (1 Kgs I I :8). Of
course, Solomon's harem was being patently pagan. Was Solomon early on also acting
Implicitly as a pagan?
It is as though the main ingredients of Solomon's kingship, the good and the bad, are
already present in I Kgs 3: 1_3. 16 Solomon loved YHWH and followed the divine commandments. But that did not prevent his ill-advised marriage and the possibly illicit cultic
practices in which he and his people were engaged. Two Solomons, as it were, are put
forward in the introduction to I Kings 3. The question is: Which one will finally triumph?
The initial answer to that query is encouraging. Solomon went to Cibeon, the "great
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high place, to offer a thousand burnt offerings, on which occasion YHWH appeared to
him in a dream (I Kgs 3:4). When invited to ask what Cod should give him, the king's
response could not have been more praiseworthy. Having acknowledged YHWH's loyalty
to David, his father's exemplary obedience, and the divine role in his own succession (I
Kgs 3:6-7a), Solomon confessed his sense of inadequacy for the job he faced. He was
only a little child" (na'ar
who did not know how to "go out or come in," that is,
he was young and inexperienced (v 7). His task was formidable since Israel was too great
to be numbered (v 8). What the king wanted, therefore, was a "listening heart/mind" Oeb
somea') and the ability to discern good from evil (v 9).' 7 Cod's granting this would enable
him to administer justice (Iispotl. YHWH gave Solomon the opportunity to ask for anything imaginable and he opted for "wisdom." That was indeed laudable.
Cod was pleased. Since Solomon did not ask for long life, riches, or the life of his enemies, but instead requested discernment for hearing justice (habfn lismoa'
Cod
gave the king a "wise and discerning heart/mind" Oeb Dakam wenabon [vv. I 1- 12]).
What Cod granted Solomon would be unsurpassed (v 12e). In addition, Cod would
include riches and honor precisely because the king had not sought these things (v 13l.
Most importantly, Cod had provided Solomon with the gift most needed to rule "this
weighty people" (v 9) justly, prudently, and wisely.
That Solomon had w ithout question been endowed with wisdom from Cod was
amply demonstrated in his arbitration of the dispute brought before him by two prostitutes (vv 16-27). 18 With remarkable insight into maternal instincts, the king intuited that
the woman who was unwilling to see the living child cut in two had to be the true mother (vv 26-27).19 Predictably, Israel was overwhelmed when it saw that "the wisdom of
Cod was in him to execute justice' (kf -hokmat 'el6hfm beqirbo la 'asot
[v 28]).
With such a w ise king on the throne, Israel's prospects were exceedingly enviable.
But there is more to Solomon's wisdom than the fact that Cod gave it and the king
applied it. What is the connection between Solomon's divinely proffered wisdom and the
way I Kings 3 begins? We need to remember the introductory information about the foreign marriage, the sacrifices and incense at high places, as well as the king's loving YHWH
and walking in the statutes of David (vv 1-3). We also must keep in mind that Solomon
arrived at C ibeon-the "great high place"-to make a thousand offerings (v 4l.
Two references in the context of Solomon's receipt of wisdom are crucial in this connection. One occurs during the dream, when Cod makes the lengthening of Solomon's
days depend on the king's walking in "my ways, keeping my statutes and commandments
as David your father did" (v 14). "Walking" (hlk), "statutes"
and the example of
David recall I Kgs 3:3 . In other words, Torah and David's exemplary keeping of Torah
precede the story wherein Solomon receives divine wisdom. Wisdom cannot be thought
of in this instance apart from To rah, and vice versa. Both wisdom and Torah derive from
Cod. Both are to be used by the king as he rules over Israel. 2o Indeed, using wisdom without Torah has already been illustrated in 1 Kings 2, w here destruction is the outcome.
The second reference occurs after Solomon awakes, Before the dream the king offered
a thousand sacrifices at Cibeon (v 4l. This was consistent with the practices of the people
and Solomon already mentioned (vv 2-3 ). But after receiving wisdom from Cod, Solomon
returned to Jerusalem, stood before the ark of the covenant, offered up burnt offerings and

Reflections on Solomonic Wisdom

23

peace offerings, and celebrated a meal with all his servants (v 15).21 This is most interesting
in view of our having been informed that the people's previous cultic activities were a function of the temple's not yet having been built (v 2). Is Solomon now offering sacrifices in
Jerusalem proleptically? Does the narration at this point signal that the combination of
Torah and divinely given wisdom eventuates in appropriate cultic practices? Does the meal
with his servants serve to ratify and confirm what has just happened? However such questions are answered, it seems clear that I Kings 3 depicts Solomon as a king whose behavior is equally informed by the concerns of Torah and wisdom.
According to the present canonical form, Torah cannot be thought of as "special revelation' and wisdom as "general revelation."2z In I Kings 3, Torah and wisdom are tandem
resources provided the king by God. As further evidence of this, Kenik has shown how
much terminology in the dream sequence evokes traditional language and ideas about
Israel's model kingn This peri cope about God's bestowal of wisdom on Solomon is
replete with the language and concepts of Torah.
The close association between wisdom and Torah is also confirmed by the way I
Kings 9, a second divine appearance account, is explicitly tied to I Kings 3. After the king
finished all his building projects, "YHWH appeared to Solomon a second time, as he had
appeared to him at Cibeon" (v 2: wayyercP YHWH >el-selamah senft ka>aser nir>ah >elaw
begib'6n). In this appearance, God responded to Solomon's temple dedicatory prayer
(8: 12-61) by emphasizing Torah and the necessity of the king's adhering to it (9:4-9).24 If
Torah is violated, Solomon's kingship will indubitably end in disaster 25 Wisdom without
Torah cannot guarantee Solomon's success.
In the end, Solomon's kingship has to be judged according to the way that he incorporates the contents of two divine appearances, one in which wisdom is given in the "ambience of Mosaic law' (see note 23) and the other in which Torah remains the crucial element in Solomon's carrying out the mandate he has been given. Properly understood, the
wisdom which God gives was designed to help Solomon orient his kingship toward
Torah, not rely on some administrative competence that is allegedly neutral with respect
to God's will as expressed in Torah.
4.

Kcs 5:9-14 [RSV 4:29-34])
As impressive as Solomon's adjudication of the dispute between the prostitutes was,
the king's wisdom went far beyond the courtroom, not only in application but in reputation. The sapiential gift which God gave to Solomon consisted of "wisdom' (hokah),
"extraordinary discernment" (tebunah harbeh mead) and a "broad mind" (ral:lab leb),
either the latter quality or all three qualities were "like the sand on the seashore" (5:9
[RSY 4:2911- the amount of wisdom was equal to the number of Israelites over whom it
was to be exercised (3:9; 4:20)' The result was that the monarch's wisdom was greater
than that of any other sage, no matter how famous. He was wiser than the eastern and
Egyptian wisemen 26 Even worthies whose possession of wisdom was a matter of general
knowledge (Ethan the Ezrahite; Heman, Calcol, Darda, the sons of MahoD could not
match Solomon; thus, his fame was widespread in the surrounding nations (5: 10-11 [R5V
4:30-31]). This wisest of sages was responsible for three thousand proverbs (mesalim)
and one thousand and five songs (slnm); he was able to expatiate on any variety of tree,
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beasts, birds, reptiles or fish (5: 12-13 [RSV 4:32-33]). Naturally, such sagacity eventuated
in both royalty and ordinary folk seeking out Solomon to observe this amazing display of
wisdom for themselves (5: 14 [RSV 4:34]).
How should this summary of Solomon's magnificent sapiential prowess be understood
in the overall presentation 7 At first glance, it seems without question to be an unqualified
positive valuation. But a closer look reveals otherwise. To be sure, it continues to be
stressed that Solomon's wisdom derived from God (5:9, 26 [RSV 4:29; 5: 12]). But the
context has to be taken into account, for it shifts the emphasis. For one thing, the summary follows chap. 4 (RSV 4: 1-20), which, according to Stanley Walters, is an "office-note."27
There are four of these in Samuel and one in Kings (I Sam 7:15 -17; 14:47-51; 2 Sam
8: 15- 18; 20:23 -26; I Kgs 4: 1- 19). They are designed to differentiate the period of the
judges and the post-Solomonic kings from the time of Israe l's first three kings (Saul, David,
Solomon) and the prophet who anointed the first two (Samuel). The various judges and
post-Solomonic kings are separated by a rise-and-fall pattern, which is to be contrasted
with the divisions that obtain in the Samuel, Saul, David, and Solomon stories. In addition,
the office-notes serve a hermeneutical function in which an editorial viewpoint is conveyed by signaling a new, theologically significant, beginning in the narrative.
If Walters's thesis is valid, we should be on the lookout for clues indicating a shift in
direction in Solomon's kingship after I Kgs 4: 1- 19. One may already be evident in 4:20,
which at first appears innocuous enough; indeed, it seems to be a straightforward positive
assertion. The population was as numerous as the sand by the sea-doubtless an allusion
to Cod's promise to the ancestors having been fulfilled. Also, the people ate, drank and
were happy. It seems impossible to improve on the situation. At the same time, there is a
potentially ominous note. Solomon's rule over "all Israel" (kol yisra'el [4: I]) is the first
datum revealed in the office-note. But this very first verse afterwards-and the last verse of
the chapter in the Masoretic versification-refers to a divided Israel: "Judah and Israel." That
is, in spite of the numbers, in spite of the celebration, there is already a hint of the schism
that is soon to be triggered by Solomon's policies (I Kings I 1- 12).
Furthermore, notwithstanding the impressive achievements of Solomon which are
rehearsed- the boundaries of the kingdom/B the tribute taken, the amount required for
one day at court, the vast holdings in horses and, of course, Solomon's incomparable wisdom (5: 1-14 [RSV 4:21 -34])- there appear to be cracks in the wall. There is another disquieting mention of "Judah and Israel," though it is once again found in the context of
peace and contentment (5:4-5 [RSV 4:24-25l. Also, even the impressive foreign policy
achievements as manifested in the arrangements made with Hiram of Tyre (5: 15-25
[RSV 5: 1-12]) seem to be qualified by the fact that after arrangements to acquire T yrian
materials and workers for the building of the temple, Solomon raised a levy of forced
labor out of all Israel (5:27 [RSV 5:13]). Ironically, this notation follows immediately a
verse that underscores Cod's gift of wisdom to Solomon (5:26 [RSV 5: 13]).
Perhaps we should not be surprised, since already in the office-note Adoniram's job as
head of the forced labor contingent indicates that this was hardly a temporary policy on
Solomon's part (4:6). Even if it is the case that the kind of labor to which Israelites were
subjected is to be distinguished from that to which non-Israelites were subjected (see
9: 15-22, especially v 22), that does not absolve Solomon entirely. Samuel had warned
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early on that Israel's king would introduce a range of oppressive exactments, including
making the people "his slaves" (I Sam 8: 11 - 18, especially v 17), Besides, had Solomon's
policy regarding Israelite laborers been as benign as some commentators maintain, it
would be hard to explain the later reaction of Rehoboam, the king's successor (I Kgs
12:4)29 For all his wisdom, not everything in Solomon's life portended a glorious future. 3D
5.

(1 Kcs 10: 1-13)
We already know from I Kgs 5: 14 (RSV 4:34) that Solomon's wisdom gave him an
international reputation, Thus, a state visit by the Queen of Sheba is merely illustrative of
one particular foreign response to the Israelite king's enviable fame. She came expressly to
test Solomon with hard questions, a test he passed with flying colors (10: 1-3),
Consequently, she is overwhelmed by the king's abilities and surroundings, and thus effusive in her praise of him (10:4-9), Once more Solomon's wisdom appears to be cast in a
shadowless light.
But that judgment may also be premature. Paying close attention to the Queen's
speech where she gushes over Solomon is instructive. Having affirmed that Solomon was
indeed greater than she had been told and that those who stood before him experiencing
the benefits of his wisdom were most fortunate, she avers that Cod's love for Israel led
Him to establish the king on the throne to "execute justice and righteousness" ([vv 7-9];
mispat
This was surely among the most important duties of an Israelite king
(see 2 Sam 8: 15), so in this instance the Queen of Sheba is echoing a decidedly Israelite
sentiment.)I However, while she claimed that executing justice and righteousness were
among the virtues that most caught her attention, the narrator's report about what
impressed her most placed the accent elsewhere: the house that he had built, the food of
his table, the seating of his officials, the attendance of his servants, their clothing, his cupbearers, and the burnt offerings which he made (vv 4-5). There has been a subtle shift
from the administration of justice (3 :28) to wealth, consumption, exotic goods, ritual and
entertainment Parker points out that none of these accumulations are said to have benefitted Israel in any way- Solomon's wisdom is edging closer to the service of his own selfaggrandizement. )2
The texts preceding the Queen of Sheba account indicate in other ways that neither
Solomon's reliance on wisdom nor his adherence to Torah were what they should have
been, For example, in the account that details the building of the temple (I Kings 6), the
construction is, as it were, "interrupted" by the insertion of a text in which YHWH pointedly reminds Solomon to walk in '" my statutes and obey my ordinances and keep all
my commandments and walk in them",," (v 12), The sudden appearance of YHWH disabuses one of the notion that the building of the temple in and of itself could be considered an act of complete obedience without remainder. Indeed, the Lord's willingness to
dwell among Israel was more a function of obedience than the erection of a sanctuary,
even though the deity had commanded that it be built (v 13),
As the narrative unfolds, we realize that the Lord's abrupt admonition in 6: 11 - 13 was
hardly superfluous, It is somewhat disconcerting that Solomon spent thirteen years on his
palace and only seven years on the temple (6:38; 7: I), If that fact is not damning, then
certainly the reminder that Solomon made a special dwelling for his Egyptian wife is
SOLOMON AND THE QUEEN OF SHEBA
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(7:8); this reference and that in 3: I do not let us forget for a moment that the king's foreign wife/ wives is/are going to be a problem.
It must even be asked whether Solomon's retaining of Hiram, a craftsman from T yre,
raises questions about the king's changing outlook and conduct, Hiram's father was a
T yrian, his mother an Israelite from Naphtali; his "wisdom, understanding, and skill" were
in metallurgy 0: 13- 14l. Hiram contributed a great deal to Solomon's building projects (vv
15-46)- no single person was said to have done more. Are Hiram's Tyrian connections a
negative? Should a semi-foreigner have been so involved in the building of YHWH's
House? Was his wisdom nothing more than technical skill and artistic aptitude?ll
Answering these questions would be all but impossible if we possessed only the text in
I Kings. But it is difficult to avoid thinking about a similar use of craftsmen when the
wilderness tabemacle was under construction (Exod 31: I- II ; 35:30-36:2; see also 36:338:23l. In the Exodus setting, YHWH named Bezalel and endowed him with the necessary gifts, including the "Spirit of Cod," for a specialized task having to do with the tabemacle (31: 1-5). Oholiab and others who were to assist Bezalel were also specifically selected
by the Lord (v 6). These craftsmen worked according to explicit divine instructions (v I Il.
After the beginning of the desert project had been interrupted by the golden calf incident (Exodus 32-3 4), Moses prepared the people once more by summoning them for an
offering (35: 1-29). Then the role of the divinely selected craftsmen was reintroduced
(35:30-36: I). It turns out that all the artisans involved in the project received their ability
and got their orders directly from the Lord (36: I). Cod's involvement in this could hardly
have been more intimate.
This contingent of divinely elected workers seems to stand in sharpest contrast to the
man that Solomon employed. While the Tyrian was possessed at one level of sufficient
skill- skill that was indeed rooted in wisdom- there were negative factors at work. He was
not fully an Israelite, he was not uniquely called by YHWH, he was not assisted by craftsmen similarly endowed, and he was not said to possess the "Spirit of Cod." In spite of the
fact that Solomon was building the temple at David's and YHWH's behest (2 Sam 7 : 1314; I Kgs 8 : 18-19), his use of Hiram appears to throw something of a shadow over the
project. l4 Hiram's involvement undercuts the supposition that Solomon's building project
was a full-orbed fulfillment of Cod's will.
These hints of something less than Solomon's complete obedience coupled with the
more materialistic emphasis surrounding the Queen of Sheba's visit perhaps call for
another appraisal of the king's great temple dedicatory prayer, something which on the
surface seems to be unassailable (8: 15-53). Throughout the prayer, Solomon entreats the
Lord to forgive or heal Israel for any number of transgressions and their concomitant punishments. But in one instance Solomon implores the Lord to reverse the effects of exile
(vv 46-53)1 This is an ultimate punishment for Israel. Should exile be even a remote consideration for a people whose king was leading according to the twin precepts of wisdom
and Torah? The point is not that in the event of exile YHWH would refuse to forgive and
restore Israel. Rather, the issue turns on the fact that there might be an exile in the first
place, since this was the punishment that Israel was to avoid at all costs. Exile could only
mean that Israel had committed sins of such gravity and with such persistence that an
unthinkable punishment had become a grim reality. Unfortunately, there has been a series
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of clues leading up to the Queen of Sheba's visit which make us realize that Solomon's
mentioning of exile in his prayer was more than hypothetical. We are doubtless supposed
to regard Solomon's prayer as sincere, but at the same time it is one of those instances
where the supplicant revealed more than he realized. Solomon was in effect simultaneously praying for the reversal of the effects of exile and prophesying that it would almost
certainly happen.
6.

CONCLUSION

Solomon's reign ended in unmitigated disaster-Israel was split into two and never unified again. This foolish king took many of his wives from the surrounding nations and
erected shrines to their gods and goddesses (II: 1-8). Such egregious behavior prompted
the Lord to denounce Solomon and raise up a series of adversaries against the kingdom
( II: I 1-13, 14-40).35 One of these, Jeroboam ben Nebat, became king of the northern
kingdom Israel after leading a revolt against Solomon's son Rehoboam, who was the first
king of Judah (I 1:26-40; 12: 1-20). Though Solomon's own death was peaceful (II :4 143), the death of the United Kingdom over which he had ruled and to whose end he had
contributed could hardly have been more tragic.
The issue brought to the forefront by this sad story is not which of several possible
social systems are to be preferred. To judge the monarchy deficient on the basis of modern political standards is a thorough anachronism. Likewise, attributing the biblical presentation of the monarchy to those who had a stake in suppressing democratic or egalitarian
institutions is no less an ideological reading than arguing for the legitimacy of the divine
right of kings on the basis of the text. Rather, this account is geared to raise issues having
to do with the importance of combining Torah and Wisdom, both given by God, in the
person of the king who was responsible for leading God's people. In I Kings I-I I, Torah
is not to be seen as a "religious" requirement and Wisdom as a "secular" one. They
together derive from God and are to be seen as instrumental for guiding those who are
elected to carry out God's mandate in Israel's life. Solomon's problem was not that he
was a king, but that he was a king who increasingly allowed to slip from his grasp the
combination of Torah and Wisdom without which even his best efforts would be
doomed to failure. The "wisest" thing Solomon could have done was adhere to Torah 36
The "loyal opposition" in I Kings I- I I ought not, then, to be construed as those who
considered themselves oppressed by Solomon and then later rebelled against that oppression. From a canonical point of view, we dare not lose sight of the fact that the rebellion
in the story was a function of YHWH's bringing judgment on Solomon's disobedience,
not some romantic notion of the noble aspirations of the downtrodden. Indeed, the one
who successfully led the revolt against Rehoboam- fully sanctioned by a prophet speaking
in God's name (II :29-39)-was himself admonished to pay close attention to Torah (v
39), Because he failed as miserably as Solomon at that task (J 2:25-33), his name became
synonymous with inducing Israel to sin (e.g., 15:34).
Rather, Solomon faced the task of presiding over an institution that in many significant
ways compared to similar "worldly" institutions of the surrounding nations. At times, Israel
wanted just such an institution (I Sam 8:5). Though problematic and potentially destructive from God's point of view (8 :7- 18), such an institution could be "sanctified" for Israel's
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purposes. In Solomon's case, this meant combining Torah and Wisdom in the execution
of his office. Torah and Wisdom would enable Solomon and Israel to be in but not of the
world. Their monarchical institutions paralleled those of the pagan world in a thousand
details. The difference-if a difference was to be maintained- would be the combination
of Torah and Wisdom. The more Solomon moved away from these divine gifts, the more
he became a king like all the other nations had. Apart from Torah and Wisdom, Solomon
became increasingly of the world over against which he had been selected- and Israel had
been elected-to be an alternative. With Torah and Wisdom, Solomon-and Israel- could
have walked that fine line between being in but not of the world. Without them, the
results were as disastrous as they were predictable. It soon became all but impossible to
distinguish between Israel and any other nation. Institutional structures per se were not
the issue. The will of God as expressed in Torah and Wisdom was.
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THE TEACHING OF JESUS:
THE ETHICS OF A RESTORATIVE AND
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I.

INTRODUCTION

No study of two sayings from the synoptic tradition can completely account
for the position that Jesus took on the Law, but for a number of reasons Mark
10:9 and 2:27 can provide the basis for a possible way forward. Although
occasionally disputed, both sayings have strong claims to authenticity.! Each
impinges on a different part of the Law. Both sayings contain a prescription, as
well as the justification for the demand made, thereby reducing the amount of
speculation necessary in reconstructing the logic of Jesus' demand 2 And
together they illustrate one of the central difficulties in accounting for Jesus'
attitude toward the Law.
Nonetheless, existing paradigms for explaining the approach taken to the Law
by Jesus have failed to account for these sayings and those like them in the synoptic tradition. For example, it has been argued that Jesus describes the real
meaning of the Sabbath in Mark 2:27. 3 But that cannot be said of Jesus' treatment of the so-called divorce provision in Mark 10:9. There Jesus appears to set
the Law aside, rather than define its real meaning.
Alternatively, one might argue, as does Marcus Borg, that Jesus' approach is
dictated by a hermeneutics of mercy4 However, in so doing Borg is forced to
argue that Jesus' comment on divorce was initiated by his contemporaries and, as
a result, he relies heavily upon the secondary features of the account.
Furthermore, he makes no attempt to explain how it is that Jesus' view of the
divorce question can be understood in terms of a concern for mercy.
Yet another alternative has been to combine the two models and to argue
that Jesus at times "abrogates" the Law and, at other times, insists upon observing
its "true meaning."s But this, like the argument that Jesus exercises his sovereignty
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over the Law, only begs the larger questions: Was jesus inconsistent in his approach to
the Law," or is the consistency he practices foreign to our own, cu lturally conditioned
notions of what constitutes consistency?, If he was inconsistent by our standards and
his, can patterns be isolated which account for at least parts of his approach? If not, on
what basis did jesus take first one approach to the Law and then another?
Together, then, these passages illustrate the difficulties in using some of the existing
paradigms for understanding the problem of jesus' attitude toward the Law. For the
same reasons, however, they also provide possible windows to the unifying "logic"
behind part of his demands.

II.

TORAH:

A

PARADIGM OF ITS USE

Accordingly we will offer an alternative paradigm; suggest other points of contact
with the synoptic tradition; and assess the significance of the paradigm, using the
insights of comparative religious ethics. Then we will consider where the approach
taken by jesus might be located in a schema for charting jewish approaches to the
Law. In closing we will identify two important implications of the results described
here.
A The Law, Emptied of Continued Relevance
As described in Mark 10:9, jesus must have been aware of the fact that his
demand impinges upon the provision for divorce in Deut 24: I. Nonetheless, he
makes no direct reference to it. He does not refer to it in order to endorse its continuing validity or to assess its meaning and appropriate application. Nor does he directly
forbid his hearers to avail themselves of the provision. 8 Instead, the logion takes the
form of a single-stranded mashal with a nuance which is far more difficult to define. 9
As it appears in the Creek of Mark's gospel, the saying derives much of its prescriptive force from the use of me with the subjunctive mood verb, XffiptS£-tffi. There are
other features too that contribute to this impression: It is terse. The subjects and verbs
of both clauses are arranged in antithesis to one another: 0£o<; - Xffiptsbffi. And the relative clause is placed in an advanced position in
the sentence. In this way, the act of man ·'putting asunder is placed in sharp contrast
with the act of Cod "joining together."
There are few who would disagree about the interpretation of the second clause. It
is a simple, unconditional prohibition of divorce. ' 0 However, by referring to that which
Cod has "joined together," the first clause elicits assent to the notion that marriage is
divinely instituted and, by implication, calls for a pattern of behavior which accords
with that understanding.
In other words, the logion does not simply call for the hearer to refrain from invoking the provision for divorce. It calls for a pattern of response which takes seriously
the character of marriage as divinely instituted." As a result the provision for divorce
is not directly rescinded. Instead, it is emptied of any continued relevance .'2

B. The Law, A Summons to Free Fulfillment
Significant features of the demand in Mark 2:27 closely approximate basic features of
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the logion in Mark 10:9. As in Mark 10:9, Jesus must have been aware that his own
demand impinged upon the demand made by Torah. In spite of this he does not
appeal for an approach to Sabbath observance on the basis of the Law itself. Nor does
he explicitly summon those who hear him to abandon observing the Law. Instead, he
simply advances his own demand. As in Mark 10:9, the demand also begins with a
reference to the creative intent of God and, again, takes the form of an antithesis.
In Mark 2:27, however, the contrast is sharper and has a different significance. This
is due in part to the fact that, unlike Mark 10:9, both clauses are of equal grammatical
DUX 'tov u'v8po)1!oV i:Yfvf1:0 is juxtaposed with
value. The main clause to;
the nominal clause OUX 6 u'V8pCOTCOV DtU 'tov
The Sabbath is also the
subject of both clauses, and this strengthens the contrast. Whereas in Mark 10:9 marriage is the subject of the first clause and divorce the subject of the second.
These are differences of considerable significance. For while both divorce and
Sabbath observance are thereby set against the background of God's will as creator,
the effect is not the same. The provision for divorce, as we have seen, is emptied of
continued relevance. Framed as his demand is in Mark 2:27, Jesus summons his hearers
to a "free fulfillment" of the Sabbath. 13
Accordingly, Jesus provides no clue to the specific nature of the response expected.
Instead, he confines himself to characterizing the Sabbath as God's gift to Israel and,
only as the Sabbath is observed as gift, is the end for which it was intended realized.
As Robert Tannehill notes:
The lack of concern with qualifications and with the practical problem of establishing rules of behavior is quite apparent as soon as one considers the implications of such a saying within the context of Jewish piety. The saying does not
spell out a rule which will directly solve questions of how to behave on the sabbath. Starting from this aphorism various practical conclusions could be reached,
from an almost total disregard of the sabbath law because of human need to
observance of the sabbath law except in unusual cases, since the sabbath is good
for man. The aphorism does not predetermine the conclusion but requires the
hearer to think about these things in a radical way. 14

C. Other Points of Contact in the Synoptic Tradition
Together, these two patterns provide a paradigm which can be applied to authentic
traditions elsewhere in the gospels. The first, second, and fourth of the so-called
antitheses found in Matt 5:21-48 provide an example. I \

1. The Antitheses
Here Jesus is described as juxtaposing his own demand with that of Torah. He
introduces his demands in language which is without substantive parallel; and he does
so without customary recourse to other parts of the Law. Yet, as Reinhart Hummel
observes, the antitheses "are less antithetical in content than in form. "16
The fourth antithesis might appear to set aside the Law, but the remaining antitheses do not clearly dispense with the Decalogue. Conversely, the first and second
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antitheses might suggest a heightening of the Law's demand. Yet the fourth antithesis
does not heighten the Law's demand, but appears instead to supplant it.
The relationship of Torah to the prescriptive content of Jesus' demand is then of
greater complexity than the words "radicalization; "abrogation; or "exposition" can
account for. The patterns of prescription are, however, very much like those which we
have identified above in Mark I 0:9 and 2:27
On the one hand, antitheses one (on murder) and two (on adultery) can be compared with Mark 2:27. Both demands point to a wider range of attitudes and actions
than that required by the commandments by juxtaposing an additional demand with
Torah. So the prohibition of murder is juxtaposed with the further warning:

nus 6 0PYLS0J.l£VOs 1:0 aO£A,cp0 aino'll
£voxo" £<J1:aL 1:11 KP'L<J£L
And the prohibition of adultery is juxtaposed with the words :

n&; 6 pAfnf.OV Yl.lvalxa npos 1:0 fTCt81.lJ.l1l<JaL

li011 fJ.l0LX£l.l<J£V atmlv
Neither antithesis begins to spell out all of the possible actions or attitudes which are
prohibited. To the contrary, it is impossible to specify the claims which they make. In
this way the auditor is summoned to its free fulfillment.
On the other hand, the fourth antithesis compares favorably with Mark 10:9. Jesus
juxtaposes the demand for trustworthy oaths with his own prohibition of oath-taking.
The demand for trustworthy oaths is, as a result, no longer relevant: E<J1:f.O OE 6

A6yos UJ.lWV vat val ou ou.
2. Mark 7:15
One or the other part of our paradigm may also apply to still other synoptic traditions. For example, in its present setting and form, Mark 7: 15 cannot be authentic. '7
However, it may have originally had a different form, or it may have been uttered
under circumstances which would put the logion in a very different light. We re it possible to recover the form or reconstruct the setting, we believe that the demand would
compare well with at least part of the paradigm described above.
So, for example, Charles Carlston argues that the earliest and authentic form of the
saying may have been: what truly defiles a man comes from within, not from withOUt."' 8 If he is right, then the Law is not set aside; instead, its free fulfillment is
demanded. And the logion, like other parts of the synoptic tradition, conforms to a
part of the paradigm which we have identified.
Be that as it may, by examining those prescriptive traditions with strong claims to
authenticity, we have identified two patterns which help to define the relationship of
Torah to the prescriptive content of Jesus' ethic. In the space remaining, it needs to be
asked, What ties these two parts of the paradigm together? Why does Jesus take one
position on the Torah in Mark 10:9 and another in Mark 2:27, at times emptying the
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law of continued relevance and at other times summoning his followers to a free fulfillment of God's will? Is he inconsistent, or is the consistency he practices foreign to
our own, culturally conditioned notions of what constitutes consistency?
III.

PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION IN THE ETHICS OF JESUS

The answer could be provided by arguing, as so many have, on the basis of coherence. But this approach has bedeviled studies of the historical Jesus. Of necessity, arguments from coherence begin with a given picture of the whole and then argue that
one part or another of the tradition coheres with the larger picture that the writer has
in mind. This approach has its advantages. However, such arguments often disregard
the potentially diverse character of Jesus' thought and the variety of influences which
may have shaped his thinking. Furthermore, such an approach is ultimately no more
convincing than the extent to which one is prepared to accept a given scholar's larger
assumptions.
This tendency can be seen, for example, in the case which some have recently made
for a Jesus who is a "teacher of subversive wisdom. Insisting that eschatology cannot
account for the whole of Jesus' teaching, some have argued that the model ought to
be completely abandoned. '9 The work of more cautious scholars suggests, however,
that such absolute distinctions ought not to be made too quickly, or too firmly. 20
Accordingly, the methods of comparative religious ethics are used here, believing that
this model will allow us to analyze the use of ethical language without prejudging the
outcome. The use of such a model also has the advantage of allowing us to study the
use of ethical language from selected passages, without insisting on a picture of the
whole in advance. Interpretation of the evidence will, of course, always remain a matter of debate, but in theory the use of such a method requires greater accountability
to the evidence because it focuses upon the logic of individual demands.
Others may question the wisdom of using a method like the one described here,
particularly since the language of the method is patently foreign to the setting in
which Jesus lived. Yet, like the application of other social sciences to the biblical text,
the purpose of comparative religious ethics is not to reproduce the subject's thoughtworld or thought-forms. Indeed, by using a method of this kind, we acknowledge the
distance which exists between us and the object of study. Use of the method is also
based upon the realization that the questions to which we seek answers may not
have been the questions to which Jesus or his contemporaries may have addressed
themselves.
Nonetheless, such methods should not be allowed to force the original subject matter
to "'say' things that are alien to its original purpose. For this reason, students of comparative religious ethics require that the definitions they use conform with the subject's intuitive understanding of the term and be cross-culturally applicable. A thorough defense of such an approach cannot be undertaken here, but the authors of the
method have made every effort to conform to these criteria. It has been applied to
more than one culture, some of which are from the past. And more than one student
of religious ethics has confirmed the model's usefulness. 21
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A. The Logic of Religious Ethics

The concept from comparative religious ethics which is the most helpful here is
that of "practical justification.' In a given situation anyone making a demand must
describe how s/ he expects an action to be performed: "What is to be done, to whom,
in what way, under what circumstances."22 In addition, s/he may be called upon to
give reasons for the action (or behavior) s/ he demands.
The process of providing those reasons is called "practical justifica tion.' Although
often unexpressed, the reasons given may, in fact, lie on one of three levels, which
can be arranged in an appellate fashion: 21
3. Vindication

2. Validation

t
I. Principles / Rules

t
Situational Application
If, for example, the speaker was called upon to justify the prescription, "do not
strike your parents," s/he might begin with an appeal to a moral principle, such as
"Honor you r father and moth er." In so doing s/he would be appealing to level one.
Challenged, s/he may then argue that the person to whom s/he is speaking ought
to honor her/ his parents because it is a direct commandment of the community's god.
S/ he might also elaborate by arguing that, having accepted the premise that w hoever
has the power to create humankind has the right to be obeyed, the person to whom
s/he is speaking is, therefore, bound by that creator's command. These appeals belong
to level two, validation.
Only if these last reasons were challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable would the
speaker then be required to move to level three and to vindicate her/ his demand. The
speaker would then need to argue by some means that it is reasonable to obey the
creator or that there is a creator 2 4
In a religious ethic a number of statements may prove to be significant, but none is
more important on level two (i .e., validation) than the appeal made to divine authority. Logically prior to all other demands, even the harshest or most inviting of sanctions
are of logically secondary significance to such an appeal. Without having identified the
divine authority making the demand, any other justification given for a course of
actio n lacks m eaning. Without being convinced that a certain divinity can and will
exercise authority, the demands made lack force. 25
B. jesus and Practical justification
Where tradition provides us evidence that Jesus defended his demands in this way,
he is described as having appealed to the will of the Creator.
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1. In Mark 10:9
The prescription in Mark 10:9 relies for justification upon an explicit appeal: 0 ... 0
9£0C;
The reference to Cod immediately suggests that we are no longer
on the same level of the appellate ladder of practical justification as we were in discussing the appeal to moral principles. We are, instead, dealing with a higher order of
justification: an appeal to divine authority.
This particular appeal rests upon two basic premises. One is a prior and general
premise (here, that the intention or design of a creator is obligatory). The other is a
positive belief about Cod (here, that he is creator of the marital relationship). An
instance of what students of comparative religious ethics call "proprietary
entitlement,"26 the logic of the appeal combines these premises and, if given full
expression, would run as follows:
Premise I: The intention or design of a creator is right or obligatory.
Premise 2: Cod is the creator of not only men and women, but of the relationship established between them (i.e., marriage).
Premise 3: Cod intends that man and woman live in unbroken relationship to
one another.
Conclusion: Therefore, maintenance of that relationship is right or obligatory.
Appealing as Jesus does to the authority of Cod as Creator, certain understandings of
the logion are seen to be misleading. One such interpretation is that of the appeal as one
made to 'Scripture against Scripture,' or Schnft gegen Schrift, as some writers refer to it. 27 As
we have noted, in our judgment the references to Cen I :27 and 2:27 are both secondary.
And even if the references were authentic, Jesus does not appear to place any weight on
the argument that these texts (as opposed to Deut 24: I) provide an earlier, superior view
of marriage28 or a view which must be harmonized with that of Deut 24 : 129
Completely absent too is any indication that Jesus relied upon his own authority in
justifying his demand JO The only evidence that might be adduced for the suggestion
that he does is the bold character of the assertion itself. Nonetheless, it is upon Cod's
authority that the weight of the demand rests.

2. In Mark 2:27
A similar justification is given by Jesus for his demand in Mark 2:27. There is only
one difference. Rather than refer to Cod explicitly, Jesus uses a reverential circumlocuOta 'Cov 6: v9po:l1tov £YEV£'CO J1 Again, then, the logic of the
tion: 'Co
appeal is that of proprietary entitlement:
Premise I: The intention or design of a creator is right or obligatory.
Premise 2: Cod is the Creator of the Sabbath.32
Premise 3: Cod, in creating the Sabbath, intended that it be observed in such a
way that man's (i.e., Israel's)l3 weI/-being would be enhanced.
Conclusion: Therefore, that the Sabbath should be observed with a view to
man's well-being is right or obligatory.
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The logic of the appeal excludes alternative interpretations of the appeal from consideration for the same reasons adduced in connection with Mk 10:9. 34

C The Significance of Mark 2.-27 and' 0.·9
As brief as are the authorizing reasons offered here, their importance cannot be
underestimated.
1. For the Logic of Jesus' Ethic
Together, these two passages preserve a record of Jesus validating his demands,
using the highest order of appeal possible on that level. The only higher appeal that he
might have made would have been to vindicate (rather than validate) his demand. That
is, he might have attempted to defend belief in the divine authority back of his
demand. 3s This we have no record of him doing and, given the setting in which he
taught and lived, he may not have found it necessary.
In both prescriptions, then, we are in contact with that which is, logically speaking,
most basic to the justification which Jesus gave for obedience to his demands: the personal authority of God, who is also creator. It is a finding which is all the more important because it is drawn from sayings material in which both demand and the validation for the demand appear in single sayings. Separate traditions are not employed.
The connection does not need to be reconstructed.
To date, where scholars have argued that the Endzeit = Urzeit equation shaped the
content of Jesus' demand, they have been forced to rely upon an argument from
coherence J6 Here the connection is explicit and, using the insights of comparative religious ethics, we have been able to characterize the connection in more specific terms.
2. For the Place of Torah in Jesus' Ethic
The pattern of validation used by Jesus also explains why he does not begin in
making his demands with the word of Torah itself. For him Torah is not identical in
an absolute sense with the will of God. At times the two intersect, even though the
demands of God's will may be impossible to specify using the Law. At other times the
Law is emptied of continued relevance. In either case the issue is always the will of
the Creator, which is the ultimate justification for the demands Jesus makes. Such an
understanding of the place of divine authority in his demands and the resulting ambiguity in his attitude toward the Law should come as no surprise.

IV.

JESUS, JUDAISM AND THE LAW

Judaism before, during, and after the life of Jesus manifests considerable variety of
opinion on the place of the Law in the context of Jewish eschatological expectation.
The schema used here for describing that variety has been developed by Gershom
Scholem J7 Scholem's interest is primarily in the development of the Messianic idea as
reflected in rabbinic literature and, clearly, our interest lies elsewhere. Nonetheless, his
schema is of considerable heuristic value: (I) Describing such expectations in terms of
tendencies, Scholem recognizes eschatological beliefs ([ike many others) are often a
matter of emphasis. Accordingly, his approach avoids the pitfalls of attempting to
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assign particular approaches to one "party' or another. (2) Although his work is not of
immediate relevance, it does establish that these emphases exist elsewhere, and there
is no evidence to suggest that (at least in this case) there is any reason to make a special exception for the material discussed here. (3) Scholem's schema is also at home
with the notion that there was more than one Judaism in the ancient world.
Specifically, he describes conservative, restorative and utopian tendencies in Jewish
messianic thought. In what follows, we review those categories, focusing on the way
in which Torah figures in these three visions of the future. The discussion is, necessarily, illustrative in nature and is not meant to be exhaustive.

A. Conservative, Restorative and Utopian Tendencies in Jewish Eschatology
At times the literature can be conservative in its vision of the future. Seeking to preserve that which already is, it sees even the eschatological future in these terms and,
so, expects the Law and, in some instances, even the halakhah to be a part of that
future. 38 So, for example, T. B. Sanhedrin 51 b reads as follows:

R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha in the name of Rab: The
Halachah is in accordance with the message sent by Rabin in the name of R. Jose
b. Hanina. R. Joseph queried: (Do we need) to fix a halachah for the days of the
Messiah? - Abaye answered: If so, we should not study the laws of sacrifices, as
they are also only for the Messianic era. But we say, Study and receive reward. i.
e. Learning has its own merit quite apart from any practical utility that may be
derived therefrom 39

Current circumstances may preclude the offering of sacrifices, but the halakhah governing sacrifice will govern eschatological practice 40 It remains important even in the
present and even now it is worthy of study.
At other times the literature can be restorative in its outlook. Anticipating a return
to or recreation of a past, ideal condition, the literature draws upon golden eras of the
past, when obedience was a hallmark of man's relationship with Cod. It looks for a
day when the demand of Torah or the will of Cod was at once lighter and heavier,
because it is perfectly understood. 41
One portion of the Testament of Levi (apparently free at this point of later
Christian interpolation 42 ) envisions the future in just such terms:
And he [i. e., the eschatological priest] shall open the gates of paradise; he shall
remove the sword that has threatened since Adam, and he will grant to the
saints to eat of the tree of life. The spirit of holiness shall be upon them 43
At still other times the literature can be utopian in its outlook, anticipating a state of
affairs which never existed before. Abandoning models provided by either the past or
the future, it can be "a narchic" in character, foreseeing a day when recourse to the
familiar means of quantifying obedience will be unnecessary44
Although a problematic passage, susceptible of a variety of interpretations, Jer
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3 I :3 1-34 is clearly utopian in its outlook:
Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant
with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I
made with their fathers when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the
land of Egypt, my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband, says
the Lord. But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel
after those days, says the Lord : I will put my law within the m, and I will write it
upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no
longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know
the Lord," for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says
the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.
These three tendencies rarely, if ever, find pure expression in Jewish literature.
Combi nations are more frequently the rule, and no one group is always the predictable advocate of a particular vision of the future 4S For example, it is not at all clear
that Jeremiah (or the later editor of his prophecies) foresees a future entirely without
Torah in any external sense 46 His vision, therefore might be characterized as one
shaped by both utopian and conservative impulses. Nonetheless, the influence of differing visions of the future does exist.

B. Restorative and Utopian Tendencies in the Eschatology of Jesus
Against this background, Jesus need not be seen as a "conservative" in order to
locate him within Judaism; nor do we need to characterize his approach as a singular
exception to an otherwise uniformly "conservative' world. The apparent ambiguity of
his approach to the Law and the justification which he gives for obedience to his
demands suggest that his ethic had restorative inspiration and that he drew at length
for such inspiration upon the creative role of God. Endzeit may not have been Urzeit
for Jesus in that he draws at length upon the Ge nesi s account, but the will of the
Creator certainly appears to have been the will of the one who brings the end.
However, the tendencies in his thought do not appear to have been limited to the
restorative impulse. He foresees obedience of a kind for which the creation narratives
may provide inspiration, but they do not completely delimit his demands. As such, he
re-envisions the return of the Creator, embracing not only a restorative, but utopian
vision of things to come. It is, nonetheless, a Jewish vision of the future and of the
Law's place in it, shaped by hopes that had and would continue to shape those visions.
V.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Of course, just how far these categories dominated Jesus' thought and eve n his
approach to the Law remains to be seen. As was noted above, the results of this study
are necessarily provisional. We have dealt with only a few of the sayings which might
be discussed and with only prescriptive sayings.
Nonetheless, the passages have strong claims to authenticity and provide an opportunity to study not only the kind of demands which Jesus made, but the justifying rea-
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sons which he provided for those demands as well. Avoiding reconstruction across
sayings and prescinding from an appeal to larger assumptions about the nature of the
teaching of Jesus, this approach located at least one dimension of his approach to the
Law squarely within the Judaisms of his day.
The evidence described indicates that it is premature to argue that an eschatological
understanding of Jesus should be replaced by a sapiential one:? Such a position not
only fails to account for the kind of evidence described here, but overlooks the possibility that Jesus could have been influenced by both realms of thought. 48 Any long-lasting contribution to the discussion of what the whole of Jesus' teaching may have
looked like will need to avoid the simplistic and misleading "either/or" that has characterized much of the past debate.
The logic of the demands made by Jesus also presents a challenge to the ··either/or'·
approach which has characterized the discussion of parts of Jesus' teaching - specifically, the relationship between ethics and eschatology in his thought. The insights of
comparative religious ethics suggest that both divine authority and eschatological
understandings of God are too closely intertwined in the demands which Jesus made
to justify arguing that either "theo-Iogy' or oIeschato-logy" is more basic to the teaching
of Jesus. The former might be argued to be logically prior, but the latter proves to be a
part of the most basic appeals which Jesus makes when justifying his demands:o
As such the ethic of Jesus is at odds with conservative understandings of God's will
and breaks in upon attempts to capture the will of God in those terms. However, the
"loyal opposition'· Jesus practices is not opposition for opposition's sake. In the
Kingdom one confronts again and again the will of the God who was, who is and
who will be.
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INTRODUCTION

It is my great pleasure to offer this essay in tribute to Professor Robert W. Lyon,
my first teacher of New Testament exegesis and criticism at Asbury Theological
Seminary. Although he set rigorous academic standards, our honoree always
stressed the need for scholarly endeavor to serve the people of God within whose
faith and life the documents originated. Therefore, churchman that he is, it is fitting
that my subject should deal with some aspect of the Church's life and thought
which are to be found in the NT. But Bob is a certain kind of churchman, believing
that the people of God need to know how to hear and accommodate the loyal
(might we say "loving"?) opposition within it. At its best, a conversation among multiple and diverse voices on the grand theme(s) of Scripture can move us closer to
the ideal of the Church as semper reformanda. It is in this spirit that I offer this twopart thesis in commemoration of his retirement: (I) By approaching I Corinthians
and I Timothy via their dominating images of the Church as body and house(hold),
one is thereby able to integrate (and not merely treat in no particular order or configuration) their primary themes or motifs, respectively. (2) These two distinct
images (and the internally-integrated themes which they "control") are in "opposition" to each other in the sense that they resist the objectifying and absolutizing of
one over the other: i.e., they protest the confusing of these or any other image with
the single reality to which they join us.
On the way to developing these points further, a word needs to be said about
definitions and rationales which should be kept in mind throughout.
I. [ concur with those who see in I Corinthians and I Timothy two very different views of the Church and church life. Others might minimize the diversity. Since
both, after all, do appear in the same Canon, they cannot be that far apart.
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Obviously, enough of a similarity exists between them that permitted each to be included.
In response, one may point to significant diversity among other NT writers. There is the
multiple gospel corpus. The Synoptics differ among themselves according to the manner
by which each evangelist adopts, adapts, and arranges his traditions. And there are the
well-known contrasts between the Synoptics and John. Acts reports tensions in the early
Church between non-hellenistic and hellenistic Jewish Christians (6 : 1-6) and between
these and the Pauline Gentile mission (15: 1-5). The Apostle in Galatians vividly recounts
his "heart-to-heart" with Peter at Antioch (2 : 11 - 14). Furthermore, the Canon itself preserves the literary contributions of these disputants in the two epistolary corpora: Pauline
and "general" or "catholic."1
2. We have here at least a toleration, if not delight, in plurality and diversity. It is legitimated. The Bible itself tells us so. Consequently, whatever hermeneutical method is used
to interpret the NT, it shall have to avoid harmonization, reduction to a common denominator, and preferential treatment of one document over another, and one theme above
another. So it is, as Paul Minear observes, with images: "No writer makes any single image
serve in a passage of any length as the only or sufficient analogy for the community of
faith. There is, however, an equally significant corollary. If no figure dominates the stage,
all figures gain in import by sharing that stage.2 However, there are boundaries. Only this
much variety is sanctioned. If there is deviation, it is "standard deviation."l
3. But why approach this study via "images" rather than through examining themes or
Leitmotivs? The reason lies in part with my discontent w ith the way in which the latter
kind of investigation usually emerges as "singular" and "horizontal" in character. Images,
however, tend to organize several categories at first regarded as separate into a cluster or
gestalt. My thinking first started moving in this direction as I began reading bumperstickers
more carefully. There was a certain cohesiveness or integrity to the presence of these
signs anticipating the 1984 presidential election: "Reagan-Bush, "Free Trade, "Nuclear
Power," "Pro-Life," "Support the Right to Bear Arms." Likewise, the following constellation
of stickers had its own integrity: "Mondale-Ferraro," "Fair Trade,' "Solar Power," "ProChoice," "Support the Right to Arm Bears.
What is the 'glue' which binds these slogans together? My claim is that controlling
images (including verbal ones) help to envision or picture such a gestalt. This is clear
when we observe how much of a community's modus operandi is determined by the symbols and metaphors that organize its complex of persons and policies. 4 In the fairly recent
past, small colleges and universities occasionally employed family language to describe the
character of campus life. However, one may now find the president referred to as the
CEO of a "management team" in a corporation having to pay attention to the "bottom
line" and the products' which one "delivers" to various "markets" This view of education
as a business enterprise has profound and not-so-subtle effects on the concept of mission,
curriculum development, faculty hiring and promotion, and student recruitment. So far as
I Corinthians and I Timothy are concerned, I shall endeavor to show how the body language of the former and the house(hold) language of the latter account for and integrate
several categories: Christology, faith, Pneumatology, church organization, leadership, class,
women, and eschatology. In other words, I shall not be so much concerned with determining a singular meaning for "body' and "house(hold)" as I w ill with showing how they
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work to give coherent shape to these internal "themes."
4. Furthermore, I shall attempt to suggest how the diversity between these two images
and the subjects which they "control" may function in an equally authoritative way to
determine the "whole counsel of God." The Canon itself, when viewed with sufficient
comprehensiveness, can provide the clues. It conveys not only standard subject matter
but also standard means of making it "work." Four phenomena are crucial. (a) The Bible
legitimizes multiple visions and expressions of the same reality. For example, the
Abrahamic and Davidic Covenants appear in both unconditional and conditional forms
(Genesis 12 and 22, 2 Sam 7: 14-16 (See Psalm 89) and I Kings 9, respectively). The role
of human, ethical response in justification is conveyed variously in Galatians and James.
(b) Scripture contains both a conservative and libertarian attitude towards tradition, seen
most clearly in the gospel tradition . One is concerned to preserve and conserve. The
other is to adapt and apply. (c) With multiple visions and a dual attitude to tradition, the
authors themselves inform, confirm, and correct their readers, depending on the need. In
other words, having argued for or assumed a foundation of thought and experience, writers either provide weal or pronounce woe, either console or condemn. (Or, more often,
they do both, to one degree or another). (d) Documents possessing the qualities in (aHC)
seem to have been selected for their capacity to transcend the original Sitze im Leben so as
to "speak" to future generations in other times and places. Can we understand the role of
the two letters in this light? My suggestion is that one of the canonical functions of
Corinthians is to confirm the genius of all corinthian-like church situations and to criticize
excesses or shortcomings of those of the timothean kind-and vice versa. In other words,
readers in every age were intended to gaze into these full-length, I 80-degree mirrors,
reflecting the whole truth about themselves, "warts and aiL" It remains for us to see which
of the two images tends to govern and support a particular tradition in our own day and
how each will convey bane or offer blessing (or both)S
5. In the process, it will be apparent that certain kinds of historical questions are out of
place in such canonical (biblical theological) study.6 Whether or not Paul wrote I Timothy
is not a criterion for making a value judgment for or against the views of the letter. Is it
the historical authors of the NT who are authoritative, or is it the corpus of literature recognized as such by the Church? We do not have the option of preferring I Corinthians
above I Timothy (or vice versa). So, the focus of attention is on exegeting the final form
of the canonical text rather than on the historical reconstruction of each church's beliefs
based on information mined from the NT. Here we have a microcosm of the classical
debate on the nature of biblical theology.
6. Ultimately, interpreters will have to consider more self-consciously the nature and
role of image-symbol-metaphors in exegesis and hermeneutics. With apologies to Ogden
Nash, one has to ask, "What's a meta for?" As their etymology suggests, symbols act primarily as bridges, connectors «j'\)v+
= "throw together") which "carry [us]
across" (/.-Lf't<X + <pfPftV) from one understanding or experience to another (and back?).
They are not the reality about which they speak. Rather, they enable us to move from
our present conception or experience of it to another. Such a shift can be a disturbing
experience. Quoting Amos Wilder,' Paul Minear writes that the symbols touch, '''that
level of experience... where man is made and unmade, where the world is shaped and
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reshaped, w he re the bondage of necessity or social and psychological patterns is dissolved."'8 Of their particular usefulness, Minear writes, "In every generation the use and reuse of the Biblical images has been one path by which the church has tried to learn what
the church truly is, so that it could become what it is not. For evoking this kind of selfknowledge, images may be more effective than formal dogmatic assertions. This may well
be why the New Testament did not legislate any particular definition of the Church and
why C hristian theology has never agreed upon any such definition."9
7. Furthermore, we have to ask how much of the metaphor is essential and how
much of it is penumbral? It used to be (until the end of the nineteenth century) that each
detail of a parable was thought to correspond to a point whose message was equally
meaningful and authoritative. Then Adolf luelicher convinced several generations of
scholars that there was only one central point to be made and sought. iO Thus, in the
Parable of the Unjust Judge (Luke 18: 1-8), one is not to deduce that God is corrupt but
that, on analogy, he will hear the case (the "prayer") of the persistent petitioner. In recent
years, several scholars have rightly dared to challenge an overly-mechanical application of
Juelicher's fundamental insight. " Yet, the main point still stands. So it is with more complex analogies such as metaphors. We may have to distinguish the primary vision which
the core of the image promotes from penumbral, optical distortions which adhere. In
other words, the idea of household does not stand or fall with the presence or absence of
servitude from slaves. Nor does such an image of the Church require that women be
excluded from leadership roles. In this way, one can avoid the "battle of the proof-texts'
approach, whereby an opponent's scriptural backi ng / bashing can be countered by
another, equally as authoritative (and damaging).
8. Imagistic language is flexible in other ways. The same metaphor can have positive and
negative applications. For example, government can function under God (Romans 13) or
under the Devil and his henchpersons (Revelation 13). The Temple can realize its purpose
as a house of prayer for all the nations, or it may degenerate into a den of thieves (Mark
I I). Families may be either healthy or "dysfunctional" (a word whose usefulness (functionality) is nearing extinction). Because Jesus' own relatives regarded him mad and requiring isolation (Mark 3:2 1), he redefined his family along other lines: those who do the will of God
(vv 31-35). However, by this appeal to the flexibility of language, I am not suggesting that
exegesis of the specifics is no longer important for hermeneutics. Nor am I proposing that
the Prologue to 5t. John's Gospel should read, "In the beginning was the metaphor." Rather,
I am calling for an exegesis (and hermeneutic) of the reigning metaphors or images. What is
their role in the communicative and interpretive task? in doctrine?
So far as organization is concerned, I shall move in two stages: Part II will explore the
dominating image of the Church in each letter, demonstrating how each vision controls
or governs several categories. In Part III, I shall attempt to show how each NT paradigm
and its constituent parts might function as mirrors of contemporary church life, at least on
the American scene.

II.

IMAGES OF THE CHURCH

In I Corinthians, body imagery prevails, especially in chap. I 2 where Paul attempts to
prevent both uniformity and disunity resulting from a misunderstanding and misappropri-
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ation of spiritual gifts. This problem is but a variant, perhaps the most serious one (requiring three chapters of attention), of the difficulty announced as early as I : I O. So the
Apostle appeals for the charismata to bring about unity from diversity. However, my main
concem is not to repeat that common observation but to concentrate on the character of
the body language. Of the I 14 instances of swma in the NT, 46 occur in I Corinthians in
various senses. None ever appears in the Pastorals. The usages salient for my purpose are
these: "just as the body is one and has many parts ..., thus also Christ. For we all were also
baptized into one body by one Spirit... (vv 12- 13). Rather than join the debate over
every contested point here, I shall concentrate on the character of the image.12 This language suggests inter-relation with Christ (however defined) and with others so joined with
him, such that what affects a part, affects the whole (3: 17; 5:5, 6, 9-13; esp. 12:26). The
picture of the Church which emerges is that of a collective, intimate, organic, integrative,
dynamic entity.
In I Tim 3: 15, the Pastor regards the Church as "the house (hold) of God, the bulwark
and pillar of the truth ."ll No such sense occurs in I Corinthians. I. This determinative reference is reinforced in vv 4, 5, and 12, where leaders, unable to "rule" at home, will hardly be successful in this role in the Church. To appreciate the full impact of "house(hold),"
we must not think of a modem, single-family dwelling inhabited by two parents and one
and three quarter children (mistakenly called "traditional" by careless politicians and
churchpeoplel. Wayne Meeks observes that "the household was much broader than the
family in modern Western societies, including not only immediate relatives but also slaves,
freedmen, hired workers, and sometimes tenants and partners in trade or craft."15 All of
this needed to be organized and administered as a veritable institution requiring structure,
order, and efficiency. A premium would be put on preserving and protecting life and
property. "The strucuture of the oihos was hierarchical, and contemporary political and
moral thought regarded the structure of superior and inferior roles as basic to the wellbeing of the whole society."1 6
"Pillar and bulwark of the truth" extends the image in the direction of the cultus: the
"house of God," i.e. the Temple (or a pagan shrine). Here, too, the religious image suggests something more than a place where God and people meet: orders of priests, rotations of service, supply of sacrificial offerings, furniture, paraphenalia, and the oversight
required to make everything work. Stability and propriety, conserving of tradition, and the
passing on of sound teaching belong quite naturally to such an environment. More can be
said under this heading, but I shall reserve pressing the point further for the categories that
follow. It is enough to observe that we have before us the differences which exist
between an organism and an organization. l?

Christology
The prevailing image of the Church in Corinthians has its roots in a particular
Christology, which branches out in several directions. This appears most specifically at
15:20-22, especially in the "in Adam" - "in Christ" contrast, where each is viewed as a corporate or at least representative figure. The fundamental issue is that Paul uses the language
of organic, 'personal' connection between Christ and both individual Christians and their life
together as a body. Clowney points out that "The key to Paul's use of the metaphor 'body
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of Christ' lies in this representative principle as it is applied to the literal body of Christ.
He... refers to Christ's physical body when he says .. .'Whoever partakes of the sacrament
unworthily is 'guilty of the body and blood of the Lord' (I Cor I I :27l. Here the crucified
body is in view." IB Subsequently, the Apostle takes the imagery further: "For you [emphatic]
are [thel body of Christ and individually members [of itl" (v 27. See 10: 16-17). Earlier, he
had argued that the reason that Christians may not unite physically w ith prostitutes is that
their bodies (here, individually) are members of Christ (6: 15l. Sexual ethics are grounded,
not in an idea about Christ, but in one's union with Him, however that might actually occur.
Once again, there is a sense of intimate relationship and "organic" connection.
In I Timothy, the relation between Christ and believer is more formal and remote.
The creed or hymn of 3: I 6 emphasizes several revelatory moments of salvation historyall "public' and none of them directly touching the Church's experience of him. Earlier,
C hrist Jesus is portrayed (2:5-6) as the man who mediates between God and humankind.
He spans the gap. But mediation, while suggesting a certain kind of resultant proximity
(he mediates as a human for humans),19 does not necessarily mean intimacy.2o The soteriology of ransom for many suggests substitution or exchange rather than incorporation. In
chap. 6, the author lays a different Christological groundwork for ethics. The foundation is
not the current, mystical union with the risen Christ. Rather, Timothy is to fight the good
fight and run the race by looking back to the good confession which Jesus made before
Pontius Pilate (v 13) and by looking forward to the "appearance of our Lord Jesus Christ"
(v 14). Instead of proximity, there is remoteness. (Once again, I must remind the reader
that I am not making a value judgment here,)

(The) Faith and Truth
Likewise, the language of faith matches the ecclesial and Christological images just
reviewed. So, the accent in I Corinthians falls on faith's subjective dimension. In general,
Christian faith is not to be defined in terms of human wisdom but according to the Spirit
and power of God (2: 5l. That same Spirit grants a special exercise of faith (12:9l. But
faith capable of moving mountains means nothing without love (13 :2), which is superior
to all (v 13l. Yet, there are objective grounds for this subjective response. Empty is the
Corinthians' faith (and so is the apostolic preaching) if Jesus did not rise from the dead
(15: 14, 17). Of course, such an emphasis is not lacking in I Timothy (e.g., I: 5, 14, 19;
2:7, 15). However, dominating this letter is the articular "the" faith, a reference to a body
of doctrine, of teaching (3 :9; 4: I, 6; 5:8; 6: 10, 12, 211. In fact, the two expressions ('trIO'
1ttO''tHOO' Kat 'tljO' KaAljO' OtOaO'KaAtaO') appear together at 4:6 (See v I). The preservation and transmission of teaching (also specified in some cases as "sound" or "healthy")
dom inates the letter (1 :10; 4:1, 6,13; 5:17; 6:1, 3). Furthermore, the role of teaching
looms large here, too. Thus, besides calling himself a preacher and apostle, Paul early on
(2:7) claims to be a "teacher [OtOaO'KaAoO'l of the Gentiles in faith and truth" (or,'a
faithful and true teacher"?). Although women are not permitted this role (v II), teaching
(OtOaO'KEw) is incumbent upon the young Pastor (4: I I, 6:2) and a qualification for the
bishop who must be OtOaK'ttKoO' (3 :2).
Of course, these activities are to be found in I Corinthians; but they bear a different
nuance, a sense governed by the dominant vision . LuoaK'ttKoO' is not so much a qualifi-
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cation as it is a spiritual endowment (2: 13, twice). The Spirit grants to the body the
charism of teachers (12:28, third in the listl, though not all teach (the Greek grammar
requires a negative response to Paul's questions in v 29), In a more general sense, Paul
(and even nature itself) teaches (4: 17, II: 14, 14:6). And the Corinthians themselves may
introduce into Christian worship a psalm, a teaching, revelation, tongue, and interpretation (14 :26), Finally, in the pastoral letter, faith and teaching are grounded in the truth
(2:7, 4:3. See 2:4, 6:5). All of this corresponds naturally to an understanding of the
Church in 3: 15 as both the "house" of God and the ·'support and pillar of the truth.'· (Not
surprisingly, what follows in v I 6 bears the marks of a creed or confession about the
··mystery of godliness' or ·'piety".) The point is not that such formality is lacking entirely in
I Corinthians (See 5:8 and 13:6). Paul can be very conscious about the reception and
transmission of traditions (I 1:2, 23; I 5:3), However, the communication of revelation
both through him (as a bearer of a "word from the Lord" in chap. 7) and through the
Spirit is much more direct and ad hoc and in keeping with the body language of this letter.

The Spirit
Next to Christology, perhaps the closest link with the image of the Church as body is
with Paul's claims about the Spirit's role. It is He who enables one to confess jesus' lordship (12 :3), in whose body believers are discrete members (v 27), Each of the Spirit's individual and varied gifts is designed to function for the common good (v 7 and much of
chap. 14's argument about the relative value of the gifts of prophecy and tongues speaking). Throughout the discussion, there is constant oscillation between the diversity of the
charismata and the unity of the Spirit, who apportions them as he wills (vv 8-11. See vv
4-6 for the ·'proto-Trinitarian' origins (the same Spirit, Lord, and God) for the varieties of
gifts, service, and working). In the middle of Paul's development of the body imagery, the
link with Spirit is most clear at v 13: "by the one Spirit, we were all baptized into the one
body and were made to drink of the one Spirit."
In I Timothy, the differences in conception and operation are not simply numerical.
The nineteen instances in I Corinthians do quantitatively overshadow the two references
here. However, most notable is the distinct focus which complements the categories
examined thus far in this letter. The creed of 3: I 6 opens with the declaration that God
(ewcr) or "he" (ocr) was manifested (fq>avfpw8YJ) in (the) flesh. He was justified in or by
(the) Spirit (fOtKatw8YJ fV 1tVfU).Lan). This statement, reminiscent of another document
connected with Ephesus, seems to say that the Spirit argued that jesus was in the right,
was vindicated (See also john 16:8, I 0). Here, too, the connection between Christology
and Pneumatology is clear; but it proceeds along other lines. Furthermore, the teaching is
encoded or at least formalized in a poeticlhymnic pattern. It belongs to a confession of
commonly-held truth. The only other mention of the Spirit's role follows immediately and
reflects a similar motif (4: I): "And the Spirit says specifically (PYJ'twcr) that in subsequent
times some will desert from the faith [understood as a body of doctrine which the
Church as pillar of the truth is to preserve) and give their minds to misleading spirits and
demonic teachings." This is followed by a brief but condensed summary of their content
(vv 2-51. Then the Pastor exhorts his younger colleague how to combat their influence
(vv 6- 16). Thus, the Spirit functions as the revealer of truth about future (and perhaps

52

Lemcio

imminent) threats to the integrity of the Church, via onslaughts against its doctrines.
Again, the nature of the Spirit's role corresponds to the image of the Church as the pillar
of the truth. Pneumatology and ecclesiology walk hand in hand.

Leadership
It should come as no surprise, given the controlling images and the observations about
(the) faith, teaching, and Spirit, that concepts of leadership should follow suit. Cod-appointed (or placed, E8£'w) Spirit-gifted apostles, prophets, teachers, and governors should lead
the body of Christ (12 :28, 3 Il. But these appear to be leaders of the Church universal.
There do not seem to be "officers' of the community at Corinth per se. Chloe's circle
reports dissension to Paul (I : I 0-1 I); but it is not certain that they themselves are members
of the Corinthian church. 21 None of the principals (Apollos, Cephas, and Paul himself),
around whom "cults of personality' have grown are in town at the time (v 12). Who
orders the prayers and prophesying by men and women (I I : I- IS)? No one seems to preside over the chaotic eucharist (I I: 16-34l. Is anyone heading up the worship encouraged
in 14:26-34 7 Through whom does the church write its inquiries to the Apostle7 Whatever
leadership there is seems entirely ad hoc and remains completely in the background."
However, there does seem to be a steady stream of emissaries from Paul, including
Timothy (4: 17; 16: I 0, 12, 15- 18l. The body at Corinth does not have a head. An egalitarian spirit prevails, even though some kind of hierarchy cannot be ruled out.
It seems quite natural, then, that "the household of God, the bulwark and pillar of the
truth" (see above) should require specifically-qualified leaders rather than "gifted" persons.
Aspiration to fill the office of a bishop (mLCiK01CTjCi) is noble. Among other things (3 : 1-7),
one must be a good teacher (v 2) and manage (1CpOLCi'tTjVat) his own children and
household. Otherwise, he will not be able to care for (mL/-lEA,OUCi8at) God's Church (vv
4-5l. A similar set of standards is to be applied to deacons (vv 8- 13), who must likewise
be grounded in the truth (v 9) and able to manage their children and households as experience for an analogous role in the Church (vv 12- 13). This phenomenon is not so much
a matter of later development as it is a function of sociology and theology, as the community at Qumran should ever remind us. Timothy himself, urged to be a good minister
(bLaKovoCi) of Jesus Christ, must maintain certain standards of character and performance (4:6, I 1- 16), of which teaching has a prominent place (vv 6, I I, 13, 16). He has
been granted a gift (xapLCi/-la) through prophecy (words more prominent in I
Corinthians) when the council of elders
laid hands on him (v 15). Paul's
further instructions regarding Timothy's disposition towards other elders reinforces what
was said earlier about their role as teachers (5: 17l.

Class
Lacking qualified leaders at Corinth may in part, at least, be a function of class. Not many
in that body were wise as defmed by "fleshly' standards, not many were powerful or noblybom (EUYEVEtCi). In their case, God had chosen the foolish ('ta /-lropa), weak, low-bom, and
rejected elements of the world in order to confound their opposites (I :26-28)23 Did any
own slaves? Although householders may have done so, it is only a possibility24 That there
were slaves among Christians at Corinth is clear from 7:21 -22; but there is no way of telling
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here how many, if any, belonged to Christian households. More clear is 12: 13: in stressing
that the many have become one through the Spirit, Paul supplies "whether Jews or Greeks,
slaves or free." Fee notes, "As in 7: 17-24, these terms express the two basic distinctions that
separated people in that culture-race/ religion and social statuS."25 What is clear is that there
does not seem to be enough of a problem between Christian master and slave to call much
attention to the nature of their social and spiritual relationships.
How different is the situation in I Timothy. Determining the socio-economic conditions does not require detective-like assembling of circumstantial evidence. Women were
rich enough to afford elaborate gold-leaf hair pieces (2:9). Before becoming widowed,
some were financially able to provide relief to the afflicted (5: 10). The church at Ephesus
was economically sound enough to support widows, although their number had begun to
drain resources, such that "real" widows needed to be distinguished from those young
enough to remarry (5:3 -16), Masters were numerous enough to require advice for their
treatment of slaves. And both needed instruction about their attitudes towards one another (6: 1-2). Affluent members existed in sufficient numbers and influence to need exhortation twice regarding both the evils of money and its potential for good (6:7-10, 17- 19).

Eschatology & Relation to the World
Will membe rs of an organism relate differently to the world and its future than those
belonging to an organization? An answer can only be inferred. The slogan, ''you can't take it
with you," has its biblical roots at I Tim 6:7: "we brought nothing into the world and [it is
certain thatJ we cannot take anything out of the world." The point here is that the Pastor
does not appeal to the imminent end of all things as the rationale, It is the end of one's physical life, not the end of the age which should cause one to be free of wealth, This is in keeping with prayer for the general population and for political authorities (kings and all who are
in power) so that 'we may lead a quiet and peaceable life" (2:2), In other words, there is a
sense of legitimate accommodation in a world whose imminent end is not in sight. Indeed,
the author refers in 4: 1 to the Spirit's clear warning about apostasy in later times (UO"'tcPOLO"
[not cO"Xa'tOLO"] KatpOLO"). But not much more is made of this, either here or elsewhere in
the letter. How different the scene in Corinth, Apparently there are some (though not
many) in this body who are able to buy goods (ayopaI;;HY) and deal (xpao'\)0"8at) with the
world (7:3 1-32). Yet, they are to live free of acquisitions and connections in view of the present circumstance, variously described as the impending distress, the shortening of the
appointed time, and passing away of this world's form (vv 26, 29, 31),

Women (and Men)
Might it be that images of the Church at Corinth and Ephesus have an effect on the
status and role of women in these churches? Could an analogous, interlocking influence
be at work here, too? The Corinthian context is public worship and the exercise by both
sexes of prayer and prophecy (I I :5), which heads the list of spiritual gifts (14: I). Of all
the charismata, prophecy has the special value of building up the Church (vv 3-5, 12),
two chapters before being imaged as a body (See esp, 12:23-24, 27-31). What is often
overlooked in the intricate discussion about the need for women to be covered during
the prophetic act is that, although it signals inferiority, the covering is an egalitarian device.
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In other words, the · veil" confers authority
read the best texts at v I Q) upon
women to participate equally with men in speaking a word from Cod to the congregation. And, although Paul begins his argument with a hierarchical, and hence vertical,
"chain of command" model of authority (Cod-[head of!] C hrist-man-woman) and the
chronological priority of the male in creation (vv 3, 8), he switches to a more lateral and
organic one. "Nevertheless woman is not apart from man, nor is man apart from woman
in the Lord" (v I I). Furthermore, the procreative process reverses the original created
order: "For just as the woman came from the man, so also man comes through woman;
and all things come from Cod" (v 12}26
Of course, the Pastor in I Timothy 2 : 11 - 15 does not make room for such a reversal
in the order of creation which gives Adam priority over Eve. Nor does Paul in I
Corinthians link any subordinationist language with her being the first to transgress. It
appears to be a different world, a different mindset not to be explained away by recourse
to different authors or to an earlier (allegedly better> and later (allegedly worse) development (known by the grossly-simplistic category, "ea rly catholicism"). The canonical
approach rules out preferential treatment, whether the criterion for doing so is historical,
authorial, or doctrinal.
Instead, one must proceed along two contextual lines, o ne more narrow and the other
more broad. More narrowly speaking, it is necessary to be as precise as possible about
what Paul is or is not saying in the immediate context. One has only to examine the renderings among modern translations of <XU8EV'tEtv in v 12 no domineer"? "have authority"?} or of crcosEtv ("save"?, "kept safe"?, restore"?) and of EV 1:11 1:EKVOYOVt<x ("in (the
act of) childbearing"?, "in the birth of the Child"?} and various permutations of these to
see that the sense here is not as straightforward as it seems at first reading 27
So far as the broader issue is concerned, one must ever keep in mind that the author's
attitude towards women belongs to the controlling image of the letter which we have
seen to be a more organizational, institutional, formal, and hence traditional one. The
accent is upon regularity, preservation, conservation, and established authorities. Political
and social stability is reinforced by prayer for leaders and by the maintenance of slavery,
albeit on a different plain. The real threat is ideological. This increases the tendency to
guard, protect, and transmit the truth to the next generation. So, not surprisingly, political,
social, ecclesiastical, and familial hierarchy are firmly in place at the church in Ephesus.

III

CANONICAL CONVERSATION

Unfortunately, the canon does not itself explicitly suggest the canons which should be
applied in the interpretation of these macroscopic images and their component parts.
However, one could at least posit (given the confirmatory and critical functions of
Scripture elsewhere) that each model and its components were intended both to support
its own view of the Church and to help prevent extreme and exclusive appropriation of
the other. 28
Were one to search for "dynamic equivalents" in our American ecclesiastical context,
one might tentatively suggest that the Corinthian paradigm has supported the Church's
life as manifested in the Pentecostal and "holiness' traditions. Using very broad strokes for
the sake of argument, I suggest that these have exhibited a more intimate Christo logy,
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subjective faith, and charistmatic Pneumatology. Personal experience and right living have
been deemed more important than right doctrine. The congregation's "body life" has
been such as to welcome the marginalized of society and to be supported by the "blue
collar" worker. Its leadership has tended to be authorized by "giftedness" rather than by
formal qualification. Few had advanced education. Fewer still enjoyed the luxury of fulltime, salaried positions. Women often found opportunities for leadership, even "ordination." Until recently, its eschatology has been more imminental (pre-millennial among
Pentecostal, primarily post-millennial among Wesleyan groupsl. A corresponding attitude
to the world has generally emphasized withdrawal from political involvement and social
reform by governmental programs. Of course, the rescue of souls from societal evils, such
as prostitution, drink and gambling, was deemed appropriate from the start. The Church
as a vital, living organism (a body) bursting with energy and vitality has been characteristic
of worship in congregations arising out of this tradition.
A more "Ephesian" model has tended to undergird the mainline Reformed and sacramentarian traditions. Doctrinal purity, confessional assent, and liturgical integrity have
been dominant concerns. An educated, qualified (and often specialized) clergy has not
only maintained vigilance to defend against outside threats, it has also passed on the tradition to subsequent generations through a formal catechetical process which led to confirmation and extended into adulthood. Until very recently, the Church's operations have
been supervised by men rather than by women. The Spirit has been seen as operative in
and through the collective rather than through individual inspiration. Congregations have
served middle and upper classes whose success in the world of politics and business indicated a coming to terms with the institutions of modern life. In fact, the church itself has
functioned as an organization-albeit of a different sort. Although "this world was not their
home" in the absolute sense, churches have thrived on the stability, regularity, and tacit
support of the society in which they found themselves.
However, these pure types (or their approximations) tend not to exist as such anymore. Each has leavened the other. Charismatic renewal bearing certain "Corinthian' features (including more participation of women in leadership roles) has manifested itself in
mainstream Protestant denominations and in the Roman Catholic Church, although no
significant inroads have occurred in Eastern Orthodoxy, to my knowledge. Worship that
has been regarded as formal at best and moribund at worst has come alive. Mainline
churches have taken up (and sometimes taken over) the causes of the excluded and
oppressed. "Born again " language can be heard across the traditions. Likewise, a
'Timothean' influence has appeared among Pentecostal and Assemblies groups where
economic success has enabled and demanded a more formally-educated clergy and has
encouraged at least an openness to liturgical renewal. There has come a recognition that
structure need not squelch vitality, that what often appeared to be "free" worship contained its own, sometimes rigid, strictures.
Such cross-fertilization has helped and continues helping to keep the "down-side" of
each model from gaining ascendency. Not all growth is healthy. Uncontrolled and without direction, it can produce cancer. Change is good until moorings with the past are cut
in search of a rather fuzzy future whose realization lacks both maps and methods. The
desire for stability can cloak an underlying rigidity which refuses to consider a reasoned
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and documented strategy for change. Although unintended, quenching the Spirit sometimes results. These sensibilities emerge when an interpreter treats the texts as both preserving something at once extremely vital and profoundly vulnerable to abuse. So, by
reading each in this fashion, faith could be kept from being both mindless, on the one
hand and frozen into dogma on the other. Reading both texts thus might prevent intimacy with Christ from becoming familiarity, at one extreme, loftiness from turning to
from dissolvremoteness at the other. I Timothy would keep women's liberty
ing into demagoguery (aUeEV'tEtV), while I Corinthians could be appealed to when
orderliness is in danger of being a means of oppression. 29
Whichever the direction of the application, the interpreter must become an astute
observer of all of the dynamics of the situation. Besides becoming as fully informed as
possible, s/ he must avoid settling into an unyielding, disloyal, unloving opposition which
can easily become diabolical in its divisiveness
"throw through, so as to
separatel. Dialectic is the key. As the etymology suggests, it requires constant conversation
between the parties, neither of whom is dispensable. What cannot be done without is
thorough knowledge of the disputant's point of view. Although my loyalty is to the Other
Place, I must re late the report by Professor Billy Abraham of a tradition at Oxford (which
I dearly love) that one has to be able to defend the position of o ne's opponents more
ably than they themselves could before being allowed to criticize them.
What may we conclude from this exercize? First, individual themes in these very different documents can be integrated around a dominant image of the Church. It remains to
be seen w hether or not analogous instances can be found elsewhere. It may well be that
particular views of God or Christ (or some other category) will be the unifying elements.
Second, I have attempted to provide a sample of how two different ("opposing") voices
within Scripture might function in a more fully-blown capacity to address the entire people of God with "the whole counsel of God" in very different circumstances. If these tentative proposals even so much as point in the right direction (being themselves treasure in
breakable clay pots, 2 Cor 4: 17), then we may be going a step farther along the road of
practicing the claim that "all scripture is God-breathed and useful for teaching, rebuking,
correcting, and training in righteousness, so that God's person may be perfect [i.e. 'complete'l, thoroughly equipped for every good work" (2 Tim 3: 16).

NOTES

I have focu sed my attention mainly upon secondary literature which helps to develop what
I believe to be a novel two-part thesis.
I. The most comprehensive treatment in English of variety in the Early Church's thought and
life is still ). D. G. Dunn's Unity and Diversity in the New Testament (philadelphia, PA: Westminste r,
1977). Despite the promise of the title, there is little demonstration of fundamental un ity. See n. 3,
below.
2. Paul Minear, Images of the Church in the New Testament (philadelphia, PA: Westminster,
I 960l, p. 22.
3. I have attempted to demonstrate that, alongside the diversity, there lies a unifying, kerygmatic center. See my 'The Unifying Kerygma of the New Testament," Journal for the Study of the
New Testament 33 (1988): 3- 17 and 38 (1990l: 3- 1 I. Both articles were combined in an appendix
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of the same title in my book, The Past ofjesus in the Gospels (SNTSMS 68; Cambridge: the University
Press, 1991).
4. Minear, Images, p. 24, declares about any primary community, "Its self-understanding, its
inner cohesion, its esprit de corps, derive from a dominant image of itself, even though that image
remains inarticulately imbedded in subconscious strata."
5. Other attempts to do the same with various paradigms appear in Robert W. Wall and
Eugene E. Lemcio, The New Testament as Canon. A Reader in Canonical Criticism (jSNTSS 76;
Sheffield: Academic Press, 1992).
6. Furthermore, the history which is sometimes reconstructed is poorly done. Simplistic linear
models of development cannot be supported by the data. For example, it is a commonplace to
assert that earliest Christianity was of the apocalyptic, other-wordly variety whose egalitarian and
informal character later became doctrinnaire, hierarchical, and accommodating to the world. Yet,
except for j. A. T. Robinson, mainstream experts, both "conservative" and "liberal," regularly date
Revelation in the 90s of our era. However, here is a late apocalyptic work neither presupposing nor
advocating any specific kind of organization or leadership. On the other hand, the Qumran sectarians manifest an even earlier apocalyptic outlook whose exponents lived in a highly structured society headed by a stratified leadership. Often, it is overlooked that judaism, the matrix out of which
Christianity emerged, was itself simultaneously capable of embracing Sadducees, Pharisees, and
Essenes, each with its own social and political characteristics. Both judaism and Christianity did
develop. But they did not do so at a single rate or in a straight line. The image of a great watershed,
with many tributaries and tidal influences, describes the situation better than that of a single river.
For fuller arguments and secondary literature see my study, "Ephesus and the New Testament
Canon," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 69 (1986): 210-234 and reprinted as chap. 14 in Wall
and Lemcio, The New Testament as Canon, n. 5 above.
7. Amos Wilder, New Testament Faith for Today (New York, NY: Harper, 1955), p. 93.
8. Minear, Images, pp. 24-25.
9. Ibid., p. 24.
10. Adolf juelicher, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu 2 vols (2nd ed.; T uebingen: Mohr, 1899, 191 m.
II. R. E. Brown, "Parable and Allegory Reconsidered," Novum Testamentum 5 (1962): 36-45
and C. F. D. Moule, "Mark 4: 1-20 Yet Once More:' Neotestamentica et Semitica: Studies in Honour of
Matthew Black ted. E. E. Ellis and M. Wilcox; Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark, 1969), pp. 95-96.
Minear, Images, pp. 222-223, observes that "through all the analogies the New Testament
writers were speaking of a single reality, a single realm of activity, a single magnitude. The purpose
of every comparison is to point beyond itself. The greater the number of comparisons, the greater
number of pointers. When so many pointers impel our eyes to look in one direction, our comprehension of the magnitude of w hat lies in that direction is enhanced. This is why in the New
Testament we observe no sentimental fascination for the images themselves, such as a preacher or a
poet feels for a symbol of his own devising. The overarching interest is that reality toward which all
point." There is much to agree with here. I would only add that symbols not only point to the reality, they also connect us with it. Otherwise, why does one get so involved (whichever way it goes)
with the desecration of images (such as the flag and the cross)? Furthermore, biblical images do not
o nly point towards the Reality; they also "compete" with one another in a "monotheizing" way by
relativizing cine another.
12. Given the limited scope of this essay, it is not necessary to join the debate over the nature
of the particular relation to Christ: whether Christians are the only body that Christ has, as j. A. T.
Robinson maintained in The Body. A Study in Pauline Theology (S8T 1/5; London: SCM, 1952), p.
5 1 or whether it is another kind of body of which they are part: "an ecclesiastical Body, consisting
of believers, in which he dwells on earth through his Spirit", as R. H. Gundry argues in SOMA in
Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology (SNTSMS 29; Cambridge: University Press,
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1976), p. 228.
13. George W Knight III notes that "even though building terminology is utilized [cr1:UAOcr and
EbpatW!.w1, since the conduct in view relates to the interaction of the members of God's famil y,
modern translations have opted for 'househo ld' {RSV, NASB, NEB, NlV)." See his Commentary on
the Pastoral Epistles (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 180.
14. All six references to OLKOcr or OLKLU are confined to individuals' homes or households
(I: 16; I 1:22, 34; 14:35; 16: 15, 19), OLKObOJ.!£LV and OLKObOJ.!T] occur merely as terms of growth
by way of construction.
15. Wayne Meeks, The First Urban Christians. The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven,
CT: Yale University, 1983), p. 76.
I 6. Ibid., p. I 6.
17. Edmund P. Clowney, "Interpreting the Biblical Models of the Church. A Hermeneutical
Deepening of Ecclesiology," in Biblical Interpretation of the Church Text and Context ted. D. A Carson;
Exeter: Paternoster, 1984), p. 98.
18. Ibid , p. 86.
19. Knight, Pastoral Epistles, p. 2 1.
20. There is a certain discordancy in some forensic and cultic portrayals of Christ's mediation,
where the pleading Son finall y convinces a reluctant, frowning Father to forgive the ransomed sinner. While not an exact parallel, there are some interesting analogies within the canon of Wesley's
hymns. I have in mind the deeply intimate and incorporative cast of "And Can It Be 7 " ("alive in him
my living Head") and the more removed, predominantly juridical flavor of "Arise my Soul Arise"
("five bleeding wounds He bears" w hich "pour effectual prayers, they strongly plead for me"). Of
course, the language of adoption in the last verse changes the imagery from God as ludge to Father.
21. Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity. Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia, PA:
Fortress, 1982), pp. 92-93.
22. Although Stephanus managed a household and Gaius and Crispus might have been prominent persons o utside of the C hristian ci rcle (Theissen, ibid., pp. 73 -96), this says nothing illuminating
about their place in the congregation and their role in the correspondence. Theissen (ibid., pp. 9495) places too much we ight on sixteen named persons (culled from Acts, Romans, and I
Corinthians), despite his own ad mission that "it is not always certain that those named come from
Corinth." [11
23. Although Theissen (ibid., pp. 72-73) correctly points out that a minority of powerful persons can nevertheless exercise an influence disproportionate to their numbers, this is not the same
as showing that they did in this case.
24. After reading between the lines, mining other genuine pauline literature, and making generous use of Acts w ithout any justification, Theissen concludes that Christian households at Corinth
very likely included slaves (ibid., pp. 85-87). While the possibility can not be denied, one needs to
make a case for probability.
25. Gordon Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), p. 606.
26. According to Fee (ibid., pp. 699-708), Paul's alleged absolute prohibition of women speaking in church belongs to an early scribal interpolation. After a thorough examination of linguistic
and manuscript evidence for 14:3 4-35, he comes to the view that "in keeping with the textual
questions, the exegesis of the text itself leads to the conclusion that it is not authentic.'
27. See the thorough (and courageous) examination of 2: 15 by Stanley E. Porter, "What Does
It Mean to Be 'Saved by Childbirth' {I Timothy 2.15)7" Journal for the Study of the New Testament 49
(1993) 87- 102.
28. Clowney, Biblical Models, p. 105 sees the problem in these terms: "So long as one metaphor
is isolated and made a model, men are free to tailor the church to their errors and prejudices." Its
solution lies in recognizing that "the interpreter carries a particular responsibility to present those
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metaphors that may be misunderstood or found offensive. Only this way can balance be gained,
and only in this way can the misinterpretation of favourite models be avoided" (Ibid.l. What
Clowney does not point out is that there are signs in the Canon itself that legitimate such a role (viz.
the multiple gospel tradition, and the overall diversity of Scripture).
29. If such appropriation of biblical imagery is to be useful, the point is not to correct and balance each of the categories studied item-for-item. This would lead to anomalous results: how could
the view of slaves in I Timothy correct the apparently more egalitarian model in I Corinthians
without suppressing liberation altogether? The answer lies in being ready to employ the full range of
biblical paradigms which touch on the queston of slaves' status and role in the community. So, the
dynamics of Onesimus' retum to the "household" of Philemon would need to be brought into a
comprehensive canonical treatment, of which this study is only a discrete sample.

REASONING WITH UNBELIEVERS AND
THE PLACE OF THE SCRIPTURES IN

TERTULLIAN'S APOLOGy1

PAUL LIVERMORE

We are frequently told that deep faith causes intolerance. Fundamentalists persecute; those who look at religious questions dispassionately do not. Though the view
might have some truth, a survey of history casts doubt on it as simplistic.
Early Christians were persecuted by broad-minded Romans who insisted that
they must participate in civi l religion. Since sophisticated Romans did not themselves
believe in the gods, or at least did not believe in anything like we normally think of
when we use that word, we assume they did not care what Christians privately
thought. Further, until Celsus and Porphyry pagans never bothered to study the
faith. While the masses projected crude views on Christians, as they had on the
Jews, and accused them of violent crimes; the learned dismissed them as superstitious. 2 In his letter to Trajan, Pliny the Younger wrote 3
I do not doubt that whatever kind of crime it may be to which they have
confessed, their pertinency and inflexible obstinacy should certainly be
punished .... I thought it more necessary, therefore, to find o ut what truth
there was in this [their beliefs and mode of worship] by applyi ng torture to
two maidservants, who were called deaconess. But I found nothing but a
depraved and extravaga nt superstition, and I therefore postponed my
examination and had recourse to you for consultation.
Pliny, famous as an urbane Roman, would have rejected the claim that he prejudged their case, but he did not hope for Trajan to explain Christian beliefs. He
wanted advice on how to suppress the movement without making Rome appear
cruel. In other words: What was the politically most expedient way to make
Christians conform?
Less than a century after Pliny, Christians in North Africa were suffering under
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persecution. After becoming a Christian, T ertullian took up their case: His personality is
lege ndary. He thrived on debate, arguing with heretics and the official church after
becoming a Montanist, as well as with civil officers.
This article looks at Tertullian's debate with the officials in Carthage found in The
Apology. We w ill study the method he used in his defense of Christians. We are not asking so much what specific arguments he marshaled as what kind of arguments. Or, looking at the same issue from the other side of the equation, what kind of arguments would
Roman officials have found persuasive?
We attach to this inquiry a second. We intend to explore how the Scriptures figured in
The Apology's argument.

I. TERTUILLIAN'S TASK:

ARGUING WITH THOSE WHO DID NOT ACCEPT

CHRISTIAN PREMISES

Tertullian wrote The Apology to refute charges against Christians upon which the officials based their persecution. In chapter 2 he named four, two civil and public (sacrilege
and treason) and two private and supposedly part of eucharistic celebrations (incest with
mothers and sisters and the killing and eating of infantsl.
The latter two, incest and cannibalism, were scurrilous and propagated by rumor. That
did not make them less serious, since they grew from fear and hatred of the unknown.
We cannot tell just how many people actually thought the rumors true but evidence suggests a good number did until the middle of the third century.
Tertullian's defense against these two charges was to deny them. He noted that the
authorities could not present one person who had actually witnessed the acts. He also
pointed out how the acts were totally inconsistent with Christian faith and practice-much
more so than with pagan faith and practice. We will look at one case of this defense to
show how T ertullian argued in this regard.
The civil charges of treason and sacrilege were really more serious, since they arose
from an indisputable feature of Christian discipline, the restriction of worship to the living
God. Faithful Christians could not yield in the way Rome demanded they yield, to participate in civil religious ceremonies and offer supreme allegiance to the emperor, without
denying the faith. According to Roman law, Christians were guilty.
There are a number of ways T ertullian might have made his case to vindicate the
beleaguered faithful. First, he could have argued, as Western democracies now do, that
religion is a private matter, and the state has no right to impose its will so long as its sovereignty is not undermined. But Rome did think the church undermined its sovereignty,
and nothing in The Apology disputes that Tertullian thought religion a legitimate concern
of the state.
Second, T ertullian could have reasoned that since the state was ruled by evil people,
Christians should defy their laws. But this approach would have earned nothing but contempt as well as condemnation. Further, The Apology's tone suggests someth ing different
from defiance. It suggest an appeal to people who can reach a sound judgment. s This is
an genuine apology.
Finally, T ertullian might have argued that Christians should not be persecuted because
they were really not guilty of criminal acts. This is, in fact, the tactic he took. And it was
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for this reason that his pre-Christian work as a lawyer proved invaluable. He not only
knew the rules of legal debate but also practiced them with considerable skill.
But Tertullian's task was still not easily accomplished. True, the church now had the
advantage of an advocate skilled in legal debate, and he could marshal compelling arguments against the charges of infanticide and incest, but those of treason and sacrilege
were more difficult. As noted Christians, according to Roman law, were guilty; the public
character of Christian action in these two cases made the charges inescapable. 6
If Tertullian' s goal was to argue that Christians were not guilty of criminal acts and yet
acknowledge that in the cases of treason and sacrilege they systematically broke Roman
law, the only recourse left was to prove that the laws were flawed. He had somehow to
show that these laws, either as written or as commonly understood, were bad laws.
We will also inquire whether Tertullian could have used the Scriptures to any real gain.
Several options lay before him. First, he might have explicitly cited or alluded to them as
proof for his argument. But he could have done so and accomplished his ultimate goal only
if the officials would have accepted the Scriptures as authoritative, which they hardly did.
Two other possibilities lay before him. Following one of them, Tertullian might first
have given an apologetic for the Scriptures and then based his further argument on their
authority. In fact, he does offer in chapters 18-20 a kind of apologetic. But, as we shall
later see, he does not go on to make the Scriptures the basis for his remaining argument.
Or, T ertullian might have used scriptural themes but offered reasons why they should
be accepted as true other than that the Scriptures prove them to be true. In doing so, he
could have mentioned that these themes were scriptural and even that Christians adopted them because of the Scriptures. At the same time, however, he would have argued
that Roman officials should accept them because of other evidence. This last is the
method he follows in The Apology.
Before we go on several issues concerning Tertullian's implicit use of the Scriptures in
The Apology merit note. First, his method in The Apology differs sharply from that in his
works on heresy. For example, in the Ante-Nicene Fathers the translator, Holmes, identifies 326 citations or allusions to the Bible in Against Praxeas. In The Apology, a document
a quarter longer, Thelwall identifies only five. I have found more in The Apology, but certainly not enough to alter the impression the numbers give.
The short explanation for the difference between his method in The Apology and that
in the anti-heretical works is that the latter were written to those who accepted the
authority of the Scriptures, though the heretics did argue that they were the only ones
who properly understood the Scriptures. But since Roman officials did not accept the
Scriptures, an argument from them in The Apology would have been fruitless.
Having reached the preliminary view that Tertullian does not base his argument on
scriptural authority, we have to inquire whether we can reconcile this method with his
well-known rejection of human reason. The Prescription against Heretics (chapter 7) contains his famous remark contrasting human philosophy and God's revealed word and his
assertion that Christians have no need of any source of knowledge beyond their faith.
Granted, no one so prolific and creative as T ertullian can be held to rigid consistency, we
still query how the same person could say the one thing and then do the other. The contrasting methods seem to be main points in both documents.
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We mention this apparent contrast at the outset to indicate an issue that needs to be
taken up again at the end of our study. The issue can be put into the form of a question:
In order to be thoroughly scriptural and argue for a Christian view on this or that topic,
do we have to prove beforehand that the Scriptures offer the sole or even the primary
means of support? Or, to pose the question of the work we are presently studying, is
T ertullian thoroughly scriptural in The Apology 7
Our preliminary observations, therefore, indicate that in The Apology T ertullian primarily uses the Scriptures implicitly, that is, scriptural themes appear without any note to
the effect that they have their origins in the Bible. And even when he uses them more
explicitly by directly citing them or, as generally happens, by paraphrasing or alluding to
them, his primary point is not to use scriptural origin as the reason why pagans ought to
believe that an idea is true but simply to show this as the source from which Christian
faith and practice have sprung.
We now inquire into Roman legal practice which provided for a review of a law's legitimacy. Tertullian's effort to exonerate Christians required both that it be possible to
review a law and also that he follow the rules of legal review. Such a procedure did exist. 7
Before we can make sense of his argument, then, we must get critical aspects of the procedure in mind.
Roman law had originally grown from two sources, from the customs of early Romans
and the will of patricians and then in the imperial era from the rulers. Both kinds of law,
those from custom and those from the powerful, could very well be nothing more than
inherited, self-serving traditions. Those in power had a good deal to gain by making certain that such laws were not amenable to correction from a higher standard.
But a procedure for legal review did evolve within the Roman system. During the period of the republic, the principle of natural law was introduced into Roman jurisprudence.
The concept had already pervaded the Mediterranean world, Stoicism first coining its systematic, philosophical form. Settling the question whether Roman jurists adopted the concept directly from the Stoics or merely from their cultural milieu is unnecessary to our
purposes. During the time when Rome's hegemony was extended far beyond the Italian
peninsula, the idea of natural law had nearly universal acceptance and was profoundly
influencing Roman jurisprudence.
We should make a few remarks about natural law and its relation to jurisprudence.
First, natural law governs both that part of the universe which lack self-consciousness and,
especially in the case of human beings, that which possesses it. For humans, the good life
is achieved when people voluntarily govern their lives according to this law. Thus,
through clear thought we can discover natural law and through a positive will we can follow it. Second, Stoic ethics pivoted on the four principles of wisdom, justice, temperance,
and courage. Law was particularly concerned with the issue of justice. Third, in natural
law theory ethical questions precede legal questions. The validity of a law depends up the
degree to which it furthers justice. Fourth, since natural law is a universal principle, the
customs of people everywhere should reflect its influence. This does not mean that all
national laws are considered just, but that when they are compared, the pervasive character of natural law will appear. Thus, as the power of Rome extended farther and farther,
the jus gentium was regarded less as a mere reflection of various ethnic customs and
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more as ius naturale.
Now we consider briefly aspects of the procedure in Roman legal review. In a fine article on Tertullian's exegesis of Scripture j. H. Waszink 8 offers from Cicero (De inventione
2.40.1 16) four criteria for the examination of legal documents. Waszink makes the point
that the African father transferred techniques he learned in working with legal documents
to his study of the Scriptures. Putting aside the issue of method in interpreting the Bible,
we return to his task as an advocate before a Roman court. The citation mentioned above
is illuminating. Cicero writes that controversy over a law "arises from ambiguity, from the
letter and intent [ex scripto et sententiaIJ, from conflicting laws [ex contrariis legibusl, from
reasoning by analogy, from definition." Thus, Cicero offers four ways in which the meaning of a law can be examined to determine whether it is an appropriate law or has been
understood appropriately. The four ways are: (I) discovery of original intent, (2) comparison of contradictory laws, (3) discovery of meaning by analogy, and (4) giving precise definition to the law. The principle of natural law is seen most clearly in criterion three, but
obviously provides the background for the other three criteria as well.
Before we conclude this section on the practice of Roman legal review, we make several observations which seem to contradict what we have just observed. First, Roman
jurisprudence did not begin with the broad theory of natural law and extrapolate from it
statutes for particular situations. That is, it did not work from the general to the specific.
Rather, its tendency was to review current laws in the light of the general principles and
how successfully they achieved equity. It worked from the specific to the general and
then back to the specific.
The application of this to Christians is obvious. Roman courts would naturally have
seen the laws which required compliance with civil religion as appropriate. The mere
assertion that natural law confirmed the Christian case and refuted the law's legitimacy
would have struck them as odd. Only through a detailed argument could the conformity
of the Christian case with the principle of natural law have been made compelling.
Second, the fine achievements of Roman law in adapting natural law did not result in
its disinterested application to all cases. Those involving Roman citizens and their property
garnered the most impressive displays of such legal review. Rank injustice to non-citizens
and common people were never reviewed and do not appear to have caused much soulsearching among the government. C. E. M. de Ste. Croix 9 has pointed out that experts in
Roman law have long noted a contradiction between high standard and narrow application. In particular, magistrates were given a free hand in cases of criminal law to interpret
and apply statutes. Their arbitrary cruelty, extra ordinem procedures were sanctioned by
the state. They did not act illegally.
Thus, in the time of Tertullian, Roman legal practice offered a method of judicial
review by which a statute or a custom could be examined. The general principle behind
this procedure was that of natural law. Accordingly, a legal statute was appropriate to the
degree it reflected natural law. Roman jurists were charged not only with the task of prosecuting or defending on the basis of enacted laws, but also with examining the appropriateness of laws. However, it would not have been a foregone conclusion that the principle of natural law in the case of Christians would have led to their exoneration. In the
mind of a typical Roman jurist, Christian belief was superstitious, hardly something sup-
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ported by natural reason. Further, they not only found Christian belief illegal, they also
considered it dangerous for the welfare of the state and thus treasonous.
II.

TERTUWAN'S REASONING IN THE ApOLOGY

We query now whether Tertullian in fact appealed to the right of legal review in The
Apology. In chapter 4 he indicates how he intends to proceed and he explicitly mentions the legal principle he will use in arguing his case. (J have edited the translation myself
to divide the paragraphs into shorter and more logical units.)
Well, if I have found what your law prohibits to be good, as one who has
arrived at such a previous opinion, has it not lost its power to debar me from it,
though that very thing, if it were evil, it would justly forbid me? If your law has
gone wrong, it is of human origin, I think; it has not fallen from heaven. Is it
wonderful that man should err in making a law, or come to his senses in rejecting it? Did not the Lacedaemonians amend the laws of Lycurgus himself, thereby inflicting such pain on their author that he shut himself up, and doomed himself to death by starvation? Are you not yourselves every day, in yo ur efforts to
illumine the darkness of antiquity, cutting and hewing with the new axes of
imperial rescripts and edicts, that whole ancient and rugged forest of your laws?
Has not Severus, that most resolute of rulers, but yesterday repealed the ridiculous laws which compelled people to have child re n before the Julian laws allow
matrimony to be contracted, and that though they have the aut hority of age
upon their side? There were laws, too, in old times, that parties against whom a
decision had been given might be cut in pieces by their creditors; however, by
common consent that cruelty was afterwards erased from the statutes, and the
capital penalty turned into a brand of shame. By adopting the plan of confiscating a debtor's goods, it was sought rathe r to pour the blood in blushes over his
face than to pour it o ut. How many laws li e hidden out of sight which still
require to be reformed' For it is neithe r the number of their years nor the dignity of their maker that commends them, but simply that they are just; and therefore, when their injustice is recognized, they are deservedly condemned, even
though they condemn.
We could hardly find a clearer statement that natural law stands above civil enactments than that in the first sentence above. Civil laws which prohibit good as defined by
natural law have no legitimate force; natural laws against an evil, though lacking statutory
support, are still binding.
This principle forces an obvious insight into civil laws. They are no more than enactments of human beings and must be treated as such. When human error has been discovered, the law must be rescinded.
The last paragraph is crucial to T ertullian's argument. He does not bitterly accuse his
readers of evil or stubbornness. He gently explains that they may have followed bad laws
o ut of ignorance. But the laws should now be reviewed. Only one criterion can justify
keeping a law: the justice of the law.
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We turn to Tertullian's explicit discussion of the Scriptures in chapters 18-20. The standard edition of The Apology has 50 chapters, the section on the Scriptures appearing
about one third of the way in the work. If Tertullian based his argument on the authority
of the Scriptures, he would have developed the first third of the book as an apology for
them and in the last two thirds argued from them. But he does not, as we have noted.
We can show how this is the case by comparing the arguments of chapters I 7 and I S.
Chapter I 7 describes how humans have a kind of natural knowledge of Cod.
The eye cannot see Him, though He is (spiritually) visible. He is incomprehensible, though in grace He is manifested. He is beyond our utmost thought, though
our human faculties conceive Him. He is therefore equally real and great. But
that which, in the ordinary sense, can be seen and handled and conceived, is
inferior to the eyes by which it is taken in, and the hands by which it is tainted,
and the faculties by which it is discovered; but that which is infinite is known
only to itself. This it is which gives some notion of Cod, while yet beyond all our
conceptions- our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us the idea of
what He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as
at once known and unknown. And this is the crowning guilt of men, that they
will not recognize One, of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant. Would you
have proof from the works of His hands, so numerous and so great, which both
contain you and sustain you, which minister at once to your enjoyment and
strike you with awe; or would you rather have it from the testimony of the soul
itself? Though under the oppressive bondage of the body, though led astray by
depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, though in slavery to
false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep,
or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of Cod;
using no other word, because this is the peculiar name of the true Cod. "Cod is
great and good," which may Cod give," are the words on every lip. It bears witness, too, that Cod is judge, exclaiming, "Cod sees, and, "I commend myself to
Cod," and, "Cod will repay me.'· 0 noble testimony of the soul by nature
Christian! Then, too, in using such words as these, it looks not to the Capitol,
but to the heavens. It knows that there is the throne of the living Cod, as from
Him and from thence itself came down.
This passage mirrors themes of Romans I: ISff. and Acts 17:24ff., though differences
also appear. The ideas about the testimony of material nature to Cod have been transmuted from the Scriptures, if we must find sources, through such predecessors as the
African Munucius Felix (The Octavius, chapters 17- IS). Tertullian's reflections upon his
predecessor's work may have shaped how he read the Scriptures.
Tertullian values the testimony of the soul. While he argues that reflection on the
material universe leads to recognition of the living and transcendent Cod, he also says
that the inner soul of the human involuntarily testifies to truth about Cod. Then he makes
the astounding observation that the soul is naturally Christian (ani mae naturaliter
Christianael. Bray 'O claims that Tertullian hardly ignores the fallen condition of the
human, since he had just catalogued shackles that inhibit a clear knowledge of Cod. This
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claim is true, yet the whole point of the words which follow the recognition of this condition is that the soul persistently reflects an apprehension of Cod.
Now we turn to chapter 18 which specifically mentions the Scriptures.
But, that we might attain an ampler and more authoritative knowledge at once
of Himself, and of His counsels and will, Cod has added a written revelation for
the behoof of every one whose heart is set on seeking Him, that seeking he may
find, and finding believe, and believing obey. For from the first He sent messengers into the world-men whose stainless righteousness made them worthy to
know the Most High, and to reveal Him- men abundantly endowed with the
Holy Spirit, that they might proclaim that there is one Cod only who made all
things, who formed man from the dust of the ground (for He is the true
Prometheus) who gave order to the world by arranging the seasons and their
course. These have further set before us the proofs He has given of His majesty
in His judgments by floods and fires, the rules appoint by Him for securing His
favour, as well as the retribution in store of the ignoring, forsaking and keeping
them, as being about the end of all to adjudge His worshippers to everlasting
life, and the wicked to the doom of fire at once without ending and without
break, raising up again all the dead from the beginning, reforming and renewing
them with the object of awarding either recompense. Once these things were
with us, too, the theme of ridicule. We are of your stock and nature: men are
made, not born, Christians. The preachers of whom we have spoken are called
prophets, from the office which belongs to them of predicting the future. Their
words, as well as the miracles which they performed, that men might have faith
in their divine authority, we have still in the literary treasures they have left, and
which are open to all.
T ertullian does not mince his words. Knowledge given through revelation is superior
to that given through any other form, not just parallel to it. Echoes of the Scriptures are
numerous, as are more muted echoes of the rule of faith. Likening his former attitude to
that of his auditors, as a mocker of Christian ideas, Tertullian reinforces the view that calm
reflection can result in great change.
The balance of chapters 18-20 gives an apology for the Scriptures in three strokes. Its
divine authority is shown by: (I) the remarkable translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into
Creek (chapter 18); (2) the antiquity of the Hebrew Scriptures which predate the Creeks,
Egyptians, or other ancients renown for their wisdom (chapter 19); and (3) the amazing
fulfillment of scriptural prophecies (chapter 20l.
Thus, chapters 18-20 offer an apology for the Hebrew Scriptures. But once Tertullian
finished these comments, he returned to his previous argument and employed it throughout the balance of the book. Noting that Christianity was born in the time of Tiberius,
and thus is not so ancient as the religion of Israel, he connects the two eras by observing
that the prophets of Israel predicted the coming of Jesus. But we hear no citation of the
New Testament Scriptures, only echoes them .
Tertullian's next move (in chapter 21) is stunning. He compares teaching about Christ
w ith themes found in pagan thought.
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Accordingly, He appeared among us, whose coming to renovate and illuminate
man's nature was pre-announced by God- I mean Christ, that Son of God. And
so the supreme Head and Master of this grace and discipline, the Enlightener
and Trainer of the human race, God's own Son, was announced among us,
born- but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His
paternal origin. It was not His lot to have as His father, by incest with a sister, or
by violation of a daughter or another's wife, a god in the shape of serpent, or ox,
or bird, or lover, for his vile ends transmuting himself into the gold of Oanus.
They are your divinities upon whom these base deeds of Jupiter were done. But
the Son of God has no mother in any sense which involves impurity; she whom
men suppose to be His mother in the ordinary way, had never entered into the
marriage bond. But, first, I shall discuss His essential nature, and so the nature of
His birth will be understood. We have already asserted that God made the
world, and all which contains, by His Word, and Reason, and Power. It is abundantly plain that your philosophers, too, regard the Logos- that is, the Word and
Reason- as the Creator of the universe. For Zeno lays it down that he is the creator, having made all things according to a determinate plan; that his name is
Father and God, and the soul of Jupiter, and the necessity of all things. C1eanthe
ascribes all this to the spirit, which he maintains pervades the universe. And we,
in like manner, hold that the Word, and Reason, and Power, by which we have
said God made all, have spirit as their proper essential substratum, in which the
Word has inbeing to give forth utterances, and reason abides to dispose and
arrange, and power is over all to execute. We have been taught that He proceeds forth from God, and in that procession He is generated; so that He is the
Son of Cod, and is called Cod from unity of substance with God.
Tertullian boldly compares Christian and pagan ideas. Pagan ideas, he implies, can be
drawn from two kinds of sources, myths and philosophy. The two do not have equal
value. Though myths may resemble Christian teaching in that both refer to a divine son,
they differ in that Christ's birth is unlike anything their vile stories report. Some philosophy, on the other hand, more closely resembles Christian teaching, since both speak of
the Creator as God's Word, Reason, and Power. Tertullian hardly suggests that philosophers who spoke in this fashion had a clear idea of the truth, but he believes they were
approaching truth, and this is far from the case with the myths.
Christians, according to T ertullian, read the Scriptures for two reasons. First, as
implied in what we have noted, they provide clear knowledge of the truth; second, they
give clear directives for living. For the second, I include the one instance, and the only
instance I have discovered, in which Tertullian explicitly cites from the Bible in The
Apology and indicates he is doing so (chapter 31).
But we merely, you say, flatter the emperor, and feign these prayers of ours to
escape persecution. Thank you for your mistake, for you give us the opportunity
of proving our allegations. Do you, then, who think we care nothing for the welfare of Caesar look into God's revelations, examine our sacred books, which we
do not keep in hiding, and which many accidents put into the hands of those
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who are not of us. Learn from them that a large benevolence is enjoined upon
us, even so far as to supplicate Cod for our enemies, and to beseech blessings
on our persecutors [Matthew 5 :44l. Who, then, are greater enemies and persecutors of Christians, than the very parties with treason against whom we are
charged? Nay, even in terms, and most clearly, the Scripture say, "Pray for kings,
and rules, and powers, that all may be peace with you' [I Timothy 2:2 Il. For
when there is disturbance in the empire, if the commotion is felt by its other
members, surely we too, though we are not to be given to disorder, are to be
found in some place or other which the calamity affects.

The Scriptures explain Christian behavior. Christians do the The Apology (hence the
quotation) what the Scriptures instruct them to do. Such use of the Scriptures has a
restricted purpose. T ertullian is not asking that his readers agree with them; he merely
asks that they note how seriously Christians read them. For Christians the Scriptures provide the rule of life.
Chapter 39 offers a fascinating description of Christian worship. In agreement with
what we have seen before, he here describes how the Scriptures shape Christian belief
and conduct. The new element in this passage is that through this window into early
Christian worship we envision the actual process.
I shall at once go on, then, to exhibit the peculiarities of the Christian society,
that, as I have refuted the evil charged against it, I may point out its positive
good. We are a body knit together as such by a common religious profession, by
unity of discipline, and by the bond of a common hope. We meet together as an
assembly and congregation, that, offering up prayer to Cod as with united force,
we may wrestle with Him in our supplications. This violence Cod delights in.
We pray, too, for the emperors, for their ministers and for all in authority, for
the welfare of the world, for the prevalence of peace, for the delay of the final
consummation. We assemble to read our sacred writings, if any peculiarity of
the time makes either forewarnings or reminiscence needful. However it be in
that respect, with the sacred words we nourish our faith, we animate our hope,
we make our confidence more steadfast; and no less by inculcations of Cod's
precepts we confirm good habits. In the same place also exhortations are made,
rebukes and sacred censures are administered. For with a great gravity is the
work of judging carried on among us, as befits those who feel assured that they
are in the sight of Cod; and you have the most notable example of judgment to
come when anyone has sinned so grievously as to require his severance from
us in prayer, in the congregation and in all sacred intercourse.
In chapter 9, T ertullian takes up the charges against Christians of criminal acts. He
begins by noting that pagans are guilty of infanticide. Citizens of his own country had formerly sacrificed infants to Saturn, and some continued the practice in secret. Tiberius, in
an unsuccessful effort to eradicate the evil, had actually ordered the priests involved to be
crucified. Why, T ertullian ironically asks, should Roman officials want Christians to worship the very deity unable to save his own children?
He next takes up the issue of cultic murder beyond that of children and mentions
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cases where it was still practiced. He notes one instance in which the pagans, because
they sacrificed a beast-fighter so his was not innocent blood, did not think it a crime. He
queries: "Is it less, because of that, the blood of a man?"
Then, returning to the issue of infanticide, he asks whether sacrifice is the only way
such a vile act could be carried out. Pagans have found rnany ways to dispose of unwanted children and suffer no punishment: drowning, exposure, and abortion. The last, he reasons, is impossible for Christians.

In our case, murder being once for all forbidden, we may not destroy even the
foetus in the womb, while as yet the human being derives blood from other
parts of the body for its sustenance. To hinder a birth is merely a speedier mankilling; nor does it matter whether you take away a life that is born, or destroy
one that is coming to birth. That is a man which is going to be one [homo est et
qui est futurusl; you have the fruit already in its seed.
Tertullian next considers blood-eating. Human blood had been consumed for several
reasons: to seal a covenant between friends, to initiate one into the cult of the goddess
Bellona, to cure epilepsy by consuming the blood of gladiators. Then, having mentioned
the games, Tertullian goes on to speak of those who devour bears which have in their viscera undigested human flesh . He asks: Is this really less than cannibalism? We note in this
passage how he alludes to the Apostolic Decree (Acts 15:29).
Blush for your vile ways before the Christians, who have not even the blood of
animals at their meals of simple and natural food; who abstain from things strangled and that die a natural death, or no other reason than that they may not
contract pollution, so much as from blood secreted in the viscera . To clench the
matter with a single example, you tempt Christians with sausages of blood, just
because you are perfectly aware that the thing by which you thus try to get
them to transgress they hold unlawful.
After naming more cases of murder or cannibalism, justified by the pagans, Tertullian
turns to the issue of incest. We hear again the same litany of contradictions between
pagan rage at what Christians supposedly do and what is known of them. The practice of
incest was enjoined by Jupiter, reported of Persians, and glorified by Greeks in the story of
Oedipus. Exposure of infants makes a pagan vulnerable to unintentional incest. Here is a
infant left to the elements, picked up by a sympathetic stranger, and raised to maturity.
Years later, not knowing the biological origins, the pagan giving way to uninhibited lust
may have intercourse with this relative.
In contrast, Christian sexual ethics provide absolute protection from incest. The discipline of the church is clearly visible.
A persevering and steadfast chastity has protected us from anything like this:
keeping as we do from adulteries and all post-marital unfaithfulness, we are not
exposed to incestuous mishaps. some of us, making matters still more secure,
got away from them entirely the power of sensual sin, by a virgin continence,
still boys in this respect when they are old.
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THE SCRIPTURES IN THE ApOLOGY'S ARGUMENT

We return to the issue raised earlier, whether Tertullian contradicts himself when he
says one thing in The Prescription Against Heretics and does another in The Apology.
Actually, the contradiction might be more profound than at first recognized. In this case
T ertullian would have explicitly argued for one method of discovering truth and excluded
another in The Prescription and then would have syste matically used the excluded
method in The Apology.
Within The Apology T ertullian follows the techniques of Roman legal debate. He
depends upon the principles of natural law and its corollary, general revelation, to an
astonishing degree. He applies the principles in various ways to show how they confirm
Christian thought. His argument from the beginning to the end proceeds on the assumption that this mode of argumentation is valid and will succeed. He nowhere breaks from
it. He nowhere leaves us with the impression that he is merely playing the pagan's game
but does not believe their rules are valid. Observations made now and then about the
Scriptures introduce no new pattern of argument.
All of this leads us to an important conclusion. T ertullian really believes natural law
and the Scriptures converge in some ways. We do not ignore that he acknowledges the
serious problems w ith natural reason, as was discussed in the passage from chapter 17.
But he suggests that in all people the soul innately knows something better about Cod
than pagan thought reflects.
Does all of this make the Scriptures irrelevant? Or, to put the question a different way:
Are there two equally reliable paths to the truth about Cod and his will, Scripture and natural reason and law? We observe several points in this regard, both drawn from The Apology.
What the pagan world offers is a mass of confusion within which there are only shreds
of truth. These shreds are so mixed with error that pagans never follow them up.
Therefore, he does not appeal to natural law so that pagans will follow it by itself but that
they will note how their better thoughts parallel themes in Christian teaching.
The Scriptures, on the other hand, offer clear direction, and they are the source of
Christian faith and practice. Nowhere in The Apology does T ertullian sugges t that
Christians have come to the truth about Cod (that he is spiritual and one) or do correct
things (such as not kill or be chaste) because natural reason or natural law has enlightened
them. The Scriptures awaken within the latent but darkened shreds of truth that natural
reason and law reflect. They give clear instruction on the truth .
If this is all true, then, a second issue must be considered, the relation of the Scriptures
to the 'rule of faith.' As is well known, Tertullian and Irenaeus (Against Heresies 3:4:1 -2;
4:26:2-3) first articulated the concept of the rule, the form er stating it in boldest form (The
Prescription Against Heretics chapter 19, see chapters 12ffJ A few comments must suffice.
First, T ertullian did not see a necessary tension between the rule and the Scriptures as
Protestants might. For him the two agreed perfectly, and any fear that an unresolvable
conflict might arise is anachronistic.
Second, Tertullian appealed to the rule's authority in debates with gnostics. He did so
for a simple reason: Both Catholics and gnostics believed the Scriptures supported their
teachings; and the gnostics, it should be noted, had developed sophisticated interpreta-
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tions and hermeneutics. Tertullian knew how well the gnostics went about their business
and how skillfully they confused simple Catholics through a display of scriptural learning.
So he short-circuited their claims by saying that according to the rule, which every
Catholic knew, their case fell apart. It was not necessary in his opinion to refute them
point by point from the Bible, showing how the Catholic view was correct and the gnostic wrong. Tedious debates (as his longest work, Against Marcion) had their place, and he
hardly feared that Catholics could not prove their case by the Scriptures. But gnostic
views contradicted Christian faith at its core, as witnessed to in the rule, and their learning
was merely a display which confused the issues.
A more serious question may be embedded in our query about the relation of the rule
to the Scriptures in Tertullian's thought: Have church traditions invaded and reshaped
Christian teaching, so that they fundamentally contradict the Scriptures? Frequently, we
hear the compJaint that second, third, and fourth century teachers of the church converted
the Hebrew religion of Jesus and the apostles into the Greek one of historic orthodoxy.
The complaint, however, is often driven by an agenda, so that the scholars object
when the early teachers of the church failed to endorse their favorites views which they
imaginatively find in the heroes the Bible. Adolf Harnack " is sure the ontological language
of orthodoxy betrayed Jesus' simple gospel and made Christianity impossible for modern
people. Anders Nygren '2 is sure Tertullian is little more than a Christian moralist and did
not understand Paul and grace, as Luther did. G. E. Wright') is sure the language of the
creeds obscured the Old Testament's vision of the God who acts. The list could go on. I
only make a few comments relevant to our present task.
This complaint is wrong-headed and simplistic. There is no doubt that there is a clear
attempt to translate the Gospel into language that conforms to the cultural environment
the church lived in. But that is quite another thing from betrayal of its basic values. We
can in fact argue the reverse: Unless the Church can translate its values into the language
of its cultural environment, it has not really grasped the heart of these values. The pertinent question is: Does the church speak the language of the people and replace the values embedded in that language with Christian values? That is precisely what Tertullian
attempted to achieve in the Apology.
Using hellenistic categories and hellenistic terms as justice, treason, and sacrilege,
Tertullian redefined what those concepts ought to mean, infusing them with Christian values. He did not argue that a nation can survive without justice; he did argue that the pure
Gospel provides the best picture of justice. He did not argue that a nation can survive
without divine worship; he did argue that Christians alone really know the true God and
how to worship him. He did not argue that a civilization can survive without obedience;
he did argue that Christian ethics offered the highest form of serving the state. Whether
the new definitions he gave to the terms were correct, whether his arguments were convincing, and whether he betrayed the Gospel at this or that point are not our major concern. In The Apology Tertullian redefined in legally approved terms the values of Roman
civilization according to his Christian understanding of justice, citizenship, and religion.'4
In a little more than a century after Tertullian wrote, the Roman Empire officially
became Christian. Measuring The Apology's role in converting the empire offers special
difficulties, since the intellectual transformation of a culture is hidden from public view.
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We can see events which suggest a transformation is happening; we cannot see the
process itself or describe all the factors in it. It might be easy to assign more success to
T ertullian than he m erits; certainly others made great contributions. However, the nature
of his treatise suggests that his work was more important than some wish to
acknowledge.' 5
The collapse of paganism's dominance in the Mediterranean world signifies more than
purely political decisions or military acts. Paganism had lost its credibility; it no longer
explained the world. The temples were empty and the ir priests went unpaid, because the
values these institutions required for maintenance were no longe r embraced. The intellectual universe had shifted in a Christian direction.
Several factors are involved in the intellectual foundation of a civilization: (I) What
questions does its spend its intellectual energy trying to solve? (2) What criteria does it use
to judge truth from error? (3) What terms does it use to embody its values? (4) What definitions do these cruical te rms possess? In The Apology Te rtullian did not set the agenda
for the first three questions. The Romans decided that service of the state through divine
worship was crucial for the survival of the state, that judicial review could occur unde r an
appeal to natural law, and that treason and sacrilege were criminal acts. It is in the last category, the definition of these terms, that T ertullian made his contribution.
Though many bemoan Constantine's act as the tragic time when the church invited
the world into its sou l, it was inevitable. Certainly it was to his political advantage.
Certainly the spiritual fervor of the church contributed; "the blood of Christians [was]
seed" (chapter SOl. But the intellectual groundwork had also been laid. The case for
paganism had been eroded. Rage against Christians for the crimes of treason and sacrilege
could not be sustained, because huge numbers of people now understood these concepts
in more Christian terms. The church had succeeded in transvaluing them.
To take terms infused with pagan values and redefine them so they bear Christian values, as Tertullian attempted and in some degree accomplished in The Apology, is a
supreme act of the loyal opposition.' 6
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Intellectual Tradition, edited by W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), pp. 2223. Our study does not examine Tertullian's exegesis because The Apology presupposes careful
exegetical work rather than displays it. Consult for such a study the fine work by T. P. O 'Malley, S.
J., Tertullian and the Bible (Latinitas christianorum primaeva; Nijmegen-Utrecht: Dekker & van de
Vogt, 1967)
9 . "Why were the Early Christians Persecuted?" Past and Present 26 (1952): pp. I Iff.
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235f[
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PA: Fortress, 1984), p. 358, disputes the thesis of Bames and Fredouille that Tertullian was "a seminal thinker who was also a bridge between the pagan and the Christian worlds."
16. My thesis is diametrically opposed to that of H. Richard Niebuhr in Christ and Culture (New
York, NY: Harper and Row, 1951), Niebuhr identifies Tertullian as an example, if not the greatest
one in the post-biblical era, of "Christ against culture" (pp. 5 I ffJ He goes on to identify Augustine
as a great example of Christ transforming culture (pp. 206ffJ In this paper I have argued that The
Apology attempts precisely what Niebuhr has in mind with Christ transforming culture. Further
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(Berkley, CA: University of California, 1967), pp. 299ff.
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INTRODUCTION

Among the many reasons for honoring Professor Robert Lyon, one is the model
he has set for so many students and indeed for more distant admirers (such as
myself) as a dedicated advocate of "Loyal Opposition' in the Church and in the
academy. From his example, I have come to understand "Loyal Opposition' as a spirit that opposes institutional compromise and lethargy, on the one hand, but on the
other hand elects to work within the system for change. I am grateful for Professor
Lyon's example, and pray that what follows may be helpful in continuing his work in
making "Loyal Opposition" a living alternative for contemporary Christians.
The notion of a "Loyal Opposition" has been illustrated throughout the history of
the Christian church by a train of brilliant (jf sometimes eccentricl saints, including
early Christian monks, the followers of Francis and Clare of Assisi, the Reformers of
the sixteenth century, early Pietists, Moravians and Methodists, and a host of others.
What I wish to offer in the essay that follows is an attempt to connect this on-going
tradition of "Loyal Opposition' with its roots in the New Testament. The connection
is made by way of the phenomenon of charismatic prophecy, which appeared in
the New Testament period and continued to challenge early Christian communities
through the end of the second century.
The subject bears particular interest, I think, because in the second century the
Christian communities began to face in a critical way the crises of institutional compromise and lethargy which would beset the Church so many times thereafter. The
letters of Ignatius of Antioch and Polycarp of Smyrna (ca. the I lOs CEJ reveal a
developing institutional structure to the churches of Asia Minor, where a three-fold
order of deacons, elders, and bishops had emerged, with submission to the bishops
seen as a key to church stability.l On the other hand, the Didache (jts date is much
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disputed; probably from the first half of the second century) presupposes the existence of
itinerant prophets who were expected to preside at eucharists, and the Shepherd of Hennas
(written the 140s CE.l is in itself an account of prophetic visions received by a Roman
Christian. By the time the Montanist movement emerged (ca. the 170s) charismatic
prophecy had begun to be regarded as eccentric by many second-century Christians, but
even later writers such as Irenaeus of Lyon and Hippolytus (both writing around 200
c.E.l presumed that the gift of prophecy was still exercised in some quarters of the
churches. An examination of the phenomenon of charismatic prophecy, then, will illuminate a significant transition in the life of the Christian communities, a transition in which a
"Loyal Opposition" became necessary.
CHARISMATIC PROPHECY IN THE NEW TEST AMENT

In order to make clear the role of charismatic prophecy as a "Loyal Opposition" in the
second century, it will be worthwhile to consider for a moment the role that charismatic
prophecy had played in the New Testament age. Here we are in danger of belaboring a
rather obvious point, namely, that the religion of the New Testament included charismatic
prophecy as a central and distinctive element.
Jewish author Geza Vermes has made an intriguing suggestion about the character of
Jesus: Vermes points out that although Jesus did not fulfill the typical image of the firstcentury rabbis of Jerusalem, he did in fact reflect the image of what we know of first-century Galilean rabbis, a circle to which Vermes refers as first-century "charismatic Judaism."2
Jesus appeared both in the role of rabbi (teacher) and of nabi (prophet) and his identification with the movement of John the Baptist solidified his identification with the prophetic
tradition in tension with the institutional Judaism of his day.
Instances of Christian prophecy after Jesus are numerous in the New Testament. The
prophet Agabus mentioned in the Acts, for instance, predicted a famine (Acts I 1:28);
Paul himself records an ecstatic vision in which he (or the person whom he describes)
was "caught up into Paradise' (2 Cor 12: 1-4l. Perhaps more importantly, Christian
"prophets" (so called) were consistently enumerated as constituting a recognized caste or
office within early Christian communities, typically enumerated immediately after the
rank of "apostles" (I Cor 12:28, Rom 12 :6, Eph 4:11, Acts 13:J)J The consistency in
these lists suggests that these designations (including that of "prophet") were not merely
ad hoc designations of leadership roles, but were early on recognized as common positions
across widely different Christian communities. The book of the Revelation, moreover,
stands as an intact example of New Testament prophecy, and its position within the
canon (not undisputed) signifies the importance of visions and prophecy within the continuing Church well beyond the New Testament period.
Although the prophets of the New Testament age existed within the structure of the
early communities as a distinctive caste or office, it is easy to see how their ministry took
on an "oppositional" character. For Jesus, this oppositional character was expressed in tension with both ruling elites (Sadducees) and rabbinic experts (Pharisees), setting off the
lowly and humble (the ptochoi, "spat upon'; Matt 5:3) against the high and mighty. In the
Revelation, especially the letters to the seven churches of Asia Minor (Rev 2-3), prophetic
opposition is directed against the churches' lethargy ("lukewarmness") and their compro-
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mises in the face of Roman oppression and Roman civil religious demands. In this we
may see prophetic opposition in the context of second- or perhaps third-generation
Christian communities, reacting no longer against the institutions of Judaism but rather
against the existing institutions of Christian communities.
It is important to note, however, that the Revelation's positive reliance on charismatic
prophecy does not seem to have characterized all of the communities represented in the
later New Testament literature. If the Revelation stands as an affirmation of charismatic and
., oppositional" prophecy, the Pastoral Epistles and the letters attributed to Peter bear a different character. [n these letters, "prophecy'" (when used positively) seems to denote only the
writings of the Old Testament (or perhaps an occasional pagan "prophet," Tit I: 12l. There
are consistent warnings about "false prophets" (2 Pet 2: 1-3), but the contemporary offices of
the church listed in these works were deacons, "widows, and presbyter-bishops. The office
of contemporary Christian "prophet" that had appeared prominently in the Pauline lists is
notoriously absent in these letters. In this we may see a development that foreshadows
Ignatius of Antioch's more institutional church structure in the early second century.
The New Testament literature, then, indicates that charismatic prophecy was at first a
central element of the Christian movement, typified in the ministry of Jesus himself, with
a caste or office of "prophet" recognized consistently in the early Christian communities
associated with Paul. The later New Testament literature suggests a growing division
between those communities in which visionary prophecy was normative (viz., the community represented by the Revelation) and those other communities in which Christian
prophets no longer appeared as recognized leaders (viz., the Pastoral Epistles and the first
and second letters attributed to Peterl.
CHARISMATIC PROPHECY IN THE EARLY SECOND CENTURY

This divergence over the role of Christian prophecy continued into the early second century, and the literature of the so-called "Apostolic Fathers' reflects both sides of the divergence: On the more institutional side, continuing the tradition of the Pastoral Epistles, are
the letters attributed to Ignatius of Antioch, generally dated from the II Os C.E.s It would be
wrong to characterize Ignatius himself as "compromised," since the letters we have from him
were written while he was being conveyed to Rome, under guard, to face martyrdom. The
letters stand as a critical development in the polity of the early Christian communities,
though, because in them the three-fold order of deacons, presbyters (presbuteroi, "priests" or
"elders") and bishops appears plainly. Absent in them are the "widows" of the Pastoral
Epistles, and the offices of "presbyter' and "bishop, confused or perhaps identical in the
Pastoral epistles, appear in Ignatius as clearly distinct offices. The Ignatian letters presuppose
throughout a congregational structure in the churches of Asia Minor in which there were
many deacons and presbyters in each city-church, but a single bishop for each:
Since, then, in the persons already mentioned I have seen your whole community
in faith and have loved it, I exhort you: be eager to do all things in godly concord,
with the bishop set over you in the place of Cod, and the presbyters in the place of
the council of the apostles, and the deacons, most sweet to me, entrusted with the
service of Jesus Christ... 6
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We should note Ignatius's reference to "the bishop set over you in the place of Cod" in
this quotation from his letter to the Magnesians (6: 1), If there is a consistent theme to the
Ignatian correspondence, it is the necessity of unity in the church grounded in obedience
to a single bishop in each community, Ignatius consistently utilizes the parallelism given
above, with the bishop in the place of Cod and presbyters and deacons subject to the
bishop,7
In one place (philadelphians 5 :2) Ignatius acknowledged his love for "the prophets,
presumably Christian prophets (although this has been disputed), At this point, though,
Ignatius affirmed the role of the prophets so long as they remained within the unity of the
church 8 Thus, although there may have remained Christian prophets in the churches of
Asia Minor in Ignatius's time, they were never given a consistent place in Ignatius's understanding of the authoritative offices of the church, and he understood that their conduct
and teaching had to be subject to local bishops,
The situation is very different with the ancient Christian text called the Didache or
"Teaching of the Twelve Apostles.' The date of this text is much disputed- estimates
range from the middle of the first century to late in the second century- but the work is
probably an early second-century compilation of earlier written and oral traditions, some
of which may date from the first century9 On the one hand, the community described in
the Didache had deacons and bishops (apparently multiple bishops) answering to the pattern of the Pastoral epistles, and a distinction between bishops and presbyters is not made
in the work (15 : I), On the other hand, the Didache describes a number of traveling
Christian leaders: "apostles, "prophets, and "teachers, and gives fairly lengthy descriptions of these (I 1-13), The bishops and deacons can be described as 'your honorable
men together with the prophets and teachers' (15:2),1 0 Since the prophets and teachers
(and itinerant "apostles") are described separately, this passage indicates two different
types of leadership in the Didache community: local deacons and bishops, and traveling
(or "itinerant") apostles, prophets, and teachers, Although local congregational leaders are
warned to test the itinerants carefully to be sure of their validity, there seems to have
been a sense in which, once tested, the itinerants held authority over local officials, After
a discussion of the method of celebrating eucharist, the Didache concludes, "but [allow]
the prophets to hold Eucharist as they will" (10:7),11
The fact that the Didache is concerned to root out false itinerants (apostles, prophets,
and teachers) should indicate some level of tension between local and itinerant leaders in
the community, But the community of the Didache seems to have integrated this tension
in a different way than the communities of Asia Minor depicted in the Ignatian epistles,
For the community of the Didache the "loyal opposition" of the itinerant prophets had
become a part of the on-going life of the community, On the one hand, it can be argued
that the Didache's community is closer to that of the Pauline churches of the New
Testament, since the same sets of "primitive" offices appear in both (apostles, prophets,
teacher, etc.; this makes the case for an early dating of the Didachel. On the other hand,
it could be argued that the Didache represents a "Montanist" community because of the
prominent role played by the prophets (this would make the case for a late second-century dating of the work), Neither of these extremes is necessary, however, if we recognize
an on-going tradition of charismatic prophecy that extended from the Pauline period
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through the early second century right up to the Montanist movement (probably in the
I 70s CE. and thereafter). This would conform to the most consistent scholarly datings of
the Didache, and would indicate the importance of the work as presenting a picture of a
more "charismatic'· early second-century community that stands in rather sharp contrast
to the community represented in the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch.
One other work reckoned among the" Apostolic Fathers'· can be considered here, and
that is the "Shepherd of Hermas.' Mentioned in the Muratorian fragment as having been
written
quite recently, in our own time in the city of Rome, by Hermas, while his brother
Pius was sitting on the throne of the church of the city of Rome ' 2
the work may be dated rather accurately to 148 CE. (or the months immediately before
and after it) in Rome. The work bears significance in our discussion because, like the
Revelation in the New Testament, it is an intact example of early Christian prophecy.
The "Shepherd of Hermas' contains a sundry collection of divine revelations given to
Hermas involving a number of divine beings representing Christ (one figure for Christ is a
shepherd, hence the title of the work) or the personification of the Church (the figure is
of a woman, the "Bride'" of Christ). The work seems to presuppose the rather rigorous
doctrine of many early Christian communities, that post-baptismal sins could not be forgiven (cf. Heb 6:4-6). One of the primary (and first) revelations of the work is that
After you have made known these words to them, which the Master commanded
me to reveal to you, all the sins which they have formerly committed shall be forgiven them, and they shall be forgiven to all the saints who have sinned up to this
day, if they repent with their whole heart, and put aside doublemindedness from
their heart. 13
That is to say, Christ makes a one-time offer of forgiveness for post-baptismal sins if the
church will repent sincerely. It is interesting to consider this as a prophetic message, for it
does, in a sense, "liberalize" the church's earlier rigorism, and could be taken as a first sign
of growing laxity in the early church regarding moral life. Nevertheless, the issue was
apparently taken so seriously that only by a divine revelation such as this one could the
church consider changing its approach. The "Shepherd of Hermas,'" then, shows how
prophecy could influence the early church to change its accepted ways, even in a less rigorous direction.
The early second century in general, then, presents a varied picture with respect to
charismatic prophecy. Some communities seem to have been moving towards a formalized local structure in which prophecy was pushed to the periphery of the community's
life. The communities in Asia Minor represented by Ignatius of Antioch represent this situation. In other areas, though, prophecy seems to have persisted. We do not know of
Hermas's influence in the Roman church (the Muratorian fragment treats it skeptically), but
in the community represented by the Didache itinerant charismatic leaders seem to have
played a central, perhaps defining role. We should be safe in concluding, I think, that
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through the end of the second century the two strands represented in the New Testament
and in these communities both continued as vital forms of Christian religious life.
CHARISMATIC PROPHECY AND THE MONTANIST MOVEMENT

By the end of the second century, though, the more institutional and less prophetic tradition represented by Ignatius of Antioch seems to have been winning the day. The rise
of Montanism, or perhaps we should say the isolation of charismatic prophecy in the
Montanist movement, gives clear evidence that by the I 80s charismatic prophecy was
seen as increasingly "eccentric," i.e., outside of the centers of Christian thought and life.
The Montanist movement was described by Eusebius of Caesarea, Epiphanius,
Hippolytus, T ertullian, and other ancient Christian writers. 14 A consensus of ancient and
modem scholarship places the origins of the movement in the I 70s C.E.IS The movement was centered in Phrygia, headed by a prophet named Montanus and prophetesses
Prisca (or Priscilla) and Maximilla. Attempts to prove that Montanism was grounded in a
pagan Phrygian cult, or that the Montanists perpetuated theological or christological heresies have not received wide acceptance. 16
The distinguishing mark of the Montanist movement, then, lay not in the area of doctrine, but in the claim that the gift of prophecy through the Holy Spirit was truly given to
Montanus, Prisca, Maximilla, and other "prophets" of the movement. Not surprisingly, the
movement was referred to by some ancient authors as "the new prophecy.' Secondly, at
least in the Montanist community known to Tertullian, the movement stood for a rigorous Christian morality reminiscent of older eras of the Church's life. In both of these
respects, however, Montanism appears within the development of Christian polity not as
an aberration from an originally institutional Christian church, but rather as a local expression of a tradition of Christian prophecy which, as we have seen above, extended from
the age of Paul through the communities represented by the Revelation in the New
Testament, and then by the Didache and the "Shepherd of Hermas" in the early and middle parts of the second century. Thus, Hans von Campenhausen refers to Montanism as
"a reactionary phenomenon" insofar as it reflected this earlier strand of Christian prophetic tradition. 17
If this is true, though, it remains to be explained why the movement should have
received such a consistently negative response from those communities that in retrospect
have been identified as orthodox. Eusebius of Caesarea noted that the movement was
condemned very early on:
For when the faithful throughout Asia had met frequently and at many places for
this purpose, and on examination of the newfangled teachings had pronounced
them profane, and rejected the heresy, these persons were thus expelled from the
Church and shut off from its communion.18
But these councils did not carry weight beyond Asia, for Tertullian noted that at one point
the Bishop of Rome (in the early third century) had briefly acknowledged the validity of
the movement. 19
Two more likely explanations for the isolation of Montanism as a "heresy' excluded
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from communion with the orthodox can be offered. First, the ecclesiastical power structure centered in monarchical bishops and represented by Irenaeus of Lyons seems to
have prevailed by the end of the second century in those communities that were also
reckoned to be theologically orthodox.20 The older pattern involving itinerant prophets,
which had been a living option up until the middle of the second century, seems to have
been increasingly "eccentric," i.e., outside of the center of the churches' life, from that
time. Second, the very use of charismatic prophecy by the Montanists seems also to have
been regarded as unusual. Although some early Christian writers from the third century
and beyond preserved the memory that prophecy had at one time been exercised in the
Church, others frankly acknowledged that the age of prophecy had passed. Tertullian's
contemporary Origen wrote,
Moreover, the Holy Spirit gave signs of His presence at the beginning of Christ's
ministry, and after His ascension He gave still more; but since that time these signs
have diminished, although there are still traces of His presence in a few who have
had their soul purified by the Gospel, and their actions regulated by His influence.21
In both of these respects then, both in its rejection of episcopal authority and its continuing use of the charismata such as prophecy, the Montanist movement represents a strand
of earlier Christian tradition that had become dissociated with the communities reckoned
as orthodox.
But Montanism, perhaps especially as represented in Tertullian's later career, did function as a kind of "Loyal Opposition" in the later second century and beyond. It serves to
remind us- and perhaps it should serve to remind the Faith and Order Commission of
the World Council of Churches today- that the consistent three-fold ministerial orders of
deacon, presbyter, and bishop were not established in the churches without considerable
time, and not without considerable loss. The loss J refer to was the loss of living prophecy
as a "normal" part of the life of the Church. The Montanist movement shows, if nothing
else, the tragic reality that by the end of the second century the exercise of this kind of
"loyal opposition' was regarded eccentric (at best) and heretical (at worst) for most
Christian communities.
CONCLUSION: CHARISMATIC PROPHECY AND "LOYAL OpPosmON"

But the story of "Loyal Opposition" in the Christian community did not end with
Montanism. Within months of Constantine's conversion to Christianity, St. Anthony and
others in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria began withdrawing to the deserts where they could
pursue a more radical vision of Christian faith. Francis and Clare of Assisi would call
Christians in the twelfth century to obedience to the "apostolic poverty" of Christ and the
earliest disciples. Sixteenth-century Reformers of whatever party (including many Catholic
Reformers) would call for a return to "primitive" Christian conditions.
The witness of ancient Christian prophecy as "loyal opposition" was not lost on all of
these later reformers. John Wesley, for example, was well aware of the role of prophets in
the early Christian communities, and in his sermon on "Prophets and Priests" he called
upon the model of ancient Christian prophets to justify his use of laymen and laywomen
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as preachers in the Methodist movement:
I cannot prove from
three centuries, that
with early Christian
believe these offices
of Constantine. 22

any part of the New Testament, or from any author of the first
the office of an evangelist [which Wesley elsewhere identifies
"prophets"] gave any man a right to act as pastor or bishop. I
were considered as quite distinct from each other till the time

Moreover, Wesley believed that the Montanist movement, with its continued exercise of
the prophetic office, reflected the true Christian faith in the later second century:
By reflecting on an odd book which I had read in this journey, The General Delusion
of Christians with Regard to Prophecy, I was convinced of what I had lo ng suspected:
( I) that the Montanists in the second and third centuries, were real, scriptural
C hristians; and (2) That the grand reason why the miraculous gifts were so soon
withdrawn, was not only that faith and holiness were we ll-nigh lost, but that dry,
formal, orthodox me n began even then to ridicule whatever gifts they had not
themselves, and to decry them all as either madness or imposture.2l
Thus, although his understanding of the chronology of the decline of prophecy and other
details about ancient Christian prophecy may have differed from our understanding,
Wesley nevertheless had a clear sense of the continuity between the Methodist movement's "loyal opposition" within the Church of England, and the "loyal opposition ' represented by itinerant teachers and then by Montanists in the ancient Christian communities.
The C hristian church is an "incarnational" institution: bearing the marks of its origins in
Christ and the apostles, it lives from age to age in "the flesh," i.e., in the realities and vicissitudes of history, and it faces the crises of an on-going human institution. But from time to
time, Cod raises up brilliant women and men to challenge the institutional dilemmas that
the Church faces. They are the "loyal opposition" that adorns and enlivens the life of the
Church from age to age. They appeared even in the New Testament period, and as we
have seen above, in the second century and then beyond.
But the "loyal opposition" also appears in our own time, and we are blessed indeed
when we come into the presence and under the influence of one of these brilliant and
faithful pioneers of the Church. Such a person is Robert Lyon, and we offer thanks and
praise for his consistent witness of loyal opposition, and for the challenge that his witness
lays before us.

NOTES

I. Each of the authors or communities dealt w ith in this paragraph will be discussed in detail
later.
2. Geza Vermes, Jesus the Jew (London: Fontana, 197 6), chapter 3, "Jes us and Charismatic
Judaism," pp. 58-82.
3. Gerha rd Friedrich, "prophetes" in Theological Dictionary of the New Testame nt 6 :850
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman's, 1968). Quotation marks are used with the term "apostles" here to
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denote that the term, in these passages, may not denote so much "the twelve," but a larger group of
disciples who were "sent out" (apestalmenos) by Jesus.
4. "Apostolic Fathe rs" (or "Apostolical Fathers") is the designation dating from seventeenthcentury European scholarship (jean Cotelier and then William Wake) to denote a diverse group of
writings generally reckoned to date from the first half of the second century. On the designatio n,
see Simon Tugwell, The Apostolic Fathers (Harrisburg, PA: More house Publishing, 1989), p. viii.
Robert M. Grant, An Introduction "The Apostoli c Fathers: A New Translation and Commentary," (6
vols.; New York, NY: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964) deals with the history of the texts of the
Apostolic Fathers (pp. 13-33 ) but seems unaware of the Cotelier edition in which the expression
"Apostolic Fathe rs" originated (actually, "fathers who flourished in the times of the apostles" in the
title of Cotelier's edition)
5. On the dating of the Ignatian epistles and the controversies over their authenticity, see
Tugwell, pp. 104-105; Robert M. Grant, Introduction, pp. 47-63 ; Edgar J. Goodspeed, The Apostolic
Fathers: An American Translation (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 203 -205; and
most definitively William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of
Antioch (Hermeneia commentary series; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 1-7. In w hat
fo llows I have accepted a modem consensus (recognized since the middle of the seventeenth century) that holds seven epistles of Ignatius to be genuine (what Schoedel calls the "middle recension"
[of 3] although earlier works referred to it as the "shorter recension" [of 2]).
6. Magnesians 6: I; translation is that of Schoedel, p. 11 2. See also Schoedel's comments on
the three-fold order, pp. 22-23. The three-fold order found in Ignati us has been recognized as form ing the basis for contemporary discussions of Church polity, most notably in the World Council of
Churches Faith and Order Commission document e ntitled Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry (Faith and
Order paper no. I I I; Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982), IIl:A: 19-21 , p. 24.
7. For si milar passages urging obedience to the bishop, see Ignatius's letters to the Ephesians
2:2,3:2,4: 1-2,5 :1 -3; Magnesians 6 :1 -2, 7: 1; Trallians 7:2; Philadelphians 3:2,4: 1,7 :1 -2,8 :1 ;
Smyrnaea ns 8 : 1-2, 9 : I; and to Polycarp 6: I. The theme of obedience to bishops does not appear
promine ntly in the letter to the Romans, where Ignatius's primary concern was the preparation for
his approaching martyrdom there. Not surprisingly, we might note, the authenticity of the Ignatian
epistles was defended in the seventeenth century by Anglican bishops, defending episcopacy against
the presbyterianism of Puritans (three principal Anglican defenders of the Ignatian epistles were
James Uss her, Archbishop of Armagh, John Pearso n, Bishop of C hester, a nd William Wake,
Archbishop of Canterbury) .
8. The very next passage (Philadelphians 6: I) goes on to state that prophets should not be
accepted if they "interpret Judaism"; on this see Schoedel, pp. 20 1-203.
9. On the dating of the Didache, see Robert A. Kraft, Barnabas and Didache. "The Apostolic
Fathers: A New Translation and Commentary," vol. 3 of 6 vols.; (New York, NY: Thomas Nelson
and Sons, 1964), pp. 76-77. Kraft argues that Didache is composed of a number of earlier documents and oral traditions (divisions between these can be seen easily in the text), and although
much of this material dates from the first century, the present form of the Didache dates from no
earli er than the early second century. To th is may be contrasted Tugwell (p. I), who asserts that the
Didache was composed in the first century; but Tugwell consistently gives surprisingly early dates for
the literature of the Apostolic Fathers.
10. Translation is that of Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (2 vols.; Loeb Classical Library;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and London: William Heinemann Ltd.; 1912), 1:33 1.
I I. Lake, I :325. Lake has "suffer" for epitrepete. The expression he translates "hold Eucharist" is
simply eucharistein ("to give thanks"), although following the first six verses of chapter 10, it does
seem to denote presidency of the weekly eucharistic celebratio n.
12. Muratorian fragment; translation in Lake, 2:3.
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13. "Shepherd of Hermas," Visions 2:4; translation of Lake, 2: 19-21.
14. The principal sources for the study of Montanism are the following: Eusebius, Ecclesiastical
History 5: 16- 19 <PC 20:465-484; NPNF 2: 1:229-337); Epiphanius, Panarion [21 :148-49 (PC
41 :855-882); Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 8: 12 (ANF 5: 123- 124). There is also a letter
attributed from Firmillian to Cyprian preserved among the letters of Cyprian (Cyprian Epistles 75;
FC 51 :295-313), and many of Tertullian's later works (from his Montanist period) describe the
movement.
15. On the dating of Montanism, see Timothy Barnes, "The Chronology of Montanism," Journal
of Theological Studies 21 (October I 970l: 403-408. To his conclusions, in general, one may compare
Hans von Campen hausen, Ecclesiastical Power and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three
Centuries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 181, n. 15; Eusebius A. Stephanou,
'The Charismata in the Early Church: Greek Orthodox Theological Review 2 I (Summer 1976) : 132;
and E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (New York, NY: W. W. Norton Co.,
1965), p. 63, n. 3.
16. On the former (the notion of a Phrygian cult origin of the movement), see Wilhelm
Schepelern, Der Montanismus und die phrygischen Kulte (1929); also with Schepelern in rejecting this
theory are Hans von Campenhausen (p. 181, n. 16) and E. R. Dodds (p. 63, n. 2). The latter theory, that the Montanists reflected theological or christological heresies, may have some grounding in
the fact that later Montanists might have reflected such teachings, but ancient orthodox writers
themselves admitted the theological orthodoxy of the earliest Montanists: Epiphanius, Panarion
48: I; Firmillian's letter to Cyprian; Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies 8: 12; Tertullian De leiuniis I
and De Monogamia 2 (although of course these latter works date from Tertullian's own Montanist
period, so it should come as no surprise that he would defend the Montanists' doctrinal orthodoxy).
17. Von Campenhausen, p. 181.
18. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5: 16: I 0; translation of Hugh Jackson Lawlor and John Ernest
Oulton, Eusebius: The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine (2 vols.; London: SPCK, 1954),
1:160.
19. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean I; cf. ANF 3 :597.
20. James L. Ash, Jr., "The Decline of Ecstatic Prophecy in the Early Church," Theological Studies
37 (june 1976) : 230.
21 . Origen, Contra Celsum; translation of Crombie in ANF 4:614.
22. The sermon "Prophets and Priests" was called "The Ministerial Office" in earlier editions of
John Wesley's works; in Albert Cook Outler, ed., Sermons <Bicentennial Edition of the Works of
John Wesley; Nashville, TN : Abingdon Press, 1984) 4:77. Here Wesley supposes that the separate
office of "prophet" or "evangelist" continued through the age of Constantine; our own conclusions
in this article would suggest the late second century as the time for the diminishing of the office of
charismatic prophet.
23. Journal for 15 August 1750; in W. Reginald Ward and Richard P. Heitzenrater, eds., Journals
and Diaries <Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press,
1988), 3:356-357.

"THE RIGHT USE OF THE APPROPRIATE
MEANS"- THE DEBATE OVER STRATEGY
AND GOALS AMONG NINETEENTH
CENTURY EVANGEL REFORMERS
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According to the eighteenth century Calvinist Jonathan Edwards, the spiritual
awakening he witnessed in New England was completely unexpected, a "surprising"
work of Cod unaided by human instrumentality. In the distinctly different theological climate of the nineteenth century, Arminian Charles C. Finney was convinced
that a revival was "not a miracle," but simply a natural result of Christians availing
themselves of the resources placed at their disposal by Cod. To produce a successful revival, Finney believed, all that his fellow preachers had to do was to engage in
the "right use of the appropriate means.'"
The so-called "appropriate means" to which Finney was referring were the controversial "new measures' of evangelistic technique which he and other revivalists
were at that time employing. Finney's new measures included the public participation of women, the overt display of religious emotion, and the promotion of revival
meetings that would last for several days. Most importantly (for our purposes),
Finney also insisted that revivals could flourish only when Christians had a proper
attitude "in regard to any question involving human rights"-by which he was indicating issues such as temperance and slavery. Unlike most evangelists (then and
now), Finney was convinced that a preacher's engagement with the pressing social
concerns of the day was an important accessory to the work of converting sinners.
Nonetheless, Finney always viewed his commitment to social concerns as an
"appendage" to revivals; it was never to take away from the primary task of personal
evangelism. 2
Finney fully expected other revival preachers to understand and agree with the
pragmatic parameters of his maxim to pursue the "right use of the appropriate
means." Many of those who were inspired by Finney's revivalism, however, went
beyond his rather cautious involvement with social reform and his opportunistic
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standard for achieving successful results. These other reformers debated what specific
"means" were appropriate and what, in fact, constituted the "right use" of those means.
The outcome of this debate was a conflict among nineteenth century evangelicals regarding social reform strategy, a conflict that was derived from their differing goals and theological presuppositions 3
Through their involvement in this struggle over strategy and goals, evangelical reformers were attempting to resolve the ethical tension that exists between means and ends, a
seemingly relentless quandary confronting those Christians of every era who are committed to seeking a more just society. Thus, a study of antislavery advocates (abolitionists)
and other nineteenth century evangelical reformers provides us with an example of some
of the challenges and pitfalls facing all of us as we try to live out our Christian vocation
with integrity.4
Specifically, nineteenth century reformers disagreed with one another over three related questions. First, to what extent can Christians use power in order to achieve their
desired outcome? That is, how should Christians relate to the "princi palities and powers"
of this age, given the strategy of "nonpower' that seems inherent in the gospe!? What is
the correct stance, they asked, that one should take toward existing political and ecclesiastical institutions? Does one accept these institutions as legitimate; does one try to reorganize and purify them; or does one stand over against them as a prophetic witness? At
issue was the problem of who does the empowering in the reign of God- God himself,
human beings, or some cooperative combination of them both?
Closely related to this first question was a second : what is the appropriateness of using
coercion to obtain desired results? This apparently straightforward query was complicated by the existence of various tactical options used by abolitionists- personal persuasion,
political action, civil disobedience, rebellion, and even the threat of war- all of which
could be defined as coercive strategies to a greater or lesser degree. Hence, the reformers
questioned further, what amount of coercion is acceptable or unacceptable? Is any violence permissible? Where is the line between violence and nonviolence? Such topics
became especially critical among antislavery reformers in the I 840s and I 850s with the
escalation of anti-abolitionist vigilantism and the rise of sectional jingoism preceding the
Civil War.
A final question concerned the dilemma that reformers faced between their commitment to religious principle and their utilitarian dependance on expedient methods.
Simply put, evangelicals asked themselves which tactical model was to take priority: a
reliance on pragmatic means (emphasizing the achievement of success), or an adherence
to ethical principles (insisting on sanctified behavior, without the expectation of success)?
Thus, in their desire to live out the implications of the kingdom of God within
American society, abolitionists and other reformers had to contend with (at least) three
fundamental tensions- power versus non power, violence versus nonviolence, and success
versus nonsuccess. These three concerns certainly were not unique to nineteenth century
reformers; indeed, Christians in every time period must deal with them. Nonetheless,
such strategic questions take on different forms in different contexts- and the particular
context within w hich nineteenth century evangelicals deliberated was the emerging
democracy of the young American republic.
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The early nineteenth century in the United States is often referred to as the "era of the
common man," a period when the demand for greater democratization was felt throughout all institutions of American society, including the Church 5 It is not surprising, then,
that the theological notion of the "kingdom of God" came to be known in America by a
democratic euphemism-the so-called "moral government of God"-a term that referred
to the extent of God's jurisdiction over human activities. The moral law of God's government, according to nineteenth century thought, had an approximate equivalent in the
civil law, if the civil law was democratically administered 6
By using this theological concept, evangelical preaching provided a religious vocabulary
that coincided with the prevailing political discourse of the early American republic.
Those nurtured under such preaching, particularly revivalistic reformers, appropriated the
moral government language to frame their deliberations concerning the civil government.
Among Northern social reformers (such as the abolitionists), the imminent "government
of God" was identified with the government of the United States-but only after the latter
had been democratically reformed and freed from the sin of slavery.7
It was believed that sufficient human means were at the disposal of revivalists and
reformers to help establish the divine government. With the assistance of these available
means, each moral agent was free to choose to obey God. When practiced by regenerated individuals throughout the whole society, such obedience would eventually effect (or
at least closely approximate) the harmonious millennial government of God a
This social optimism was made possible by the general spirit of millennial expectation
that existed among the religious segment of the population. Millennialism is a theological
concept regarding the prophesied reign of God on earth 9 The most prevalent antebellum
expression of this concept was postmillennialism. Postmillennialism asserts that Christ's
second coming will occur after an idyllic thousand-year period. According to this belief,
human beings are presently in the penultimate time prior to the millennium. It is the
responsibility of humanity to assist in ushering in the impending millennium by approximating God's government as much as possible. On a personal level, the postmillennial
goal assumes that individuals can become holy. By extension, the collated holiness of
many individuals will eventually result in the millennial society. 'o
The United States was viewed as the most suitable arena for God's unfolding millennial drama. I Abolitionist Jonathan Blanchard was convinced that "the world is on its return
to God," with America leading the way. Blanchard foresaw that reforms would sweep
the land, Though there was a great amount of work to be done, there was an exuberance and a certainty that it would be accomplished, since it was God's work. Already, as
revivalistic reformers pointed out, the temperance reformation had produced widespread
results. Such success encouraged the reformers toward ever more ambitious endeavors in
preparation for the millennium, For abolitionists, this meant the creation of a society free
from slavery.' 2
I

POWER VERSUS NONPOWER: THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZAnON

In the early years of the abolitionist movement (before 1840), Northern evangelical
reformers were in general agreement that their principal task was simply to persuade others that slavery must be ended immediately. Within a few years, though, more definitive
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strategic matters were broached. As one reformer reflected some years later regarding
this important tactical juncture: "When a large body of the people were convinced of the
truths abolitionists had taught them, the question arose, How shall they best be led to put
their principles in practice?" Their predominant tack had been simply "moral suasion"-a
term that referred to the voluntary convincing of others by the use of the press, the pulpit,
various forms of education, and legislative petitions. Up to that point, abolitionists had
eschewed overt political activity or any trappings of institutional power. l ]
By 1840, however, the effectiveness of moral suasion was being questioned by many
abolitionists. It seemed that more efforts were required just to produce the same results.
For example, one of their original goals-the persuasion of slaveholders to emancipate
their own slaves-was a dismal failure. In some ways, the South was more unyielding in
its commitment to slavery than it had been prior to the rise of abolitionism. And the
North was equally intolerant of antislavery agitation, as evidenced by unremitting mob
violence directed against abolitionists. Abolitionists realized that their attempts to change
the political and ecclesiastical structures by moral suasion had failed. 14
Many abolitionists believed that they were bogged down by the ineffective tactics of
moral suasion. Since "the motto of abolitionists should be 'onward,'" wrote a contributor
to an antislavery paper, then "greater force should be immediately brought into the field. "
One contemporary perceptively observed that, for such reformers, "moral persuasion'
was no longer "potent enough, for their cause. Hence they are hurriE;d onward, like mad
men, to grasp the civil arm to aid in accomplishing their purpose." Some abolitionists
were now willing to embrace the tactics of power politics, tactics that had long been used
by their opponents. Other abolitionists, however, were unwilling to sacrifice their high
standards in order to play the political game.15
Such disagreements among reformers were due to differing views about whether
C hristians should rely upon the power of human institutions to reach their goals and, consequently, the degree to which human governments were to participate in the establishment of God's government. Polemics among abolitionists consisted of deliberations about
the role of organized structures in the emerging millennial order. Thus an understanding
of the divisions that existed among abolitionists can be gained by analyzing the ways in
which they understood and talked about God's government, human government, and the
interaction between the two. Various formulations of abolitionism represented various
degrees of support for or denial of the power of institutions.
There was a spectrum of views regarding the arnount of institutionalization considered
appropriate within the society. Differences among abolitionists were articulated in the
language of their theological discussions concerning the appropriate structures for a democratic society. These differences can be sorted into distinct groups that existed along an
"institutionalization continuum" -specifically, those who were supporters of traditional
institutions, those who were mernbers of new abolitionist political parties and denominations, and those anti-institutionalist abolitionists who rejected all forms of human empowerment. lo
At one end of the spectrum of antislavery views regarding institutionalization were
evangelicals who supported traditional structures. These were the abolitionists who
endorsed existing churches and traditional politics. They decided to rernain within the
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established denominations and parties in order to reach their goal of the immediate end
to slavery.
Abolitionists who were institution-supporting felt that slavery was merely an evil blemish that needed to be removed from a generally healthy society. They thought that by
advocating antislavery from a position of power they could raise the religious consciousness of the people within their churches and political parties. Many of them were concerned about achieving realistic, practical results which, they hoped, could be obtained
more readily by working within established structures than by staying aloof from power
structures in an attitude of self-righteous purity. l?
Institution-supporting abolitionists were convinced that human principalities and powers were ordained by God. People need to be controlled by coercive governments until
the millennial government of God puts an end to inherent human sinfulness.
Furthermore, following the dictates of Romans 13, citizens must submit to their civil leaders as instruments of God's law on earth, for the external human law is equivalent to the
law of God. I S Since institution-supporting abolitionists thought that God ordained the
existing political organizations, they were dedicated to working through these extant structures, hoping that they could change the laws to conform to abolitionist goals. 19
Evangelical leaders in the major denominations and political parties believed that human
structures were a pragmatic means to a desirable end. Since such structures would never
be perfected, significant social change would occur only when religious people were willing to compromise their utopian principles. As a Whig partisan explained: "Politics is a
game of expediency."2D
Other abolitionists took a middle stance between institutionalism and anti-institutionalism 21 They formed new abolitionist denominations, such as the Wesleyan Methodist
Connection. 22 They also formed an avowedly evangelical political pressure group called
the Liberty Party, the first political party to be unequivocally committed to the elimination
of slavery. Liberty Party leaders believed that democratic governments in church and
state were divinely-established institutions, a part of God's moral government. God's
influence, they asserted, is exerted "through the instrumentality of human governments."
Yet, while they affirmed the divine intention for human government in general, they also
condemned the existing governments as immoral. Liberty leaders contended that the
established systems of power needed to be reorganized to conform to the standards of
God's government. Their opponents were accurate when they asserted that the Liberty
Party "invoked Divine authority to justify a use of political power in ... reforming the state."
These political abolitionists were resorting to means that relied on a form of power (the
legislative compUlsion of other people) while at the same time challenging the existing
power structures Zl
Contrary to those who maintained traditional institutions, Liberty leaders felt that political parties and churches must be rigorously altered so that the organizational power of
human structures was carefully limited. But contrary to the anti-institutionalists, Liberty
leaders felt that there was a need for Christians to exert some power within social structures so that society could function in an orderly manner. Their tactic was to come out
from existing "despotic" institutions and to literally "re-form " them along sanctified lines.
They described their strategy as "secession and re-organization." In their view, it was pos-
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sible to exert a limited degree of democratically-elected power while still maintaining their
distance from those who used power in an arbitrary or capricious manner 24
Liberty Party leaders began with the premise that human cooperation with God was
essential for the successful establishment of the divine government on earth. One Liberty
man asserted the importance of human initiative in the form of a rhetorical question:
"Are not C hristians themselves a part of those means which God makes use of to carry
forward his moral government[?]" On the societal level, this synergistic theological concept led to the view that some human institutions were divinely-ordered, but that such
institutions needed to be democratically reorganized and carefully circumscribed. The
Liberty Party agreed with anti-institutionalists that existing human governments (both civil
and religious) were corrupt. At the same time, they agreed with the supporters of institutions that some power structures should not be destroyed, but maintained. They believed
that human governments should be reordered to correspond w ith God's democratic
moral government. When that occurred the millennium would commence, for God's
government would be coterminous with human government: a "perfect state of society'
would exist. 25 In both ecclesiastical and political matters, the members of the Liberty
Party were trying to hold a delicate balance between their desire to renounce institutional
tyranny and their perception of the need for some structure. They thought that it was
important for abolitionists to find a "middle ground."
At the other end of the abolitionist spectrum of views regarding the use of institutional
power were the followers of the prominent antislavery advocate, William Lloyd Garrison.
The Garrisonian abolitionists asserted that the only legitimate strategic measure for religious reformers was moral suasion. These nonresistants, as they were called, believed that
coercive actions of any kind were sinful. Since human governments are based on the
premise that legalized compulsion could be used to back up their legislative actions, nonresistants defined such structures as inherently sinful. "Political action, by voting, even for
the abolition of slavery, under a civil government based on physical fo rce,·· was regarded
as sinful by the Garrisonians. Their religious consciences were to have no involvement
with partisan politics 26
According to the Garrisonians, it was fruitless to attempt to legislate change, because
human institutio ns (both civil and ecclesiastical) would never be purified. God's moral
government would be actuated in God's time, and only through the agency of individual
moral influence. According to Garrison, "political reformation is to be effected solely by a
change in the moral vision of the people, not by attempting to prove that it is the duty of
every voter to be an abolitionist."27
The Garrisonians shared a common assumption: the radical sovereignty of God's rule
over human behavior and institutions made external human law superfluous. Human
institutions such as religious denominations, political parties, and even the government of
the United States, all of which mediated between God and humanity, were unnecessary if
Christians would completely obey God's law. Since the Garrisonians believed that God's
law could be perceived directly and comprehended adequately by any unrestrained individual, no other person or human institution could or should attempt to define that law.
In fact, divine law was intended to supersede and replace all mortal laws, rules and institutions. The interposition of any human element whatsoever between an individual and
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God was considered an unwarranted assumption of divine authority,
Human authorities were considered wrong because they were coercive, External
human law required restraint in order to force compliance, and thus denied an individual
complete freedom of conscience, Slavery was the prime example of a coercive institution, Once slavery was viewed in this paradigmatic way, it was not difficult for
Garrisonian abolitionists to believe that tyrannical institutions of any kind, and especially
those connected with slaveholding, were the source of society's imperfections. They
understood the "the disorder, confusion and misery, which every where prevail" in society
as caused by worldly power exercised by unnatural, artificial, sinful institutions 28 Church
polities, in particular, were problematic, because "the present organized church associations and organizations, as they are, are not only in the way of humanity ... but in the way
of Christianity itself."29
All of the abolitionists believed that human society could and should approximate the
millennium- the eventual and inevitable rule of the government of God on earth, This
millennial rule would be established by the incremental perfection of individuals until the
entire society was perfected, But according to the Garrisonians, human structures stood
in the way of the establishment of the divine order; therefore, those structures should be
abolished in preparation for the millennium. Continued adherence to human institutions
among Christians impeded the consummation of God's millennial rule, and, according to
Garrison, "whatever the gospel is designed to destroy at any period of the world, being
contrary to it, ought now to be abandoned,"lo The only appropriate response for a
Christian was to "come out from among them, and be ye separate." For Garrisonians that
meant severing all connections with human structures, including support for political activities or local Christian congregations, since they imposed unnatural restraints upon individuals,l'
According to the Garrisonians, any attempt at reforming or restructuring human organizations was not only wrongheaded, it was wicked, A somewhat improved situation
brought on by reforms would only delay the eventual necessary destruction of all human
devices, and thus delay the harmonized society of the millennium. The type of government that they proposed was to be "immediately exercised by God" rather than organized by humans, since such a human structure would inevitably be based on coercive
restraint. The harmony of this divine government would result in a new society in which
individual self-mastery held sway and in which the moral law was obeyed on a purely
voluntary basis.l2 Eventually, the Garrisonians withdrew from human institutions, They
developed a strong antipathy toward all those who continued to support the established
structures. Since "government is upheld by physical strength, and its laws are enforced at
the point of the bayonet," the nonresistants repudiated "all human politics," Churches,
which were shams of true religion, were also to be discarded, Organized religion was to
be replaced by each individual's own religion of the heart, unmediated by any creed or
c1ergyman,ll
VIOLENCE VERSUS NONVIOLENCE: THE PROBLEM OF COERCION

Coincident with the problem of institutional power was the problem of coercion,
Initially, the majority of abolitionists were pacifists; they viewed all war as unjustified
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aggression-similar in its barbarism to the enslavement forced upon African Americans.
The abolitionists' pacifist position became most forcefully articulated in the mid- 1840s
during the Mexican War. The Mexican War was a baldly expansionistic enterprise that
soon became a divisive domestic policy issue within American society. In response to the
War's proponents, who hoped to extend slave territory by confiscating Mexican land, the
abolitionist Liberty party took a firm stand against the conflict.)4
Likewise, abolitionists within the evangelical denominations used the widely-perceived
immorality of the Mexican War as a springboard for their declarations of disgust toward
all wars. The Rochester Annual Conference of the Wesleyan Methodist Connection (an
abolitionist denomination), declared in 1847 that "the gospel of Christ is eminently the
gospel of peace,. ..whereas war in its spirit and practice is antagonistic to the gospel." In
this vein, they resolved "to maintain tal high and uncompromising opposition to war as
an inhuman and anti-Christian practice and as one of the sins in the sisterhood of evil
now rife throughout our common country and desolating our poor fallen world." Even
more strongly worded was their statement of 1852, in which they resolved
that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is opposed to all forms of war, that every war is the
crime of the nation or people that wage it, that every battle is a bloodstained blot,
that every victory is a loss, and that we will do all in our power to oppose war, and
to promote the principles of peace, until the time shall come in which we have
good hope, when men shall beat their swords into plow shares and their spears into
pruning hooks, and learn war no more.
As late as I 860, they reiterated their
ever avowed principles upon the inhuman system of war. We regard it to be in
direct conflict with the first principles of Revealed Religion- as having its origin in
selfishness, lustful, and revengful [sicl passions- a relic of a barbarous age, and the
stronghold of despotism and slavery.)5
It was during this same time period, however, that abolitionists (including the
Wesleyan Methodists) were becoming increasingly involved in the Liberty Party, which
was an attempt to use political power to extirpate slavery36 As these abolitionists became
more and more comfortable with the idea that the exercise of political power was justified during the (supposedly) limited interim before the millennial government of God was
established, it became easy to slide down the slippery slope of coercion towards other
forms of empowerment, such as civil disobedience, the armed insurrection of slaves and,
eventually, the necessity of war in order to crush the rebellious slavocracy of the South. l7
Consequently, over the years that led up to and beyond the Civil War, evangelical abolitionists significantly altered their former posture of unconditional pacifism 38
By 1863 , for instance, at the height of the Civil War, the Wesleyan Methodist's
Rochester Conference declared that they were "for God and our country, and this without evasion, condition or exception. The Conference resolved, in an abrupt about-face
from their earlier explicit opposition to all war, that "while regretting, the necessity of an
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appeal to arms ... yet we justify such appeal, and offer.. our prayer for the further success of
our arms. Similarly, in 1864, the Wesleyans stated:
We stood for coercion when Sumpter [sicJ was fired upon, and the history of th[is]
'War for the Union' has taught us that Subjugation needs to take the place of coercion .... While [weI regard ... War as in itself undesirable, and even an evil-yet as a part
of a great National Police System, we hold it legitimate; and in defense of imperiled
rights fully justifiable. Our present War being provoked for the Support of
Constitutional Freedom, and the rights of man, has our unqualified approbation,
and our Prayers for its success in supressing [sicl Rebellion 39
At the end of the war, the Wesleyans reveled in the presumed divine implications of
the Union victory. They declared that they were "doubling [theirl diligence' for social
reform work now that the imminent day was close at hand when "God shall break every
chain and let the oppressed go free that we may sing literally, The year of Jubilee has
come.'" As historian James Moorhead has stated, Yankee Protestants such as the
Wesleyans were convinced that the Civil War was the final apocalyptic shedding of blood
needed to atone for America's original sin of slavery-a necessary evil in order to bring
about the conditions requisite to inaugurate God's millennial govemment 40
As the century wore on, the Wesleyan Methodists moved even farther away from
their previous pacifism. During the Spanish-American War- America's imperialistic foray
into Cuba (and elsewhere)-the Rochester Conference resolved that, although they were
opposed to war for aggression or conquest, and deprecating a necessity of a resort to
arms, yet seeing in the present crisis, or issue, our beloved land reaching out the hand of
help to the suffering Cubans, illustrating the great principle of human brotherhood, we
hereby, place ourselves on record as endorsing the statesmanlike, patriotic and above all
Christian attitude of our Chief Magistrate, and pledge our loyal support, and earnest
prayer, in his, and our Nation's behalf of larger conception of human relationship, and
Christian civilization.
In this resolution, the Wesleyans were affirming the right of the United States to conduct a war in order to extend the so-called "white man's burden" of Christian civilization.
They even went so far as to "pledge [theirl unswerving loyalty to our government" during
war, certainly a far cry from their earlier statement that they were opposed to all forms
of war, that every war is the crime of the nation or people that wage it."41
d

SUCCESS VERSUS NONSUCCESS: THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVES

A final problem facing evangelical reformers in the nineteenth century was the tension
that existed between achieving success for their cause and maintaining the purity of their
principles. This tension was felt most acutely by the Liberty Party. The party was composed of politically inexperienced Christians who wanted to explore the potential use of
electoral power in order to obtain a righteous objective. In the end, however, many of
them were uncomfortable with their involvement in the exercise of that power. How
could they succeed politically, they asked themselves, and yet remain pure, without
becoming immersed in the muddy waters of partisan campaigning?
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On the one hand, those Liberty men with a practical bent were convinced that in
order to assure eventual victory it would be politically shrewd for the Liberty Party to
compromise its radical views and soften its strident moralism. After several years of relatively poor performances at the polls, the dilemma within the Liberty Party became clear:
in order to reach their goal of establishing a government that was pure, it seemed necessary for Liberty men to make concessions regarding their own purity. Evangelical abolitionists stressed holy motives and each individual's uncompromising attitude toward all
sin. Yet they also emphasized practical moral action and the tangible achievement of
social iustice. Eventually the stress on sanctified means seemed to preclude the achievement of the party's ends, since political victory required compromise with those of dubious religious credentials and impure political motives. The choice for Liberty leaders
became the practical achievement of a reduced goal using impure means, or the continued espousal of uncompromising means with only the vague hope of an eventual divine
consummation (especially with the continued disappointment of the Party at the polls).
How does one persevere in the arduous work of establishing a millennial society, they
asked themselves, when the promised inevitable outcome does not seem to materialize?
On the other hand, there were some antislavery reformers (a minority of the Liberty
Party) who cared less about political success than they did about the prophetic challenge
that abolitionism attempted to deliver to the structures of society.
That this [Liberty] Party will be popular, we do not claim. That corrupt men- men,
who are more for numbers than principles- for ballot-box victories than for truthwill approve of it, we do not expect.. ..That Cod will be on its side is our firm
belief:-and, humbly and fervently, do we pray, that He will condescend to make it
a means of hastening the time, when oppression and war shall be unknown, ... when
"the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters
cover the sea."42
These principled activists of the party would not support candidates of questionable
moral qualifications or issues of popular interest merely for the sake of expediency4]
They were not willing to risk the use of unsanctified means even if those means might
result in the possible fulfillment of sanctified ends. Cerrit Smith, for example, a prominent
Liberty Party congressman, was alarmed by the "immodest self-advancement" represented
by some of the pragmatists at a Liberty Party convention. He declared that true Liberty
men were those who
profess to be conformed to what is right. With them, expediency is not the rule of
right- but right the rule of expediency. The organization of the Liberty Party was a
novel and bold experiment. To form a political party on the basis of an honest,
uncalculating, adherence to the right and the true, was an undertaking so foreign to
custom-so utterly unprecedented- that there is no wonde r it was stared at as
impracticable and fanatical. The experiment was well worth making, even if it had
been made in the face of all probability of success 44
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For Smith and other abolitionists like him, faithfulness to righteous principles was infinitely
more important than political success.
Similar to other Christians throughout the Church's history, there were a few nineteenth century evangelical reformers who tried to be consistent in their application of the
principles of non power, nonviolence, and nonsuccess. They refused to use unworthy
means, even for what seemed to be worthy ends. These reformers existed as a type of
"loyal opposition" to the American political and religious establishment, presenting a challenge to the "principalities and powers' of the era while simultaneously working to create
new structures for a just society. In this way, they fulfilled the dual Christian responsibility
to provide both (what john Howard Yoder has described as) "conscientious objection"
and "conscientious participation" in the world: 5 Such a twofold commitment was due to
their belief that, by following in the radical way of jesus, they were called to be a constructive- but dissenting- voice within American society.
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THE ETHICS OF JERUSALEM AND THE
MORALS OF ATHENS: ASSESSING HANS
KONG'S THEOLOGICAL ETHICS

KEN BREWER

This essay will present and assess Hans Kung's theological ethics. Kung is now
retired from the University of Tubingen, but he continues to write prolifically. The
first part of Kung's career was devoted to ecumenical concerns between divided
Christians. The middle stage saw a broadening interest in ecumenical issues
between Christians and the world's religions. Now, as his last legacy, Kung is occupied with an even greater ecumenical challenge between the world's religions and
the world's political ideologies '. The thesis of his latest project is stated tersely in this
way: world survival depends upon a global ethic; a global ethic is not possible without religious peace; and religious peace is dependent upon interreligious dialogue.2
This proposal requires that Kung somehow combine specifically Christian ethics (the
ethics of jerusalem) with non-Christian and non-religious ethical systems <the morals
of Athens}.
The plan here is to first sketch the specific Christian component of Kung's ethics.
What makes Kung's ethics 'Christian'? Then, Kung's proposal for a global ethic will
be presented. Can there be a consensus between religious and non-religious peoples about a minimum of shared ethical principles? Afterwards, attention must be
given to the components by which Kung connects these seemly disparate ethical
visions. just how does Kung hold his ethical vision together? Remarks will be made
along the way critically assessing Kung's theological ethics.

1. THE ETHICS

OF JERUSALEM: JESUS AND THE NEW HUMANISM

1. If we ask, "What makes ethics 'Christian'?," Kung would simply reply, "What is
specifically Christian ... is the fact that all ethical requirements are understood in the
light of the rule of the crucified jesus Christ ... jesus, to whom we are subordinated
once and for all in baptism by faith, must remain Lord over US. "3 jesus himself is the
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specifically Christian criterion for all ethical behavior. This position follows directly from
Kling's theological methodology, where Jesus is heralded as the norma normans (normative norm) for Christian theology4 For Kling, all Christian moral reasoning and practice
must be derived from the Gospel narratives and centered on the life, death and resurrection Jesus of Nazareth. It is, therefore, important to give a profile of Kling's Jesus before
proceeding to how Kling's christology functions in making ethical proposals. The connection between christology, ethics and ecclesiology should also be noted. The praxis of the
Church in any age or culture, Kling maintains, should be grounded and guided by the
pattem of radical discipleship modeled in Jesus of Nazareth. Kling employs the notions of
"loyal opposition" and "critical catalyst" to depict the Christian relationship to the Church
and the world. The ideas of "loyal opposition' and "critical catalyst" flow out of Kling's
reading of the Gospel narratives and his interpretation of Jesus.
A. Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of a New Humanism
If all ethical requirements are to be understood in the light of the crucified and resurrected Jesus, as Kling argues, the question arises, "Which Jesus?" Kling's Jesus is derived
from a narrative reading of the "characteristic features and outlines of Jesus message,
behavior, and fate."s He is confident that historical-critical methods of interpretation provide a relatively adequate record of Jesus from the NT documents. Kling observes two
essential features about the "real" Jesus from his investigation of the Gospels 6 First, Jesus
was Jewish and was loyal to the Jewish tradition. Second, Jesus was opposed to the way
Judaism was practiced.
Kling's "real" Jesus is essentially an apocalyptic Jewish prophet who preached the kingdom of God, taught a radical ethic of love and showed solidarity with moral failures, the
exploited, the marginalized, the non-religious, the demonized, children and sick people.
Kling sums up the teaching of the "real" Jesus as: "Jesus made the cause of the God of
Israel his own, govemed by the typically apocalyptic expectation of living in an end-time,
in which God himself will very soon appear on the scene and impose his will, establish his
rule and realize his kingdom. Jesus wanted to announce in advance this kingdom, this rule,
this will of God, with a view to human salvation. This alone he made the criteria." 7
Kling goes on to summarize the ethical component of Jesus' teaching in this way: "So
he [Jesus] called not only for the renewed observance of God's commandments but for a
love which in individual instances extends to unselfish service without hierarchy, to
renunciation even without receiving anything in return, to boundless forgiving. It is a love
which even includes the opponent, the enemy: love of God and love of neighbor in
accordance with the criterion of self-love ('as yourselfl."B Jesus did not preach himself,
but the cause of God, the will of God, God's program. God's program, Kling maintains, is
absolutely congruent with the cause of humanity. It was not a "new law' which may be
reduced to Halakhah nor separated from Haggadah. God's program, in fact, becomes the
basis for a radical new humanism where being a Christian means being fully human, not
less human.
The life and message of Jesus were opposed by the leading Jewish options within
Judaism. Jesus functioned as a "critical catalyst" within his own Jewish social context
because he did not belong to any of the reigning ecclesiastical groups of his day. Kling
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expresses it this way, Jesus was "caught in the cross of co-ordinates of options within
Judaism."9 What is meant is that Jesus is not presented in the NT as a priest of the religious-political establishment like the Sadducees; nor as a political revolutionary like the
Zealots; nor as some kind of ascetic monk like the Essences. Moreover, the NT does not
situate Jesus within the company of the devout moralists, the Pharisees. So, Kling concludes that: "it shows considerable understanding of Jesus if we do not attempt to integrate him within the quadrilateral of establishment and revolution, emigration and compromise: He fits no formula. He is provocative, both on the right and on the left: apparently closer than priests to Cod. At the same time freer than the ascetics in regard to the
world. More moral than the moralists. And more revolutionary than the
revolutionaries." 10 Jesus' life and teaching led to his crucifixion. Despite Jesus' loyalty to
the house of Israel, he was crucified as a criminal of the State. Nonetheless, the cross
became a summons to discipleship, to a life of self-giving and service to others. In fact,
according to Kling, the cross is now the normative element and pattern for determining
what is Christian about ethics.

B. The Call to Discipleship: "Follow Jesus!"
Kling maintains that the entire practice of individual Christians and Christian churches
should be oriented toward the message and behavior, the cross and resurrection of Jesus
as the model for what is Christian. Following Jesus in one's moral life, therefore, is basic
to Christian discipleship. Kling heralds Jesus as the standard, the supreme norm, the chief
source and final criterion for what it means to be Christian- not an infallible pope, the
magisterium, church councils, church tradition, natural law or canon law. Kung departs
from traditional Roman Catholic moral theology at this point. While it is not the theme
of this essay, it must be said here that the parallels between Kling's Jesus and his own
stance toward the Roman Catholic Church are unmistakable. It was Kung's christology,
not his ecclesiology, that ultimately led to the removal of his missio canonica, his official
license to teach Roman Catholic theology I I
The specific Christian norm, then, is the concrete, historical person, Jesus of Nazareth,
not some abstract ethical system or universal moral code. Kung points out that what distinguishes Jesus from the founders of other religions or ideologies is that the person and
teaching of Jesus cannot be separated. He says, "the following of Christ is what distinguishes Christians from other disciples and supporters of great men, in the sense that Christians
are ultimately dependent on this person, not only his teaching, but also his life, death, and
new life."'2 Jesus was more than a rabbi or teacher. Jesus was the living, normative
embodiment of the cause of Cod. In fact, Kling asserts that there was a harmony of will
and revelation between Jesus and Cod without any contradiction. The one who proclaimed the kingdom, also embodied the kingdom. On this basis, Christians are able to
justify and substantiate a new attitude, a new way of life, a new approach to life as well as
a different set of values and a radical new humanism. The focus upon Jesus, Kung argues,
is much more convincing than an impersonal idea, an abstract principle, a universal norm
or a purely theoretical system of ethics. Indeed, the genius of Christian ethics, Kung
maintains, is that it is rooted in a concrete, historical person. For, the person of Jesus possesses an "impressiveness, an ·'audibility" and a "realizability'· that is lacking in eternal
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ideas, abstract principles, universal norms, conceptual systems and in unattainable, unrealistic ideals. ' J
To say that Jesus is the specific, supreme norm of C hristian ethics, however, needs to
be qualified in order to be more precise about how Jesus functions as the norm of
C hristian ethics. Kung argues: .... it is of little use to appeal to absolute norms and simple
rules, deduced from natural law or Scripture, in order to solve the apparently almost insoluble problems and conflicts of humanity .. ,, "14 Kung does not think that Jesus gives
absolute answers to every moral dilemma humanity faces. The formation of Christian
ethical norms and moral attitudes occurs within the larger context and process of socializatio n within the Christian communi ty. This means that the specifically Christian aspect
of "following Jesus" must be worked out tensively in one's own existential situation and
not by universalizing or absolutizing some particular ethical demand of Jesus. Technically,
Kung suggests, we are not called to "imitate Jesus" but to "follow Jesus" (nachfolgenl. Jesus
illuminates our situation. Our situation, however, shapes how we are to apply the norm
of Jesus. The ethical process, therefore, is reciprocal, not one-sided. What is essential is
that the Christian look to Jesus and allow him to inform and shape his or her action in a
given situation . The context where the Christian learns this process is the C hristian community. The role of the Church, however, is not to dictate or mandate moral action. The
C hurch's role is simply to teach and preach the Gospel and model C hristian behavior.

C Is Something Missing from Kung 's Christian Ethics?
Two specific remarks need to be made regarding Kung's specifically Christian ethics.
First, I applaud the fact that Kung's theological ethics are essentially christocentric. The
norm of Christian moral behavior is located in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.
While questions may be raised about aspects of Kung's historical reconstruction of the
"real" Jesus, he is right to place Jesus within the context of Palestinian Judaism and stress a
fundamental continuity between Jesus and Judaism. Kling also correctly points out that
Jesus had serious tensio ns with Judaism due to unfaithfulness to the higher th ings of the
Law. Kung's Jesus is an apocalyptic prophet calling for love, justice and m ercy, a reversal
of values and non-violent resistance that led to his crucifixion (very similar to the Jesus of
E. P. Sanders' S). It is this historically reconstructed Jesus that is the norma nomans of
Kling's theological ethics. Herein lies a problem. Kung's historically reconstructed Jesus,
"real" o r not, is too fragile and too narrow a foundation to build a robust Christian understanding of the moral life. It is fragile in that historical inqui ry can only yield tentative and
conflicting results, w hereas ethical living requires a high degree of moral authority and
conviction to motivate and sustain moral action. I agree with Richard Hays' comment
that: ' .. .it makes sense to claim modestly that New Testament ethics will find a more stable starting place if we begin with the moral visions of the individual texts than if we try
to begin by reconstructing Jesus."' 6 Moreover, Kling's reconstructed Jesus is a narrow
fo undation in that Christian ethics is bound not only to th e Gospels but to the entire NT
witness as canon. Hence, the full canonical text of Scripture is missing in Kung's theological ethics.
Second, wh il e Kung e mphas izes following Jesus and the cross as normative for
C hristian discipleship and ethics, there are ethical components of C hristian doctrine that
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are either muted or completely ignored. For example, one does not find in Kung's discussion any extensive treatment of the ethical implications of human bondage to sin, Cod's
power to liberate us from the power of sin, or Cod's provision for the possibility of obedience through the empowerment of the Holy Spirit. Jesus is for Kung a concrete moral
example and he challenges us to follow Jesus in our concrete discipleship. One gets the
impression, however, that Kung's call to follow Jesus is an unconditional ethical demand
that Christians can simply apply to their situation and live successfully from the their own
human resources. Jesus is our extemal model, norm and standard for discipleship and
ethics. But something more than an external model is needed for humanity to act and
behave after the pattern of Jesus. The same Spirit who empowered Jesus is available to
moral failures to help them do what they cannot achieve in their own strength. As
Cordon Fee correctly observes, "truly Christian ethics can only be by the Spirit's empowering."' ? The Spirit's empowering presence is fundamental to any Christian ethic.
Without the Spirit, we are powerless and weak to overcome our sinful nature and habits
by our own human resources.

2. THE MORALS OF

ATHENS: SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL ETHIC

Some aspects of Kung's Christian ethics sound as if an Anabaptist ethicist could have
written it. But things get more complex when we turn to his project for a global ethic.
Hans Kung's interests have always been world scale and comprehensive. Even in Kung's
early period, when he wrote predominately on ecclesiology and received the Nihil obstat
and Imprimatur, Kung never lost sight of the world horizon or the fact that the Church
exists "... in the world for the world."'B This is true of Kung's theological ethics, as well. He
is not content to write as a Christian theologian exclusively for the Church. Nor has
Kung aspired to be a "theologian's theologian," one who writes to assuage the exclusive
interests and inquiries of the academy. Kung is a practical theologian. He writes programmatic theory with concrete and pragmatic ends in view. The proposal for a global
ethic is an extension of the fact that Hans Kung is self-consciously a "catholic" (i.e., universal) theologian. We will first deal with the development of Kung's global ethic as a programmatic agenda. Then, we will see how Kling's proposal for a new world ethic developed into a declaration about the world's religions. Finally, we examine how Kung's global ethic addresses global politics and economics.
A. The Proposal for a New World Ethic
The concept of a "world ethic' (Weltethos) developed gradually in Kling's thought. The
first stage of formation was the connection Kung made between world peace and interreligious dialogue. World peace, Kung realized, is contingent upon establishing peace
among the world's religions '9 At an interreligious conference at Temple University in
1984, Kung condensed his thoughts into programmatic theses: "No world peace without
peace among the religions, no peace among the religions without dialogue between the
religions, and no dialogue between the religions without accurate knowledge of one
another."20 These theses were the driving force behind Kung's two major books on interreligious dialogue, Christianity and the World Religions2 1 and Christianity and Chinese
ReligionS2 As Kung reflected further upon the world situation, he was convinced that
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these theses must be developed into a formal program, one that could make a significant
contribution towards world survival. He tested his initial proposal for a global ethic twice
before UNESCO (1989, 1991) and once before the World Economic Forum ( 199m.
The latter meeting included a trialogue with Kung, Hans Jonas and Karl-Otto Apel.
The project for a new world ethic was programmatically presented in Kung's book,
Projekt Weltethos (199m. It has the English title, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New
World Ethic. The word "ethos,' translated here as "ethic," does not so much denote a system of ethics as a way of life. The first part of the book outlines the paradigm shift from
modemity to postmodernity and deals with the threat to world survival and the need for
a global ethic. He explains that after the failure of "State socialism, ' "neocapitalism' and
"Japanism," we are at an end of the great modern humanistic ideologies of "political-social
revolution" and "technological evolution." The ideology of progress has been "demystified" in this century of two world wars and the Holocaust. The survival of the world is
now threatened by proliferating military aggression, hunger, extinction of animal life,
world economic catastrophe, depletion of rain forests and increased global warming.
Concomitant with these issues, Kung assesses that the world is in moral crisis. Many people no longer know a basis from which they may make moral decisions. Consequently,
they are confronted with personal and social nihilism in every facet of human existence.
The paradigm change from modernity to postmodernity is disruptive.
Given this analysis of the world situation, Kung proposes that what the world needs is
some kind of "minimal basic consensus" that affirms core values, norms and attitudes.
Otherwise, there can be no possibility of peaceful coexistence, let alone any real democracy. What is needed is an ethic that is global in perspective and mandates "planetary
responsibility' as a Kantian categorical imperative. Kung acknowledges that this task is
too great for anyone religious tradition. It requires, by its very nature, a coalition between
believers and non-believers, religious and secular people alike. Everyone has a stake in
world survival; so everyone is responsible to work to achieve it. The world's religions play
a particularly important role in providing the foundation and resources for a global ethic.
Kung's proposal for a new world ethic and global responsibility requires a transcendent
ground, a ground that is not itself conditioned. Kung is confident that such a transcendent ground may be discovered among the world's religious traditions. He q ueries,
... .who would be better suited today than the world religions to mobilize millions of people for a world ethic? To mobilize them by formulating ethical aims, presenting key
moral ideas and motivating them both rationally and emotionally, so that the ethical
norms can also be lived out in practice?"23 The world's religions, then, serve as the source
and foundation from which a basic consensus of universal moral values, norms and attitudes may be derived. But will the world's religious traditions accept Kung's proposal for
a new world ethic?

B. The Declaration of a New World Ethic
After much experience in interreligious dialogue and extensive research into the
world's religions, Kung was convinced that the world's religions could supply the moral
basis and spiritual resources needed for a new world ethic. But how could Kung make
his programmatic agenda for a new world ethic concrete and realizable in a global con-
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text? He could only do so if leaders in the world's religious traditions would embrace and
promote the idea of a global ethic. But where was there a forum to present the idea of a
new world ethic to a wide variety of religious traditions and their leaders? Kung found
that forum at the Parliament of the World's Religions which met in Chicago in 1993. He
was invited to draft a declaration for a common ethic that could be adopted by the various religious traditions attending the Parliament. 24
Kung's draft was discussed by the Council of the Parliament and by others from various religious traditions. Eventually, Kung's text was accepted by the Board of Trustees
(with some minor revisions) as what would become the "Declaration Toward a Global
Ethic." The delegates attending the Parliament would discuss and debate the prospects
for a global ethic and be asked to endorse the declaration formally. The real test for
Kung's global ethic was whether or not such diverse groups as Muslims, the Fellowship of
Isis, Greek Orthodox Christians, Shintos, the Theosophical Society and neo-pagans could
come to a consensus about a minimum of shared ethical principles. After a number of
objections were considered, the "Declaration Toward a Global Ethic' was signed by the
majority of the delegates, including the Dalai Lama, the Roman Catholic Cardinal of
Chicago, the Vatican representative, the representative from the World Council of
Churches and many other wide ranging groups and individuals. Evangelical and conservative Christian groups did not attend. They were suspicious of the syncretistic nature of
the Parliament. Moreover, Evangelicals and conservative Christians had serious problems
participating in some of the planned activities (such as neo-pagan moon worship).
As for the declaration itself, it began by citing the need for a global ethic in our contemporary world and by calling for commitment to "a minimal fundamental consensus
concerning binding values, irrevocable standards, and fundamental moral attitudes" as a
basis for a global ethic. 25 A basic demand of the declaration is: "Every human being must
be treated humanely.' The declaration then put forward some "irrevocable directives" of
human behavior to promote a more humane world. The minimal ethic proposed for a
global ethic is summed up in the following general principles of the Declaration:

I.
2.
3.
4.

Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life.
Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order.
Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness.
Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women 26

Each of these directives is followed by explications and representative examples of
how to live out the directive in concrete human experience. The conclusion of the declaration calls for a fundamental "transformation of consciousness" whereby all men and
woman are encouraged to commit themselves "... to a common global ethic, to a better
mutual understanding, as well as to socially-beneficial, peace-fostering, and Earth-friendly
ways of life."27 Kung was encouraged by the interest in and support of a global ethic by
those attending the Parliament of World Religions and by the serious consideration it
received in the aftermath. 28 Yet it remained for him to be more specific as to how a global ethic could be applied to our world situation. To address this, Kung turned his attention to the practical domain of global politics and economics.
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C. The Application of a New World Ethic
Kung selected the arenas of global politics and economics to demonstrate the applicability of his proposal for a new world ethic. His book, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and
EconomicS", reads more like a book from a political science or economics professor than
from a theologian. The first section deals with global politics while the second treats global economics. In both sections, Kung surveys and analyzes the historic background to the
present world situation. In typical Ku ngian fas hion, he posits two extreme positions and
suggests a via media. His proposed paradigm of politics and economics is centered
around the theme of responsibility. In conclusion to each section, Kung suggests several
specific proposals indicating how a global ethic could benefit global politics and economics. Kung adds a chapter discussion to the section on global politics that indicates the positive role the world's religions could play in the practice of d iplomacy and the peace
process. Space is available only to give a summary sketch of how Kung's new world ethic
applies to global pol itics and econom ics respectively.
Kung envisions two opposite poles in global politics. One side of the pole emphasizes
realism and power politics. Th is is represented by the power politics of Henry Kissinger,
the Machiavellian politics of Cardinal de Richelieu, the practical Realpolitik of Otto von
Bismarck and the power management theory of Hans J. Morgenthau. At the other pole is
the idealistic politics of Woodrow Wilson, w ho sought to subordinate politics to morality.
Kung proposes an ethic of responsibi lity where the "political calculation' of realistic politics is combined with and tempered by the ethical judgments of an idealistic politics.
Kung bases his thinking here on the ethics of responsibility outlined by Max Weber and
Hans Jonas 30 His logic is that a global society needs a global ethic where some consensus
on moral values, criteria and attitudes inform our global political decisions. W ithout a
global ethic informing global politics, democracy in the globa l village will not survive
Machiavellian power politics. But where do we fi nd global ethical standards? He gravitates toward the political theory of Michael Walzer, and away from those of Rawls and
Habermas. Walzer, like Ku ng, seeks to fi nd a via media between realist and idealist politics by building upon a "core morality: a "mi nimal" or "thi n" ethic 31 Kung, howeve r, goes
beyond Walzer to suggest that a more universal ethic for politics is the golden rule (= "do
to others what you want them to do to you"), w hich is expressed in different ways in various traditions. In addition, Kung suggests that the four general ethical directives of the
Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (noted above) would also provide moral orientation
for global politics.
Next, the global economy is divided up into two opposite poles as well. Kung believes
that the globa lization of the wo rld econo my is "unavoidable," "ambivalent," "unpredictable" and able to be "controlled."12 His logic in economics is the same as that in politics. If the world is moving toward a global economy w ith global businesses and technology, then the world needs a global ethic based o n a basic ethical consensus to guide honest business practices and a just distribution of wealth. On the one side of this pole is the
failed welfare state system. Sweden provides Kung with an example of a welfare state in
shambles with poor econom ic growth, high unemployment and weak currency. Kung
does not want to abandon the welfare state system tota lly, however. His idea is to
restructure it for greater effectiveness. At the other pole is the neocapitalism of the USA
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and England. Kung does not think that neocapitalism, with its emphasis upon the profit
motive, has produced a better model for responsible economic life than that of the welfare state.
After examining the American situation, Kung agrees with the analysis of Zbigiew
Brzezinski, former Security Advisor to President Carter, that the balance sheet on neocapitalism reveals major flaws: financial indebtedness, trade deficit, low savings, noncompetitiveness, low productivity, poor health care, deficient public education, decaying social
infrastructure, a greedy upper class, heightened litigation, race and poverty problems, pervasive crime and increased violence, a massive drug culture, social helplessness, sexual
license, moral corruption through the media, divisive multiculturalism, decline in civil consciousness, political gridlock and spiritual emptiness. l l In the light of this list, Kung concludes that economic policies need moral direction. Kung pleas for responsible economic
policies that work toward more just social conditions and ones that factor in environmental concerns.
In addition to collaboration between cultures and shared commitments of those cultures to human rights and democracy, Kung points to the moral and spiritual values of
the world's religions as an indispensable resource for a responsible global economics. The
religious traditions speak in one way or another about serving others, a commitment to a
just economic order, dealing honestly and fairly in business and prohibiting theft. Kung
implores businesses, business managers and business ethicists to tap into the ethical
resources of the world's religions. He offers this parting piece of advice: "In the long term
an immoral way of doing business does not pay."l4

D. Is Kung's Global Ethic Project Plausible?
Hans Kung must be commended for his efforts toward a global ethic. Who can disagree with the ideal of world peace, treating people more humanely, just economic distribution, responsible attitudes toward the environment or more friendly relations between
the world's religions? The world is in moral crisis. Human society certainly needs help.
Kung is to be credited not only for these efforts but also for alerting statesmen and political leaders to the positive value and role that religion can play in reaching these moral
goals for society. Nonetheless, there are two aspects of Kung's project that present plausibility problems.
First, Kung's quest for minimal values, norms and attitudes from particular religions and
cultures that are at the same time universally binding ethical values, norms and attitudes is
strained. Kung hopes to discover common categorical imperatives that are trans-national,
trans-cultural, universally binding ethical values, norms and standards from a consensus of
religions and cultures as the minimum foundation for a global ethic. In addition, Kung
seeks to ground these common ethical values, norms and attitudes in a transcendent
ground, which he calls "Cod." Without this ground, he admits, ethics and morality are at
best relative. Yet, Kung also says that he is not seeking absolute standards of morality or a
unitary ethical ideology, but only a sober and modest way to address the needs and worries of the modern age by striving for "a new basic consensus of integrative humane convictions."J5 Kung here backs away from absolute, universal moral standards grounded in a
transcend reality and retreats to the notion of human ., consensus:' The dilemma is that it is
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impossible to derive divinely grounded universal standards of morality from relative human
consensual convictions found in world religions and cultures. Religions and cultures are relative. Thus, Kung is looking for universal standards, norms and values among relative standards, norms and values. To acknowledge that universal, trans-national, trans-cultural categorical moral imperatives exist and need to be grounded in a transcendent reality is to concede that some particular objective, absolute standard of moral truth exists, is knowable
and is to some extent known in human history. This is exactly what the Jewish and
Christian traditions c1aim.16 But this is certainly not the moral understanding of "consensus'
thinkers in Westem culture. Nor is it the teaching of many world religions. Kung's talk of
"consensus" suggests that he is vulnerable to the same criticisms he made against Habermas
and Rawls. Here, I agree with the critique of Nicholas Rescher, who forcefully argues that
consensus "is not a criterion of truth, is not a standard of value, is not an index of moral or
ethical appropriateness, is not a requisite for co-operation, is not, in and of itself, an appropriate ideaL"]? While the ideals of Kung's project are worthy, "consensus' is not a valid
ideal upon which to found universal ethics. It is, therefore, difficult to see how Kung's project provides a plausible framework for a global ethic by setting the foundation for universal moral imperatives upon the shifting sands of human consensus.
Second, the four irrevocable directives for human behavior in the Declaration Toward
a Global Ethic are so general that as each tradition interprets these directives, there is little
real gain on "consensus. The problem is that as we shift from the general principle to
more specific definitions, interpretations and concrete applications of the directive in the
specific religions and cultures, then irreconcilable differences begin to emerge. For example, the first irrevocable directive suggests a commitment to a "culture of non-violence and
respect for life." This is based upon the religious-ethical prescript "Thou shall not kill'" or,
stated positively, "Have respect for life'" We are told that "armament is a mistaken path;
disarmament is the commandment of the times" and that humans, animals and plants
deserve "protection, preservation, and care."]8 There is no consensus among Christians,
let alone the other world religions, on what 'Thou shall not kill" or "Have respect for life"
means. One need look no further than the death penalty and abortion issues in the USA
to realize that this directive itself is not sufficient to settle heated and sometimes violent
disagreements among Christians. Moreover, is not this directive admittedly easier for
Theravadin Buddhists than for Shi'ite Muslims and most Christians (with the exception of
the Anabaptist tradition)? And what does it mean practically to protect, preserve and
care for animals and plants? Does this mean that animals and plants are not to be killed
for food, clothing, medical testing or other human uses? If not, what practical guidelines
are given for ethical treatment of animals and plants? These and other such problems can
be raised about the four irrevocable directives of the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic.
Due to their very general formulation, the irrevocable directives lose moral force as they
are interpreted and contextualized.
With all this emphasis upon global ethics, world religions, politics, and economics,
some might be wondering if Kung has forgotten a specific commitment to the Christian
faith. In the middle of his book on global politics and economics, however, Kung offers
this personal confession: "in the face of all the darkness of the world and the Church,
Jesus Christ stands as 'the light of the world', 'the light of men', as 'our light': The light (of

Assessing Hans Kung 's Theological Ethics

III

life} shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it'.. . . In company with
many others I openly concede that during the long decades of my life as a theologian I
personally would hardly have survived so long in the face of so much darkness in the
world and the Church without this light, which in my fragile humanity has always been
for me 'the way, the truth and the life'."J9 It is from this Christian center that Kung has
sought to construct a global ethic. He meets the world on its own turf and in its own
terms. Kung does so, however, as a Christian theologian. But how does Kung relate this
project for a global ethic to his specific Christian ethics and following Jesus? This question
is the theme of the next section.

3.

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN JERUSALEM & ATHENS

Kung is conscious of the apparent disparity of combining the ethics of Jerusalem
(specifically Christian ethics) to the morals of Athens (non-Christian and non-religious
moral thinking). He finds no contradiction, however, in joining these two into a unified
ethical vision. In addressing this issue, Kung comments: "Clearly a universal human ethic
and a specifically Christian ethic are not mutually exclusive."40 But the question of how
Kung couples a general, universal ethic to a specifically Christian ethic is not clear. On
what basis does he bridge the gap between Jerusalem and Athens? And how does he
retain a unified ethical vision?
There are at least five features of Kung's theology that serve as bridge components
between his specifically Christian ethics and his global ethic project. Kung nowhere presents these features of his theology in a coherent system. However, these components
are entirely commensurate with his thinking and aid in understanding how he unifies his
ethical vision. The five bridge components are derived from aspects of Kung's natural
theology, anthropology, theological method, conception of truth, and his employment of
Hegel's dialectical method. These five components are likened to a bridge with five
planks. A brief exposition of how each functions will reveal that these bridge components are the essential components that provide cohesion to Kung's theological ethics.
A. The Natural Theology Plank

The first bridge component of Kung's theological ethics is derived from his natural theology. Kung takes neither a strong "foundationalist" approach to natural theology characteristic of Vatican I nor a "fideistic" approach along the lines of Karl Barth. God, as the
creator of the world, may be discovered in a limited way from creation. This means that
God's self-revelation and human experience of that revelation are not antithetical.
Revelation occurs through human experience, not apart from it. Kung finds support for a
"soft" natural theology within Scripture (Rom 1:18-21 , 2:14-16; Acts 14:17, 17:27; John
I :9; Hebrews I I). His conclusion is that a true, but limited, knowledge of God may be
derived from creation apart from the special revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
Knowledge of God, therefore, is, in principle, universal in scope and can be a resource for
ethical principles as well as provide a basis for moral action. Belief in God is nourished by
an ultimately justified fundamental trust in reality. God is not only the guarantor of the
reality of reason and the rationality of reason, but also is the ground upon which ethics
and the moral life are ultimately founded. He says, 'The very last and first reality, God,
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must be assumed if a person in the last resort wants to live a meaningful moral life. Cod's
reality is the condition of the possibility of a moral autonomy of man in secular society."41
Kung maintains that theonomy is the essential condition for the possibility of moral
autonomy. In this way, a "soft" natural theology provides one plank of conti nuity
between specifically Christian ethics and a universal global ethic.

B. The Humanum Plank
The second cohesive bridge component is Kung's conception of the humanum. He
believes that there is a continuity between being C hristian and being human. While he
does not simply equate being human with be ing Christian, Kung thinks that being
Christian does not mean that one is less human . Being human and being Christian are
complementary and mutually beneficial to one another. True religion, Kung affirms, and
true humanity exist in dialectical tension . He remarks, ''True humanity is the presupposition for true religion' and "true religion is the fulfillment of true humanity."42 The concept
"humanum" denotes human dignity, worth and value. It is the central ethical criterion by
which Kung evaluates and determines what is good and bad, true and false, valuable and
va lueless in the world's religions and ideologies. If something promotes and protects
human dignity, value and worth, then it is regarded as true, good and valuable. If, however, something destroys or suppresses human dignity, value and worth, it is false, bad and
valueless. The concept of the humanum functions in this way as a general ethical criterion
for all religions and ideologies. As a result, Kung views the humanum (human dignity,
value and worth) as a universally binding and unconditional eth ical criterion. Moreover,
the general ethical criterion, the humanum, is not regarded by Kung as being in conflict
with the specific ethical criterion for Christians, Jesus Christ. In fact, Jesus Christ is considered the supreme concrete example of the formal category "the humanum. Jesus C hrist
gives an impressive, audible and realizable quality to the abstract notion of the humanum.
Since Jesus provides the supreme example of human dignity, value and worth, there is no
disjunction for Kung between Christian ethics and a global ethic oriented toward the

humanum.
C The Correlation Method Plank
The third bridge component that brings cohesion to Kung's theological ethics is his theological methodology. Kung's theological methodology stands in the tradition of revisionist theologians Paul Tillich, David Tracy and Edward Schillebeeckx. Each of these, in different ways, employs the method of correlation. The method of correlation suggests two
main sources for Christian theology: divine revelation and human experience. This
method also posits a basic continuity between divine revelation and human experience.
This basic continuity, however, does not imply that divine revelation and human experience never conflict. What it does suggest is that there is a relative harmony between the
revelation of Cod in creation and the revelation of Cod in scripture. The method of correlation, therefore, is congruent with a "soft" natural theology and accounts fo r why Kung
takes seriously the world horizon within Christian theology. The world situation with its
varied human experiences is viewed as a potential source for the knowledge of Cod.
Kung's theological method, however, departs from the correlation tradition in one very
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important respect. It includes alongside a "mutually critical correlation" space for a "mutually critical confrontation,"4] Divine revelation and human experience, Kung maintains,
are not always compatible, What is one to do if there exists a critical confrontation
between divine revelation and human experience? This is an interesting problematic for
any theological method, but especially for methods of correlation. How exactly does one
adjudicate the truth of conflicting moral claims between divine revelation and human
experience? Kung argues that Christian theologians must opt for the norm of truth found
in Jesus Christ in a critical confrontation, He says, "What then should decide the issue in
the crucial first-and-Iast questions affecting man and humanity? The biblical experiences,
the Christian message, the Gospel, Jesus Christ himself. For this Christ Jesus is in person
the 'essence of Christianity, the 'Christian message, the 'Gospel' itself, indeed God's
'Word: 'made flesh."'44 Kung's theological method of correlation, even while affirming
Jesus as the ultimate norm for assessing truth, advocates a basic continuity between the
moral truth in Jesus and moral truth found in human experience.
D. The Differentiated Truth Plank
If Jesus Christ is the norm of moral truth, how is he related to the moral truth found in
the global context? This question leads to the fourth bridge component of Kung's theological ethics, his differentiated conception of truth, Kung discusses his conception of truth
while formulating ecumenical criteria for determining truth in the world's religions. The
question of truth is important to him because the issue of conflicting moral truth claims
arises in the search for a moral consensus among believers and non-believers. Kung is of
the opinion that truth is ontologically unified. He maintains: "The truth cannot be different in the different religions, but only one: through all the contradictions, we have to seek
what is complementary; through all the exclusions, what is inclusive."4s There is no consensus on what criteria could be employed to adjudicate the conflicting moral truth claims
among the religions. Nonetheless, Kung assembles a set of criteria for evaluating truth in
the world's religions. The criteria he employs are: (I) the general ethical criterion of the
humanum; (2) the general religious criteria of the authentic or canonical; and (3) the specifically Christian criterion- Jesus Christ. The first criterion is ethical in nature and has already
been discussed above, In sum, a religious claim or behavior cannot be true if it does not
promote human dignity, value and worth. The second criterion suggests that for religious
beliefs and practices to be true, they must at least measure up to their own authoritative
teachings or canons. The third criterion, Jesus Christ, applies to Christian believers only.
These three criteria are augmented by two perspectives of truth, which results in a "differentiated" conception of truth, The first dimension of truth is the external or outside perspective. From this standpoint, the "objective" outsider view, there are many different true
and good religions. The extemal dimension of truth is correlated with the search for a
global ethic where the general ethical criterion of the humanum and the general religious
criterion of the canonical function as "minimal requirements" for the truth of any religion,
From this perspective, Kung comments, "As a religion Christianity appears in world history
just as relative as all other religions."46 There exists, however, another dimension of truth.
Kung calls this the internal or inside perspective from the Christian point of view. This corresponds to Kung's specificaUy Christian ethics and the specifically Christian criterion of
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jesus Christ. From the Christian standpoint, there is only one ultimately true ethical criterion- jesus Christ. Kung is quick to add that the truth of Christianity does not monopolize
or diminish truth in other religions. That is, as long as Christian truth claims are not flatly
contradicted. Kung does not mean to suggest by his differentiated conception of truth that
truth itself is pluralistic or differentiated. He means that our human perceptions of truth
are relative in nature. Only God has an objective, undifferentiated view of truth. Because
human perception of truth is differentiated, Kung reasons, true ethical teachings within
Christianity may be combined, although not completely harmonized with, the moral teachings and ethical practices found in the world's religions toward a world ethic.

E. The Hegelian Dialectic Plank
The fifth and last bridge component to consider is Kung's use of Hegel's dialectical
method of "sublation. Hans Kung is a theologian of the via media. Hegel's dialectical
method is one of his favorite devices for navigating the via media and has been employed
in each of the four bridge components above either explicitly or implicitly. This fact is
key to understanding how Kung combines a specifically Christian ethic with universalglobal morality from the world's religions and secularist thought. The Hegelian dialectical
method of sublation is Kung's primary tool for resolving conflicts and incompatibilities in
interreligious dialogue. He says: ' .. .the goal [of interreligious dialogue] is not a compounding of various features from various religions, nor a mingling of gods (theocracy),
nor a fusing of religions, but, rather, a dialectical 'transcending' (Aufhebenl of conflicts
through inner mediation, which at once includes affirming, denying, and overcoming
antagonistic positions."4? What is said here about interreligious dialogue applies equally
well to how Kung couples his Christian ethics to his project for a global ethic. The link is
Heger s dialectical method of sublation.
The word "sublation' is derived from the German Aufhebung, which is very difficult to
translate into English. Kung nowhere explains the concept in detail, but comments that
sublation means more than the combination of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. He suggests that sublation is "the affirmation of a truth that tums into a denial and then again
into a transcending of both affirmation and denial."48 Edward Quinn, one of Kung's translators, thinks that "sublation'" is best understood as something that cancels, preserves, elevates and transfigures all at the same moment. 49 The dialectical method requires that no
proposition be wholeheartedly denied or uncritically affirmed without qualification.
Moreover, sublation has the positive aim of mediating polar opposites. It is easy to understand why Kung employs Hegel's method of sublation in his global ethic project. For by
it, he hopes to take all the moral teachings found in the world's religions and secularist
thought, affirm the relative truth found in each, deny the absolute claims of each, and,
then, transcend and elevate each into a unified global ethic. Each of the bridge components above is contingent upon the success of Hegel's dialectical method of sublating
opposites and rendering antinomies compatible.

F How Stable Is Kung's Bridge?
Kung is an ecumenical theologian par excellence. What makes him such is his keen
insight into what divides Christians, the world's religions and secular worldviews. He is
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quick to get to the heart of issues. Kung's mind habitually locates the central antinomies
between views. In fact, most of his books deal with problematics that are construed as
polar opposites. It is also Kung's natural impulse to formulate a mediating position
between polar opposites. The assumption that underlies Kung's mediation impulse is that
God is the ultimate source of all truth and our capacity for knowing anything at all in the
world stems from God. It is from this viewpoint that Kung can affirm a fundamental continuity between natural and revealed revelation, between being human and being
Christian, between divine revelation and human experience and between truth in the
world and "Christian" truth. There is much to agree with here. However, space only
allows for two critical remarks regarding these bridge components between Jerusalem and
Athens. It is possible to cross from Jerusalem to Athens on the planks provided. But it is
much like crossing over a great chasm on a wobbly rope bridge with two very weak
boards. The two major weak planks are Kung's conception of truth and his use of
Hegel's dialectical method.
First, Kung's differentiated conception of truth has two major flaws. The first major
flaw is that his conception of truth is contingent upon a false distinction between ., objective" (the outside perspective) and "subjective" truth (the inside perspective). The subjectobject debate has been long standing in epistemology, especially since the Enlightenment.
Kung himself has criticized at length the Enlightenment view of truth as "objective" mathematical certainty and acknowledges the subjectivity of all human reason, including scientific rationalism. so There is no realm of rationality that is privileged to "objective" knowledge, while all others must be relegated to the status of "subjective." All objects of rational inquiry are related to knowing subjects, which means that one's knowing faculty cannot be separated from the willing, feeling, imagination, temperament, emotions and passions of the person doing the knowing. In addition, Kung has argued that the rationality
of reason must be presupposed by a "prior act of trust" in order to execute any rational
inquiry. This pre-scientific decision that precedes all rationality is classified in Kung's
thought as "fundamental trust."SI Moreover, if finitude and sin are factored into human
knowing, then it is extremely difficult to say that some perspectives are "objective" and
others are merely "subjective' in nature. The other major flaw of Kung's differentiated
conception of truth is that it is difficult to see how it evades the charge of practical relativistic perspectivalism. As noted above, Kung himself does not think that truth itself is
relative, differentiated or pluralistic in itself. He definitely believes in one ultimate reality,
which he calls "God." He also affirms that truth cannot be different in different religions.
It, therefore, defies logic for Kung to say that Christians possess a criterion for truth (jesus
Christ) that is not at the same time a criterion for truth in other religions and ideologies.
Second, Kung's use of Hegel's dialectical method of sublation to resolve antinomies
does little to explain how polar opposites are mediated. Kung's writings are brimming
with appeals to Hegel's dialectical method of sublation as the key to mediating antagonistic positions. There is no question that the dialectical method of sublation has the positive
aim of mediation of opposite positions. Yet Kung nowhere provides a nuanced definition
or explanation of the inner dynamics of sublation other than appealing to the very general formula that it involves an affirming, denying and overcoming of both affirmation and
denial in some kind of nondescript mediation. Without some kind of explanation of how
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antinomies are mediated and at the same time preserved, Kung's conception of truth and
his dialectical joining of antagonistic positions suffers the same problem of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's dialectic conceived of Cod and truth more dynamically, to be sure.
However, it is virtually impossible to distinguish truth from the process of human history
or God from the world and human consciousness in Hegel's philosophy. This is due to
Hegel's use of the dialectical method of sublation. In a similar way, it is difficult to distinguish an essential difference in Kung's thought between being Christian and being human,
between Jesus and the humanum, between revelation and human experience, between
modernity and postmodernity, between specifically Christian ethics and global ethics,
between Jerusalem and Athens. The reason is that Kung employs Hegel's dialectical
method of sublation to mediate these antinomies. In the end, it is hard to avoid the critical judgment that Kung's employment of Hegel's dialectical method of sublation as affirming, denying and overcoming is little more than a crude and mechanical way to sweep
unraveled theological loose ends under the proverbial carpet.
CONCLUSION

There is no question that Hans Kung has made significant contributions to theology
during his career. He will be remembered as one of the distinguished theologians of the
twentieth century. Kung is reviewed as "a unique phenomenon is twentieth-century theology" for "no other theologian has been published, translated and read so widely in this
century; no other theologian has been the focus of such a major controversy; no other
contemporary theologian has covered such a broad spectrum of theological themes."12
Hans Kung is essentially an ecumenical theologian. And it is perhaps in the field of ecumenics that Kung has made his most significant contributions. This has led John Cobb to
exclaim that "Hans Kung has contributed more than any other Christian to interreligious
dialogue."13 Moreover, even though we have found significant theoretical problems with
his Christian ethics, his global ethic project and the components by which he bridges the
gap between the two, Kung remains an outstanding example of a thoughtful and imaginative Christian theologian. He desires to engage the world in order to make a pragmatic
and responsible impact. He does so unashamedly as a committed Christian. Future ecumenical theologians in the Third Millennium are not only indebted to his ecumenical
research, but even more to his ecumenical passion.
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JUSTICE OR "JUST US"?
ALLOCATING RESOURCES IN
AN AGE OF AIDS

JOHN

F. KI LN ER

During the I 980s, many in the Christian community were characterizing AIDS as a
punishment from God and stigmatizing people with AIDS (however they contracted the disease) as modern-day lepers. It was against this backdrop that Robert W.
Lyon wrote the jarring article, "Becoming the New Testament Church to Serve
These 'New Lepers,'" in the journal Engage/Social Action. I It challenged the Church
to be radically different from the rest of the world by exhibiting vulnerability and
fostering love toward the neediest. Many in the Church were deeply moved by this
challenge, and during the years that followed, numerous ministries and ministry proposals appeared 2
Directly serving people ravaged by HIV 3 infection and AIDS, though, was just the
first step. It was an essential first step, because without it the Church would have no
credible basis for asking anything significant from society at large. However, with
many members of the body of Christ now willing to join Christ in associating with
those commonly despised, the time has come to examine more carefully what the
Church needs to be saying to a society that controls the majority of monetary
resources potentially available to help those who have or could contract HN/ AIDS.
Professor Lyon has long persuasively argued that the ethics of Cod's Reign (or
"Kingdom"' ) tends to place believers at odds with their societies as well as their ecclesial cultures. If that is true, then an ethical challenge not only to the Church but also
to society at large must be expected in a full account of the ethics of God's Reign.
This article represents an attempt to look beyond the Church and to ask what an
ethics of God's Reign can contribute to current social struggles to determine what
resources should be expended in behalf of present and future persons with
HN / AIDS. Accordingly, it concentrates on the social dimension of the demands of
love- what the Bible often refers to as "justice." Shortly after Jesus summarizes God's
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expectations for people as loving Cod and lovi ng neighbor (Luke 10:27-28), he is pictured challenging the Pharisees to love Cod and do justice (I I :42). Justice lies close to the
heart of what loving one's neighbors entails.
As I explain at greater length in Life on the Line, justice has a prominent place in the
ethics of Cod's ReignS When the psalmists reflect on Cod, they recognize that God "loves
justice" (Ps 99:4) and that justice characterizes Cod's own actions in the world (Ps 10: 18;
35:10; 76:9; 103:6; 146:7-9), Rooted in the character of Cod, the importance of justice
does not wane with time. In his day, Je remiah insisted that knowing God necessarily
entails knowing the importance Cod attaches to doing justice (jer 9:24; 22: 15- 16). Jesus
similarly insisted that those who overlook the doing of justice have tragically misunderstood Cod (Matt 7:21-23; 25:34-45).6 Justice, then, is central to what Cod expects of
people in the social order.
Needless to say, the notion of justice is not a purely theological term; it is widely
acknowledged in society at large. Th is familiarity is both a blessing and a curse. It is a
blessing in that society is at least to some degree receptive toward considering the merits
of anything that purports to be a requirement of justice. However, it is also a curse
because what society means by justice and what Scripture means by justice are not the
same. Such a predicament comes as no surprise-the Bible repeatedly warns people about
"the wisdom of the world" (I Cor I :20) and "human arguments" (Rom 3:5), People are
not wise to "lean on" their own understanding (Prov 3:5-6; cf. 14: 12), for Cod, who loves
all, has different values and views than human beings, whose minds are unavoidably
biased by self-centeredness.
Justice in the hands of self-centered individuals all too easily becomes a sword to fend
off the claims of others so that our rights can be protected to the full. It is more a "just us'
attitude than what the Bible terms "justice," Nowhere is this unbiblical outlook more evident than in the arena of AIDS. Those with HIV/ AIDS are "someone else"-perhaps to be
feared, more likely to be forgotten when it comes time for us to pursue the resources we
need and want for our own concerns,
When AIDS-related resource allocation decisions are being made, a "just us" orientation predisposes decision-makers, along with the public who elects them, to underestimate the resources that should be provided, This same orientation undoubtedly skews
allocation decisions in other arenas as well. So, although it will not be possible here to balance the funding claims of HIVI AIDS against all other legitimate claims, an examination
of the AIDS arena will underscore the difference between a justice and a "just us" perspective as the basis for society's distribution of its limited resources. The examination
taken here will begin with a consideration of various arguments for justice and assumptions about justice, and will conclude by probing several aspects of justice.
ARGUMENTS FOR JUSTICE

"Arguments for justice, as this term is used here, refers to reasons why the notion of
justice should be central to the issue of resource allocation in the midst of the HIVI AIDS
pandemic. Such reasons are rooted in the close relationship between justice and human
need. In the biblical writings, Cod is repeatedly observed to have great concern for those
in need (e.g., in Exod 22:21-25; 23:6; I Sam 2:8; Ps 107:39-41; Prov 14:31 ; 19:17l.
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Their basic needs are to be met as a matter of justice (job 29: 14- [6; Ezek [8:5-9). Such
needs can include food, clothing, and shelter (Deut 10: 18; Isa 58:7) as well as the land
essential to sustain the meeting of those needs (Jsa 5:7-8). Whatever the need, the underlying principle of justice is the same: as people have need, so they should receive {Acts
4:35; 2 Cor 8: 13l.
The more important the issue at stake, the more relevant justice as a governing concept becomes. Concern is rarely expressed, for example, when the glass of water that one
person receives at a restaurant has a minute amount more in it than that received by
another. However, if people's lives and financial well-being are found possibly to depend
upon that amount, the notion of just allocation suddenly becomes much more important.
Questions of justice are at the heart of the AIDS pandemic for the same reasons: the
predicament is expansive- fatally affecting vast numbers of people-and quite expensive
as well.
The predicament is expansive. Consider first the expansive nature of HIV infection and
AIDS. By the beginning of the year 2000, 18.8 million people had already died from
AIDS, and another 34.3 million people were living with HIV/ AIDS. In 1999 alone, 2.8
million of those deaths occurred and 5.4 million people were newly infected. 'These data
represent a 'best-case' scenario and may underestimate actual death rates. Because AIDS
may kill several members of a household, it can destroy households completely, with the
result that some of the deaths will not be captured in subsequent household surveys."?
One of the tragic results of such widespread death has been over [3 million orphans
{who have lost their mother or both parents to AIDS before they reached the age of
15)- a number projected to double in the next ten years 8
Certain parts of the world have been especially hard hit. In India, some four million
people are infected with AIDS. In Russia, the number of HIV-infected people has doubled in the past two years. In the Caribbean and much of Latin America, AIDS numbers
are rising "to frightening levels."" However, the crisis in Africa is unparalleled. Every
minute II people worldwide are infected with HIV-and 10 of those are in sub-Saharan
Africa. Annually, the world's wars kill only one tenth as many people as AIDS kills in
Africa w Of the world's children orphaned as a result of AIDS, 95% currently live in
Africa. More than 12 million sub-Saharan Africans have died of AIDS- two million last
year alone-6,OOO more just today.I I
There are now 16 countries in which more than one-tenth of the adult population
aged 15-49 is infected with HIV. In seven countries, all toward the southern end of the
continent, over one-fifth of the adults has the virus. 12 The country of Botswana is particularly hard hit, with 35 .8% of its adult population infected. Rather than the life expectancy
of 71 years that its citizens would have without the disease, life expectancy has dropped
to 39, and is expected to drop to only 29 in the next 10 years U In Namibia, Swaziland,
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, one third of the children will be orphaned by 20 I 0 .14
Uganda, with the highest number of AIDS orphans in the world (I. I million) already has
some areas in which this is the case. IS
The scope and seriousness of the problem are immense. 'This is undoubtedly the most
serious infectious disease threat in recorded human history;· notes Oxford University's
Roy Anderson. 16 Moreover, in the words of the recently-released report "Children on the
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Brink 2000," 'The HIV/ AIDS pandemic is producing orphans on a scale unrivaled in
world history."'7 The predicament is indeed expansive. But it is also expensive.
The predicament is expensive. In the United States, for instance, annual costs of HIV disease have long crossed the $50 billion mark. Such figures have included approximately
$13 billion in direct costs and $38 billion in indirect costs (the value of lost productivity
due to sickness and death).' 8 The public health care sector has been especially hard hit.
Because of the health and insurance profile of patients using public hospitals, public hospitals lose more than twice as much per AIDS patient per year as do private hospitals. '9 In
recent years, the federal government has directly spent $6.8 billion- $1.8 billion for
research, $.54 billion for prevention, and $1.2 billion for treatment, in addition to $3.3 billion for AIDS care under Medicare and Medicaid. 20 AIDS is draining whatever private
resources many individual patients have. As a result, whereas patients have used private
physicians more often than hospital clinics before they developed the illness, once they
have develop AIDS the number of persons with AIDS who need to resort to hospital
clinics has been almost five times as great as the number of those who have been able to
continue to see their private physicians 2 1
In some respects the public impact on other countries may have been even greater
than it is in the U.s. One study, for instance, documents that patients with AIDS have
tended to be hospitalized significantly longer in Europe than in the United States Zl Less
developed countries, with far fewer resources available for health care, typically have
experienced an even greater financial burden. n To date, Africa has been especially hard
hit. The majority of all people with AIDS have lived there, but less than 2% of the money
spent on AIDS globally has generally been expended there 24 Of the $1 -2 billion needed
specifically for AIDS prevention in Africa, only a small fraction of that amount is being
spent. 25 National health services in Africa have been swamped. One recent study of 16
African countries has found that public health spending for AIDS alone has exceeded 2%
of gross domestic product (COP) in 7 of the countries- a staggering figure in countries
where total health spending accounts for 3-5% of CDP.26
During the years ahead the predicament will only get more expensive. Not only will
the number of people affected continue to grow, but newer treatments will also add additional costs to the care of HN-infected persons. Experience with drugs such as AZT has
been instructive. People with HN have been able to live longer due to prophylactic treatment with these drugs, which can postpone the onset of AIDS and also lengthen life after
AIDS develops.27 The amount of hospital use over the course of a patient's lifetime, however, does not appear to be reduced by the use of such drugs 28 The HIV/ AIDS predicament, then, is both expansive and expensive-two compelling reasons why a just allocation of resources is critical.
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT JUSTICE

With these two arguments for justice in view, two assumptions about justice can now
be clarified: I) that justice is comprehensive, and 2) that justice is collaborative. These
assumptions are at least implicit throughout the biblical writings.
Justice is comprehensive. To observe, first of all, that justice is comprehensive is to underscore its far-reaching character. The word in the biblical texts is often a translation of the
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Hebrew sedaqah or the Greek dikaiosyne, both of which can also mean "righteousness,"
with its stress upon rightness and right relationship. A just situation is one in which everything important has been taken into account and placed in proper relationship with
everything else. Justice is typically invoked when it is perceived that the interests of some
are being duly considered, while those of others are not.
A just allocation of resources so understood must take into account a much broader
array of considerations than at first might appear relevant. It is not concerned merely with
medical care for those with AIDS but also with preventive efforts such as the provision of
drugs, vaccines, and information that are required in order to render that care unnecessary (at least for a while). It is concerned about the research needed to improve both
medical care and preventive efforts.
Moreover, from the comprehensive perspective of justice, medical care will include
not only physician care but also multidisciplinary teams to address the broad range of
needs that arise in the context of AIDS. It will include palliative care as well as curative
patients both to die as well as possible and to live as well as possible. To inpatient care will be added in-home care, with attention to the full range of psychological,
family, social, employment, financial, legal, and other services needed by the patient.
Justice calls on a society to do more than provide necessary funding. A just allocation
of resources calls forth the outpouring of time and energy and tears that many patients
may need more than anything money can buy. In fact, without such a personal commitment, even a just financial allocation is not likely to occur.
Justice is more than a mere abstract ideal. It is a moral mandate striving to be heard
above the clamor of a thousand injustices at work in any situation. Implementing justice
entails locating and silencing those injustices as much as it does promoting a just way forward. So a just allocation of resources in the face of AIDS requires addressing the larger
context of health care. If tens of millions of people are without health insurance, as in the
United States, or the level of care available to people differs significantly in different sections of the country, as in many countries of the world, then justice will constantly be urging attention to the broader picture with its many injustices when making allocation decisions about a particular disease such as AIDS29 Justice also mandates that other diseases
be given due consideration, and that allocation decisions not depend, for example, on
what disease happens to capture the media's attention at the moment. 3D
Justice is collaborative. Implicit in the assumption that justice is comprehensive is a second assumption: that justice is collaborative. When only one person is in need of something, the concept of justice has little relevance. It is when the needs of various people
come into conflict with each other that justice becomes so important.
Justice provides a way for people to live together. It presumes that people ought to live
together, and suggests concrete ways to enable community to exist. It is concerned about
the needs of all, recognizing that at one time or another, in one way or another, everyone
is in some way vulnerable.31 So it endeavors to protect people at their weakest points as
an integral part of facilitating the flourishing of all.
It is here that the close link between justice and love becomes particularly evident.
Love seeks mutuality in community. We are to love our neighbors as ourselves. What this
means in practice is self-sacrifice, because we are constantly prone to think of ourselves
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more highly than is warranted (Mark 7:2 1-22; Rom 12:3, 16; I john 3: 16- 18l. But the
goal is interdependent com m unity. Paul commends jesus' self-sacrifice (Phil 2:6-8), yet
interprets its message to believers as fo llows: "each of you should look not only to your
own interests, but also to the interests of others" (v. 4). The needs of all are to be met in a
community in which "your plenty will supply w hat they need, so that in turn their plenty
will supply what you need. Then there w ill be equality" (2 Cor 8 : 14l. Moreover, community is to be understood inclusively, embracing those usually considered to be "different"
(Luke 10:29-37; john 4:9, 27; CoI3:1 1). l2
While enabling the community to serve the individual, justice also gives the community itself an excellence that warrants service on the part of the individual. From this perspective it is unfortunate to subordinate the community to the individual in any general
sort of way, as is sometimes done in the United States, or to so subordinate the individual
to the community, as is sometimes done in more communitarian nations 3J As fundamentally collaborative in nature, justice works to bring together not only the needs of various individuals, but also those of the individual w ith those of the community. There are,
however, potentially conflicting understandings of the ways that justice pursues this task,
as will be examined later.
Because justice is collaborative, the language of justice is also collaborative.
Accordingly, it contrasts sharply with much of the language that is common in the context of AIDS. Much AIDS language is riddled with metaphors such as those of crime, sin,
war, and the divided society- inherently divisive metaphors that undermine a sense of
community.
The last of these metaphors is the most explicit in this regard, present every time there
is talk about what . we' (those without AIDS) must do about "them" (those with AIDSl.
The motivating concern here appears to be more "just us' than justice. Achieving a just
approach to resource allocation does not require ridding language of metaphor- an
impossible task in any case. However, it does require taking care that the very language of
the discussion does not subtly create a separation between those of us deciding how best
to allocate resources and those of us with AIDS. J 4
That justice is collaborative as well as comprehensive means that it will strive to foster
community at all levels. It is not unusual in the context of just resource allocation to think
only nationally. Yet justice also has local concerns, e.g., regarding the just access of patients
with AIDS to whatever limited number of intensive care beds (if any) are available to similarly sick patients 35
Similarly, justice has an oft-neglected international point of view. From the earliest days
of the Church- and long before that- people have readily adopted a "just us" attitude
when Cod's blessings are at issue. Even Paul (Saul-Acts 9) and Peter (Acts 10) had a
hard time accepting that all peoples of the world are cared for by Cod. But such is the
case, as much so today as in the earliest days of the Church. Accordingly, were the rate of
new HIV infections in North America and Western Europe to cease climbing, the implication for justice would not automatically be that fewer North American and Western
European resources should be devoted to AIDS. Rather, justice would likely insist that the
escalating HIV-related needs in less developed countries could now be attended to more
aggressively.
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ASPECTS OF JUSTICE

To this point two arguments for justice have been made- that the HIV/ AIDS predicament is expansive and expensive- and two assumptions about justice have been suggested- that justice is comprehensive and collaborative. The concept of justice itself, though,
has yet to be examined. This task is complicated by the different ways that people use the
term "justice." Each of these ways represents a different aspect of the concept. Since each
aspect is not necessarily relevant in every situation, and those that are relevant may agree
or conflict, a circumspect examination of each is necessary. Four major aspects will be
examined here in turn: equality, liberty, responsibility, and efficiency.
Equality. One widely-held understanding of justice is that it somehow involves the
notion that people should be treated equally. The notion of equality lies at the heart of
justice in the biblical writings as well. The ultimate basis for the egalitarian treatment of
people is that each is precious in the eyes of God. The concern for such treatment surfaces concretely in the Old Testament in the context of insuring that the original egalitarian distribution of land be preserved. Rooted in God's unwavering love for all, this egalitarian vision remained alive through the centuries. In the time of Ezekiel, God was still
directing that any return from exile be marked by an egalitarian distribution of land (Ezek
47: 14). The ultimate hope, described by other prophets, was that all people would have
their own vine and fig tree (Mic 4:4; cf. Zech 3: 1Q).
In light of this background, it is not surprising that Paul should find a situation intolerable in which some people went without the basic necessities of life while others had more
than enough. In 2 Corinthians 8: 13-14 Paul explicitly invokes the notion of equality to
argue that the Corinthians should share their resources with others. After all, God is not
partial to some and satisfied that others should lack what they need to live 36 Moreover,
true community is hampered when the lives of some are in effect valued more than the
lives of others since some have access to life-sustaining resources while others do not. 3?
In the context of AIDS an egalitarian understanding of justice often undergirds the
concern that AIDS is receiving too much funding, compared with other diseases that
afflict more people. If each person is to be accorded equal weight, it is assumed, then the
disease affecting the most people should receive the most resources. 38
Because of the moral significance of equality as a basic aspect of justice, this argument
potentially has considerable force. However, an egalitarian approach need not merely
adopt the perspective of today, i.e., "just us.' A more biblical perspective would also consider the situation over time. God's love extends across time to all generations. So God is
sensitive to injustices that become evident only when one takes a longer-term point of
view. Over time, for example, some Israelites suffered economic hardship and lost their
land. To protect the original distribution, God mandated a jubilee year every fiftieth year
in which all land would revert to its original owner (Lev 25). In addition, every seventh
year was to be a sabbatical year in which debts were canceled, even to the extent that
those sold into slavery on account of their debts would be set free (Deut 15),
A longer-term point of view makes significant difference when allocating health-related
resources. Since AIDS is a relatively recent disease, it has not received as much total funding over time (e.g., for research) as some diseases that now receive less annual funding
than AIDS. The greater current funding for AIDS may, then, be justified in order to
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achieve more of an equality over time. In fact, even further funding increases may be
called for when a disease is infectious. The infectious nature of AIDS will most likely
result in increasing numbers of people with AIDS for many years to come. The costs
involved in these numbers will be disproportionately high relative to other major fatal
conditions such as heart disease and cancer, in that AIDS deprives people, on average, of
about 25 years of life more than does either of these conditions. 39
A perspective over time also reveals the uncertain factual basis of the egalitarian argument against increased funding for AIDS. There are a variety of reasons why the size of
the AIDS pandemic is probably understated-at least understated in official national figures. Many AIDS cases are incorrectly diagnosed as something else because the immune
deficiency underlying the more obvious disease present is not recognized. Women in particular have been overlooked because their symptoms have not fit the symptom profile
defining AIDS, which was developed in the United States based on early experience with
the disease there among men . Furthermore, many cases (an estimated 10- 15% in the
US) are never reported to governmental authorities. The effectiveness of antiretroviral
therapies in delaying the onset of AIDS has also led to a sense that the numbers of people
who are in the process of developing AIDS is smaller than it really is.<o
Equality, then, is an important aspect of justice that may at first glance suggest the
appropriateness of limiting AIDS funding, at least if the focus is on today- on "just us.
However, a more careful examination of all that equality may entail over time reveals that
an allocation of resources based on justice may instead entail increased funding.
Liberty. A second aspect of justice is liberty. The Bible is filled with references to God's
commitment to human freedom (e.g., Deut 7: 15; Ps 146:7; Isa 49:9; John 8:32; 2 Cor
3: 17). One common understanding of liberty, particularly in the US today, is that people
should be as free as possible from society's interference in their lives. According to this
view, people generally live in societies primarily to protect their resources and their freedom to live their lives as they wish . Having AIDS is unfortunate, and it is commendable if
some individuals and groups want to help patients in need. However, justice requires that
no moral or legal demands be made on people's resources in order to ameliorate the
plight of others.
This so-called libertarian view is one way of understanding the place of liberty in a just
allocation of resources. But there is also a liberation view which reveals that liberty has
much more to say in the resource allocation debate. The liberation perspective observes
that a libertarian approach is based on an unbiblical concept of freedom as "autonomy"
(literally self-law), according to which there are ultimately no obligations that people have
toward God or others. This approach to resource allocation merely protects the liberty of
those who have resources at the expense of the liberty of those who do not. If justice is
to pay special heed to anyone's liberty, according to a liberation view, it should pay special attention to those who have traditionally been most marginalized in terms of access to
basic resources. Justice, in other words, resists a liberty that is for "just us.'
This liberation view of justice is radically different from the prevailing mindset in society today, according to which the most marginalized people are the most readily and easily neglected. 4 1 Commitment to liberation is rooted in Jesus' understanding of what the
Reign of God- and Jesus' own ministry as a manifestation of that reign-are essentially
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about: "good news to the poor
. freedom for the prisoners .. sight for the blind
release [forJ the oppressed" (Luke 4: 18l. While a certain measure of freedom to control
one's own resources appears to be allowable, a state of affairs in which some people are
left without basic life-sustaining resources is portrayed as intolerably unjust. As explained
earlier when examining "arguments for justice" were examined, God is deeply distressed
when people's true needs are not met. That health is included in such needs is suggested
among other ways, by the characterization of Jesus' healing ministry as a justice ministry
(Matt 12: 15- 18l. A liberation understanding of justice, then, insists that the basic needs of
the most marginalized in society require special attention if the freedom of all is to be
respected in a meaningful way.
This understanding of the place of liberty in just resource allocation may point not to
less funding for HIV/ AIDS but to greater. One of the marginalized groups in society that
has been most seriously afflicted by HIV disease is IV drug users.42 A commitment to liberation in this context would not merely involve support for more resources to care for
HIV-infected drug users because of the disproportionate burden they bear as a group. It
would even more energetically support providing the resources so desperately needed for
better IV drug education and more widely available drug treatment in order to spare
them the HIV burden altogether. 4J
In some countries, certain ethnic minority groups are also disproportionately burdened
by HIV/ AIDS. Afro-American and Hispanic-American persons in the United States, for
example, have had an infection rate that is several times as high as that for others, especially among their children 44 A recent report reveals 80% of wormen diagnosed with
AIDS to be from these two groups. Compared with white women, the HN incidence is
19 times higher for African-American women and 7 times higher for Latinas 45
Poor people generally are at special risk of HN infection. Without the opportunity for
good health care or treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases, the risk for contracting HIV multiplies about eight times: 6 As a result, AIDS incidence is highest among the
very poor4? AIDS, in turn, makes people's poverty even worse by undermining economic
productivity, creating huge numbers of orphans who tend to become malnourished and
inadequately educated, and in some countries even dangerously depleting the young
adult generation that normally would economically support children and elderly persons 48
A liberation-minded justice perspective would seek the resources necessary to free disadvantaged minorities not merely from the disproportionate burden of AIDS, but also
from those conditions so influential in creating that burden in the first place. It may also
justify allocations for research in the more developed countries that go beyond what
would seem appropriate merely in comparison with other national needs, because the
hardest-hit lesser developed countries will not be able to afford such research in the near
future.
Responsibility. Among those most critical of the liberationist outlook on justice are those
who argue that people who use IV drugs or practice homosexuality are responsible for
their illness. These critics emphasize not so much the equality or liberty aspects of justice
as the responsibility aspect. Justice demands that people pay the price for their unwise
behavior. 49
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The notion of taking responsibility for one's actions is a persuasive one, especially in
light of the collaborative nature of justice discussed earlier. Moreover, the biblical writings
from the early moral codes (e.g. Exod 21; Lev 5) to New Testament moral teaching (e.g.,
Rom 3 :5-8) explicitly affirm the importance of personal responsibility. Nevertheless, the
conditions under which this idea of responsibility is morally legitimate do need to be specified. One condition is that those involved must have been aware of the strong possibility
that their actions would produce the negative result in question. In the case of AIDS,
many people with the disease today actually became HIV infected before there was
much public education about AIDS, or they are part of populations (e.g., homeless persons) who are not effectively reached by standard forms of education. Another condition
on the notion of responsibility is that people with one disease (e.g., AIDS) not be punished for their contributing lifestyle choices if there is no intention that people with other
diseases (e.g., heart or lung diseases) be punished for theirs So No such intention is apparent at present.
Were these and other such conditions to be satisfied, responsibility would seem to
point in the direction of limiting the resources allocated to HIV / AIDS- at least as long as
the focus remains on the single patient as the responsible party. A different picture of
responsibility begins to emerge, however, when the focus widens (as the comprehensive
nature of justice requires) to include the responsibility of society. Again, the difference
between a justice and a "just us" mentality comes to the fore.
The question now becomes: Which of the various parties potentially involved has
some responsibility for the action through which the HIV was transmitted? The cases
where the proportion of the infected person's responsibility is clearest appear to be those
in which that person has virtually no responsibility-e.g., infants born infected and people
infected through blood transfusions. Women intimidated by men into having sexual intercourse without the use of condoms is at least an ambiguous case. SI Even an activity like
IV drug use is not so simply a matter of personal choice, at least not when the user has
previously been abused by a life of poverty and discrimination. As time goes on, many
who are able to alter risky behaviors are doing so. One result is an increasingly large proportion of those infected with HIV who are infected because of the irresponsibility either
of other individuals (e.g., parents of newborns) or of society at large S2
It is bad enough, as some international observers have noted, that people governing
various less developed countries devote such substantial amounts of their countries' limited resources to protecting the blood supply-the source through which they themselves
most fear becoming HIV infected. The tragedy is compounded, however, if the citizens at
large are then held accountable for infections that are as much products of grinding
poverty, limited opportunities for happiness, and little access to protective measures as
they are products of free personal choices. In more developed countries it is similarly
morally dubious whenever people are not only victimized by poor social conditions but
also denied treatment for their addictions because sufficient resources have not been allocated-and then held entirely responsible for their predicament.
If responsibility is to be invoked as an aspect of justice, both the responsibility of the
society and that of the single patient need to be considered. In the current context of
AIDS, the result is not likely to be a merely punitive justice, in which people are punished
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for their individual actions. A restorative justice, in which people are recompensed for the
ill they have received at the hands of society, is the more probable outcome. That people
should be well-compensated when they have been wronged is an expectation voiced
repeatedly in the Old Testament (e.g., Exod 22:1 -14, Lev 6:1 -7; Num 5 :5-8; 2 Sam 12:6;
Prov 6:31l. The same expectation is implicit in the New Testament, for example, in the
exemplary conversion of Zacchaeus (Luke 19: 1-9). Anyone whom he has cheated in his
capacity as an agent of the government (tax collector) he pledges to repay fourfold.
Restorative justice entails a special claim on the part of those with HIV now and those
most at risk of infection- a special claim to a society's finances, to its problem-solving
capabilities, and to its compassion. Not only does this form of justice involve liberty from
ongoing burdens, as in the case of liberating justice, but it also entails recompense for past
wrongs done. Affirming restorative justice, moreover, does not release individuals from
personal responsibility-a point that needs to be emphasized-for justice is collaborative.
Rather, this affirmation recognizes that the ethical context for holding people responsible
to the needs of society is one in which society is duly responsive to the needs of the individual. Within such a context, educational efforts stressing the individual's responsibility to
live a healthy lifestyle are bound to be more persuasive than they would be otherwise.
Efficiency. Many of those who resist the claim of people with AIDS to special treatment
appeal to a still different aspect of justice, that of efficiency. Their concern is that not too
much money should be spent on anyone group of people. The good of the whole, they
insist, must be kept in view. A sort of utilitarian ·'greatest good for the greatest number"
perspective seems to be at work here. 53
The emphasis on the importance of the common good is laudatory. However, this
way of thinking can be dangerous if it is not tempered by other aspects of justice. The
greatest efficiency of all may be to rid society of certain types of people considered undesirable by those in power. History can attest to the horrors of such "just us'" thinking.
If a concern for efficiency, however, is joined with a commitment to the needs of all,
including those most looked-down-upon in society, then efficiency may direct resource
allocation in a very different way. Instead of sanctioning spending less it may actually justify
spending more. Sometimes spending more in the near term can produce better, more efficient results in the long term. Accordingly, the child endures painful discipline now for a
happier life later (Prov 22:6), the man spends everything he has to buy a field now so
that he may have its hidden treasure later (Matt 13:44), and believers give up home or
brothers or sisters or mother or father or children or fields knowing that they will receive
a hundred times as much back (Mark 10:29-30). (They will also receive persecutions in
this age, but in the age to come they will receive something much better: eternal life-cf. I
Cor 15:30-32,)
In the struggle against HIV/ AIDS, spending more in the near term may accordingly be
justified, particularly in certain areas. For example, more funding for research may be
more efficient in the long run than less funding, since a vaccine or cure would reduce dramatically the resources required for medical care. Some funds are likely to continue to be
allocated to research until a vaccine or cure is found. So postponing funding does not
necessarily save money; rather it subjects the eventual costs to inflation and allows the
pandemic with all its costs to continue longer. It is also counterproductive in that it post-
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pones access to the wealth of knowledge about viruses, cancer, the brain, and the
immune system that is being gained through AIDS-related research s4 At the same time,
however, efficiency necessitates carefully monitoring plans for increased spending to be
sure that there is sufficient research capacity (labs, scientists, good proposals, etc.) to use all
allocated funds productively.
Other examples of increased spending that efficiency might sanction include larger
allocations for prevention, home care, and perhaps even comprehensive health care.
Prevention (e.g., through the provision of education, protective measures, or prophylactic
drugs) can not only keep the initial HIV infection from occurring, but can also forestall the
progression of HIV infection to full-blown AIDS or at least minimize the disability and
pain caused by AIDS. Home care is less expensive and, at times during the course of
AIDS, more comfortable for the patient than hospital care-as long as sufficient coordination is provided among hospital-based, community-based, and home-based services s )
And providing comprehensive care for patients with AIDS may not be as expensive as it
might seem, even in a de-centralized health care system like that of the United States.
Some element of the system, often Medicaid in the U.s., ends up assuming many of the
costs anyway. Moreover, there are great savings to be gained in better coordination of services, avoidance of the expensive practice of cost-shifting, and better protection of the
sexual partners of those who would now have a greater incentive to be tested for HIV
infection because of the improved health care available. 56
The efficiency aspect of justice, then, might seem to imply spending less on AIDS and
HIV infection. However, spending more in the present, if spent well, can lead to less
spending in the long run.
In sum, then, justice is crucial in resource allocation because the HNI AIDS predicament is expansive and it is expensive. Justice is influential in resource allocation because it
is comprehensive and it is collaborative. And justice is controversial in resource allocation
because there are competing notions of equality, liberty, responsibility, and efficiency at
work in it that can easily stymie allocation decisions.
Yet, the voice of justice in the midst of the current pandemic may not be so ambivalent or unsupportive after all. Whereas each aspect of justice, viewed from the perspective
of "just us," can be construed to justify limiting the resources allocated to this arena, the
view from the Reign of God is quite different. A more generous allocation may well
instead be warranted.
Professor Lyon is right. In many ways a person with AIDS today is like the leper of
Jesus' day- despised, feared, avoided-certainly not "one of us." Jesus met lepers' needs
without distinction- needs of Samaritans (who deserved their fate in the eyes of many) as
well as Jews, unbelievers as well as believers (Luke 17: I 1-19). How likely is the justice of
God's Reign to demand less of people today?
Nevertheless, the tentativeness of the language throughout this discussion has been
intentional. As explained at the outset, many of the arguments presented here in the context of HIVI AIDS could also be marshaled in behalf of resources to meet other basic
human needs, especially where a "just us" mentality has limited resources available to
date. In other words, the justice orientation characteristic of God's Reign challenges a variety of current allocation priorities- not only those related to HIVI AIDS. Nevertheless, the
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HIV / AIDS arena has been so riddled with "just us" thinking that it represents an excellent
place to illustrate the need to attend more carefully to the justice that God requires.
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LOYAL OPPOSITION AND THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE

WILLIAM ]. ABRAHAM

A crucial question which generally faces all rational minorities or individuals who
do not fit into the intellectual mainstream is this: how do they justify the moral
claims that they advance in the face of opposition and even ridicule? In other words,
how do they make good their claims in the teeth of widespread contrary opinion?1
In this exploratory paper I shall argue that one of the best ways to respond to this is
by a theory of conscience. En route to this I shall attempt two other tasks. First, I
shall briefly indicate why it is a good thing to have some kind of theoretical base for
our minority reports. Second, I shall draw attention to the weaknesses of four common ways of dealing with the epistemic status of minority opinion. On the other
side of my proposals concerning conscience, I shall conclude with a brief comment
on the role of conscience in the empowerment of Christian minorities.

In posing the issue in the sharp manner represented by my opening question, I
am not assuming that what is right is determined by majority opinion. That thesis is
so obviously mistaken that there is no need to argue the negative case involved.
What is at stake is more subtle than this, and it is more profound. What we want to
know revolves around a series of concerns which are naturally directed towards
those who stand outside the mainstream. How do they know they are right? What
warrant do they have for their proposals? What ground(s) do they have for their
confidence?
A clear example that comes to mind is the predicament faced by John Wesley
and the early Methodists who challenged the prevailing theology, spirituality, morality, and evangelistic practices of the Anglican tradition of the eighteenth century.
Wesley and his friends faced a barrage of objections which sooner or later had to be
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answered. Once this process began, they were driven to deal with the whole range of
fundamental questions w hich lie below the surface of the initial controversies. This is far
from being a merely political or prudential operation, for in time new insights emerge or
old truths are rediscovered; invariably a whole new tradition arises to enrich our ecclesial
and cultural life.
To be sure, a good case can be made that all opinions must face this kind of query sooner or later, for majorities as much as for those in the position of the loyal opposition.
Moreover, there is a long and distinguished school in epistemology which has insisted that
we can know nothing, including nothing in the field of morality, unless we have first established our position on a sound basis. Hence foundationalists of one kind or another have
long maintained that nobody, not even an intelligent majority, has the right to claim they are
correct unless they can logically trace their position back to adequate foundations represented by self-justifying or secure premises, axioms, first principles, and the like. Immanuel Kant's
categorical imperative and John Stuart Mill's principle of utility seek to provide precisely such
a secure foundation. Hence on at least one reading of our epistemic situation, everybody,
and not only minorities, is required to explain and justify their position.
However, no such theory lies behind the present request for warrants. Moreover, it
would be question-begging to rest on such a set of assumptions. What some minorities
rightly w ill want to challenge is this whole approach to the foundations of morality. It is
precisely this challenge against a central feature of the modern Enlightenment which puts
them outside the mainstream in the first place. Hence they will correctly protest that their
position is the kind of radical position that calls this line of inquiry into question. We had
better have other reasons for pressing the issue before us than merely an appeal to some
kind of classical foundationalism.
It is also worth noting that in some quarters the very idea of suggesting that minorities
of any sort should be asked to give an account of their proposals of the kind envisaged
here is otiose. We are all aware of the extent to which it has become fashionable to see
this kind of request as a disguised form of oppression or violence; such questioning is perceived as a type of dominance in which those in the majority make demands of the
minority as a means of keeping challengers out of the discussion and eventually out of
positions of power. 2
Not all minorities are prepared to take up this kind of defensive posture. For example,
it is more than significant that many Evangelicals are extremely reluctant to playa card of
victimization by oppression. There can be no doubting the historical reality behind their
systematic exclusion from the academy and from crucial centers of power within mainline Protestant churches. Mature observers can readily identify the academic, political, and
theological ideologies which have been developed to provide intellectual explanations for
such exclusion. In these circumstances there is great temptation to take on the status of
the victim and seek to gain power on the basis of past discrimination and exclusion. Some
have succumbed to this strategy, but I suspect that it is thoroughly uncharacteristic of the
Evangelical tradition as a whole. At least two important convictions underlie this hesitation .
First, Evangelicals deep down are committed to the search for truth as a logically distinct
value or good which cannot be reduced to political or social interest. This is deeply incom-
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patible with any move which would make the formal commitment to truth equivalent to a
quest for power. To be sure, Evangelicals are only too aware that the reality is often different.) Human beings, especially those in positions of power, all too easily can dress up the
quest for dominance and power in the form of a quest for truth. Any tradition which takes
sin seriously will be aware of such possible self-deception. However, the very claim that
such self-deception is possible or actually has happened is a claim to truth which cannot be
reduced to one more quest for power if we are to take it seriously. Hence any global theory of truth which reduces truth itself to power is self-referentially destructive.
Secondly, Evangelicals have learned over the years that the social institutions of the
church and society depend on confessional claims which need to be sustained across the
generations. These confessional claims are held to embody not just the reality of majority
victory or the attainment of raw power; they are taken to embody nothing less than the
revealed truth of Cod. Hence Evangelicals have very deep theological warrants for refusing to play the ideological card of victimization when they are hard pressed to do so by
the example of other minority groups in the neighborhood.
Why, then, do we raise this deep question of warrant at all and present it as especially
acute for minorities? On a general level we raise the matter because a rejection of foundationalism does not for one moment mean the end of the debate concerning the justification of moral claims. All it signals is that one way of resolving this complex matter has
been abandoned. Moral foundationalists, like Kant and Mill, are sometimes wont to be
perplexed by the rejection of their position. Somehow they think that if we reject their
position we have rejected morality proper and maybe even epistemology proper. Worse
still, they may think that we have automatically embraced some sort of relativism or
nihilism. This is an illusion. All we have abandoned is one family of solutions for questions
about the deep structure and justification of morality. We have simply rejected an important and illuminating alternative in the debate about the foundations of morality.
Consequently, what we have before us is a tremendous moral and epistemological challenge. We now have to work out an alternative to what has stood as a prevailing consensus in the field.
As to the special case of minorities, there are three considerations which relate to their
responsibilities. First, because they stand outside the mainstream, the onus of proof falls
on them in the dynamic of debate. At the very least there is psychological and social pressure to explain their position. Indeed it is this sort of pressure which makes minorities
such a valuable part of the social order. Often they provide the alternatives which are
needed when the mainstream becomes exhausted. They constitute a kind of monastic
renewal for the wider world they inhabit. Moreover, the vigor and urgency with which
they usually present their claims can open up the issues and provide new perspectives in
a refreshing manner.
Secondly, the courtesies of debate require that they explain the deeper convictions
that lie behind their position. After all, the majority hold the territory in part because in
years gone by they won the debate about the field as a whole. They earned the right to
be heard because once upon a time they delivered the relevant goods. Indeed at one
time they probably were the minority opinion. Hence the onus is now on the relevant
minority to come through with the intellectual goods.
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Thirdly, without some kind of critical check or some kind of reasoned account of their
position, those in opposition repeatedly fall into various forms of fanaticism. They simply
end up in the position of the dogmatist or zealot who requires us to take what they say as
correct merely on their word. This helps nobody in the debate. It puts the opposition in
the awkward position of having nothing substantial to say beyond repeating the point at
issue; it prevents the majority from benefiting from the serious discussion of an altemative
scenario; and, worst of all, it misses a golden opportunity to advance our understanding of
the logic and justification of moral claims.
Christian minorities have an additional incentive to develop their position. They owe it
as constitutive of their love of their neighbor. To misuse a standard text in apologetics,
they have a duty to give a reason for the hope that is within them. They are called to
think through and share their convictions so that the Cod they serve may be glorified and
honored. In the past they have generally seized on this option gladly.
This does not mean that it is easy. There is always the temptation to take the line of
least resistance and find an excuse to avoid answering hard questions or to short circuit
the debate by turning the whole issue into an affair of sociology and politics. The latter is
all too visible when the debate is transformed into a power struggle to be resolved by
votes, caucuses, intrigue, and the like. Political action is always inescapable and sociological analysis is generally invaluable; yet without the patient attending to the moral, theological, and philosophical considerations which swirl around the discussion, the results can be
socially disastrous. Such debate is not a substitute for war or violence; it may at times be
part of the cure for our social and ecclesiastical strife.

II
Let me pursue now our query in a quasi-historical manner. How might a loyal opposition resolve the question of the warrants for its position? Let us look very briefly at four
possibilities. They involve in turn an appeal to one's identity in a community, to divine
revelation, to intuition, and to empowerment.
In the first case we envisage that the grounding of one's decisions go back to one's formation in a community. Thus the minority may simply appeal to its membership in a
community; it appeals to its identity in a particular tradition, group, or class. On the surface this appears a hopelessly simplistic solution to our problem. However, it would be a
mistake to take it simplistically. What usually underlies the appeal to community is a
much wider story about the human condition, about the formation of our moral identity,
about the nature of human community itself, about the character of morality, and about
the virtues and vices identified by a community in the pursuit of its preservation and welfare. It is precisely because the appeal to community can be spelled out to embrace such
a rich network of material that it has become exceedingly attractive of late.
Unfortunately, this richness does not begin to deal with the fundamental objection that
is naturally lodged against it. The chief problem with this proposal is that we want to
know how we can be sure that our favored community is right. Explaining in great detail
the various elements which are buried in this option does not begin to grapple with this
problem, for the same question will break out with respect to these claims too. All along
the line the critic will want to know: "What are the warrants for the particular claim or set
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of claims proposed by the community in question?" Clearly this takes us right back to
where we started.
Alternatively, as a second possibility, the minority might appeal to divine revelation. In
this instance one's position is grounded in what God has revealed, say, in Scripture or in
Christ. The warrant is the fact that God has spoken definitively and has made known
what we should morally do; or, less strongly, we can infer what we ought to do from
what God has told us to do. However, in this case, too, problems immediately surface.
First, questions will arise as to which revelation should be used. Which of the many
putative revelations available should one accept as genuine? Unless this question is
resolved, one will be at a loss as to how to proceed. Secondly, and more importantly,
even if this issue is resolved, we will have to face the age-old question developed in tantalizing fashion by Plato in the Euthyphro. Granted that we now know what God requires
of us, does God require action 'x' because it is good, or is 'x' good because it is required
by God. If we take the first option, then morality is logically independent of religion, and
we do not need to appeal to divine revelation to ground our moral claims. If we take the
second option, the foundations of morality become purely arbitrary, for our moral claims
are decided by the whim of the deity without there being any moral constraints on what
can be deemed as required even by God.
If we cannot appeal to community or revelation as the way ahead, then what about an
appeal to intuition? Here we meet a third epistemic scenari0 4 This would fit very naturally
with our quest, for it is characteristic of minorities to take a stand at a very deep level on
their convictions. In the end they often claim just to see the truth of what they are proclaiming. There is nothing below their claim on which it rests. As the legendary Luther put
it in his famous phrase, "God help me, I can do no other." This strategy would fit nicely
with the reluctance to argue. In this analysis there is no argument; arguments presuppose
fundamental premises or axioms which in the nature of the case are taken for granted; so
it would be futile to argue for their acceptance. In other words, it is the very expression of
these fundamental premises or axioms which are at issue on this reading of the situation.
These are seen to be true intuitively; they need no demonstration or support.
Once again it is not difficult to identify the difficulties with this sort of strategy. As the
history of the debate about the value of intuitionism shows, critics have latched on to two
primary objections. First, intuitionists are generally divided on the kind of propositions
which they profess to see. Some see particular instances and then from these attempt to
build general rules. Others claim to intuit the general rules and then apply them to particular cases. If intuition is a reliable faculty, there should be no such deep disagreement
between those committed to its use. This defect in the formalties of what is perceived is
then further compounded by the second objection. When we move from the formal to
the material content of the supposed perceptions, we find even more disagreement.
Intuitionists notoriously see different propositions to be true, whether the propositions
have as their subject general rules or particular cases. They cannot agree on which cases
genuinely count as examples of good or evil action or on which rules embody good or
bad principles. In these circumstances, it is extremely tempting to look for non-rational
causes of the beliefs of intuitionists, say, in terms of gender or class analysis.
A fourth altemative is to ground one's proposals in the fact that they will be instrumental
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in bringing about the empowerment of the oppressed or the marginalized. Here one argues
that the ultimate norm or warrant for action is the potential changes embodied in the moral
action proposed; the envisaged changes are constituted by the liberation or full personhood
of the victimized group. However, once again, difficulties meet us at every tum.
First, this proposal rests on projected predictions which are precarious in the extreme.
Merely because someone says that a particular moral stance will liberate some group or
other is no guarantee that such a moral stance will actually do the job envisaged. We
need some sort of empirical generalization or evidence that things will turn o ut as we
think. Secondly, this option surrenders the epistemic value of our moral claims. It treats
moral proposals as purely instrumental, as a means to an end, thus stripping them of any
categorical content. Finally, this alternative begs the questions from the outset. It already
assumes that we know that the end in view is morally obligatory, and it does this without
telling us why we should take this as a given. [t does not secure this end as justified or
warranted. Note that the objection here is not that the end may not be in fact morally
obligatory; on the contrary, it may well be morally required. The objection is that we have
not advanced one w hit in knowing whether the proposed liberation is morally obligatory.
The obvious lessons to be learned from this review is that any account of the warrants
for our moral claims are likely to be highly ramified. Even though I have raised questions
about the viability of each option, I do not at all hold that they should be rejected in toto.
To the contrary, I want to suggest that each of them may well have a contribution to
make to any comprehensive account of our moral existence. The challenge is to develop
the kind of rich vision which will do justice to the relevant insights hidden in these proposals, while at the same time facing up to the epistemic queries with which we began
our deliberations. Moreover, we need a central concept which can enable us to bring
these insights together in coherent and natural manner. I suggest that we can make
progress in this by deploying and developing the idea of conscience.

III
The root idea of conscience is that we are endowed by Cod with the competence to
engage in moral discernment. In classical renderings of conscience such discernment has
characteristically been constituted by our ability to see that we should do good rather
than evil, a very formal first principle of morality, and by our ability to see what the good
requires of us in various moral situations, the material content of morality.
Crucial to this understanding of conscience is the claim that conscience is a capacity
given to us in creation by God. Minimalist descriptions of conscience as a moral sense, a
faculty of the soul, the candle of the Lord, the voice of Cod, and the like, are really hopelessly reduced accounts of this very substantial metaphysical and theological proposal.
Even less satisfactory are those accounts of conscience which reduce it to some abstract
right to dissent from current orthodoxy or establishment opinion. In this case the appeal
to conscience, seen in such expressions, "Well, I have a right to my conscience on this
matter," is simply the dogmatic claim of an individual to hold to the contingent opinion of
the moment. [t does not begin to do justice to the epistemic weight assigned to the concept of conscience in the pre-modern Christian world.
Few have captured the issue in modern times as forcefully as John Henry Newman s
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His central points are laid out with characteristic forcefulness . To begin, conscience is rooted in a clear doctrine of creation.
I say, then, that the Supreme Being is of a certain character, which, expressed in
human language, we call ethical. He has the attributes of justice, truth, wisdom,
sanctity, benevolence and mercy, as eternal characteristics in his nature, the very
law of his being, identical with himself; and next, when he became creator, he
implanted this law, which is himself, in the intelligence of all his rational creatures.
The divine law, then, is the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a
sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels .... This
law as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called ., conscience'; and
though it may suffer refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is
not therefore affected so as to lose its character of being the divine law, but still has,
as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience 6
For Newman this view is shared across denominational boundaries.
When Anglicans, Wesleyans, the various Presbyterian sects in Scotland, and other
denominations speak of conscience, they mean what we mean, the voice of God in
the nature and heart of man, as distinct from the voice of revelation. They speak of
a principle planted within us, before we have had any training, although training
and experience are necessary for its strength, growth, and formation. They consider
it a constituent element of the mind, as our perception of our ideas may be, as our
powers of reasoning, as our sense of order and the beautiful, and our other intellectual endowments.
Moreover, both Protestants and Catholics recognize the deep and fundamental role
conscience plays in moral deliberation.
The rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of
the greatest number, nor state convenience, nor fitness, order, and the pulchrum.
Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with oneself; but it is a messenger from him, who both in nature and in grace, speaks to us
behind a veil and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness,
a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood
throughout the church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would
remain and would have a sway?
This conception of conscience must be resolutely distinguished from the antagonistic
accounts proposed by various philosophers.
We are told that conscience is but a twist in primitive and untutored man; that its
dictates is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which the dictate
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enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly be freedom of the will, how
can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite eternal network of cause and
effect, in which we helplessly lie? And what retribution have we to fear, when we
have no real choice of good or evil?8
Equally it must be distinguished from the vulgar conception of conscience often found
in the popular mind.
When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of
the creator, nor the duty to him, in thought and deed of the creature; but the right
of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their judgment or their
humour, without any thought of Cod at all .... Conscience has rights because it has
duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a lawgiver and judge, to
be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a license to take up any or no
religion, to take up this or that and let it go again, to go to church, to go to chapel,
to boast of being above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of them.
Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have
been mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will."
Finally, despite the fact that one's conscience can be distorted and that the very idea of
conscience can be easily misunderstood in the popular mind, Newman is adamant about
the finality of the deliberations of conscience in the moral life. For Newman we have" a
duty of obeying our conscience at all hazards."'o Even the authority of the pope, who for
Newman is nothing less than the medium of divine revelation, must take second place to
the authority of conscience. "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner
toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink, - to the pope, if you
please, - still, to conscience first, and to the pope afterwards.""

IV
We can see in these remarks of Newman some of the themes which caught our eye in
our earlier survey of the options often developed by cognitive minorities in the face of
opposition. More precisely, we can see a place in the development of our moral existence
for intuition, for divine revelation, and for community and tradition. 'I What is so attractive
is the way in which these are held together in a compelling vision of morality. More especially, Newman's remarks open a door for the application of recent developments in epistemology which scarcely got a hearing in Newman's time. Before taking up this latter
topic, I would like to restate in my own terms the crucial components of the moral vision
suggested here by Newman. ') It has four central elements.
I. First, in moral deliberation it is impossible to escape the tracing of our moral deliberations back to basic moral principles, insights, and judgments which form the foundations
of our moral arguments. In moral debate, there simply comes a point where either we see
or do not see the rightness of what is before us, whether that be a principle, a particular
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state of affairs, or a particular moral judgment. There is no further reason or axiom which
is more basic that we can summon in our attempts to persuade an opponent. We either
see, or we do not see. This constitutes the natural resemblance there is between a theory
of conscience and intuitionism. In both what is envisaged is a basic capacity, a fundamental competence, a non-reducible ability to know what is the case morally speaking.
2. In a developed theory of conscience, this capacity is construed in theistic categories.
Conscience is understood as given by an all-good and almighty Creator who has made
human beings in his own image and has thus transmitted to them his own capacity to
know what is good and evil. This immediately provides a deep warrant for taking conscience with the utmost seriousness. Because conscience is given by God, to go against
conscience is to rebel against the voice of God given to us by nature in creation. More
positively, to obey conscience is to fulfill one's destiny as a creature designed to operate in
a certain way by one's Creator.
Given the way that the nature of conscience is embedded in a theistic universe, it is not
at all surprising that the very idea of conscience should become suspect or even be transformed beyond all recognition, once the theistic universe it inhabits is abandoned. Thus we
should expect thorough-going secularists, whether Marxists or Durkheimians or Freudians,
to provide a radically different construal of what theists will identify as conscience. They
will see the deliberations of conscience as merely the outcome of economic, social, and
psychological forces which have no causal relation to truth. Hence they will reject the
deliberations of conscience as radically misguided. Now, to be sure, if we knew that these
secularist positions were metaphysically correct, then this consequence would follow. In
reality, however, these remain at best thoroughly contested proposals; a mature theist will
have her own reasons for rejecting them or for accepting them only in a deeply modified
form. 14 Moreover, as a theist, she will have her own reasons for adopting a theistic conception of the universe. Hence the minimalist, reduced accounts of conscience so popular in
current philosophical and popular circles will be rejected as radically inadequate.
3. In this account of conscience, conscience is construed in thoroughly dynamic terms.
It is not an all-or-nothing capacity. It is a divinely given competence which clearly develops in infancy, through adolescence, and beyond. Conscience can be hurt and healed; it
can be distorted and sharpened; it can be lost and regained; it can be dulled and
renewed. Hence a full description of the growth and inner dynamic of conscience is an
extraordinary achievement. Moreover, any attempt to plot the relation, say, between conscience, intellect, sentiment, guilt, remorse, and the like, will be a major undertaking
requiring exquisite perceptual and conceptual skill.
4. Fourth, it is precisely because conscience is construed as a capacity or as a competence that it can be corrected and healed by divine revelation and rightly influenced, for
good or ill, by tradition and community.
Thus Christian theists will insist that the ultimate norm of good is revealed in the life
and work of Jesus Christ, the etemal Son of God. In him are hidden the full riches of holiness. Through the working of the Holy Spirit, fellowship with Christ in the body of the
church so heals and enriches human agents that eventually they share the very mind of
C hrist and see the world as he does. ls Hence the Christian looks to the saints of the
church as models of enlightenment to be emulated and consulted on moral issues. In
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these circumstances the inner voice of Cod enables one to discern the moral authority of
Christ and his saints; in turn conscience itself is healed and corrected by the Word of Cod
enshrined in the Scriptures and made fully manifest in Christ. In these circumstances,
there can be no playing of conscience off against divine revelation. ' 6 Special revelation in
the Word of Cod confirms, corrects, and deepens the natural revelation given through
the light which enlightens everyone who comes into the world. '7 From the point of view
of our moral experience, such transformation is not a quick and easy matter either for the
individual or for the Christian community. Individuals may need years and the Christian
church may need centuries before the rightness and wrongness of certain moral claims
are recognized. Such moral development is entirely natural on this account of our competence in moral discernment.

V
We are now in a position to tackle the last segment of our project. The reader will
recall that our fundamental concern was ultimately to address queries about warrants
which naturally arise with the appearance of cognitive minorities. In terms of our vision of
conscience the question which arises is this: How do we know that appeal to conscience
provides us with adequate justification or warrant for our moral claims? To this we now
turn.
The point of entry is Newman's claim that conscience is ·'a constituent element of the
mind, as our perception of other ideas may be, as our powers of reasoning may be, as our
sense of order and the beautiful, and other intellectual endowrnents."' BNewman's suggestion is that we should construe conscience as similar to such other intellectual capacities as
perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and the like. Thus, just as we
have recourse to memory in making judgments about the past, so do we have recourse
to conscience in making judgments about the moral worth of actions. How does this help
us in developing our account of conscience so that it addresses the quest for knowledge?
In recent years epistemologists have been recovering and exploring an approach to
knowledge in general which is especially pertinent to this issue. From the time of
Descartes and Locke, the two great pillars of the Enlightenment experiment in epistemology, the general tendency has been to construe knowledge in terms of true, justified
belief. The most troublesome element in this tradition has been the problem of securing
justification. The favored approach to this matter has been to pursue the quest for justification in internalist categories. Thus a person is justified in holding to a particular proposition, p, if that person has good reason for holding p, and that reason is known to the person as a reason for p. On this analysis justification for a belief is secured by being aware of
good propositional evidence for that belief.
An obvious difficulty which attends this proposal is how to secure the foundations of
one's beliefs. After all, every time one cites a reason for any belief, that reason itself constitutes a further belief, and questions will naturally arise about the status of that belief.
Justification, on this view, becomes a chain of inference and argument which either goes
on forever or which must come to a halt at an appropriate foundation . In moral theory
intuitionism represents an attempt to stop the infinite regress of argument by insisting that
at some point the agent just sees something to be the case. Not surprisingly, philosophers
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have seen such a move as empty theorizing, as a kind of intellectual hand-waving to flag
down questions. Equally, attempts to speak of a moral sense, of a faculty of discernment,
and the like, have been construed as vacuous proposals which verbally fool their proponents into thinking that they are making epistemic progress. In this intellectual environment a theory of conscience will appear thoroughly dubious.
However, in recent years we have become acutely aware that all is far from well with
this kind of internalist account of justification and its attendant account of knowledge.
Thus many have turned of late to explore an alternative, externalist account of knowledge which proceeds in a radically different direction. The crux of the turn is this. Rather
than look for propositional evidence, say, for our basic perceptual or mernory beliefs, we
ask a very different question. We ask if the practice of memory or the practice perception
is a reliable one. If it is, then we can prima faoe take the beliefs which arise from such
practices as knowledge. This conceptual shift utterly transforms the way we think about
knowledge and justification.
It also transforms the way we should weigh the epistemic status of conscience. On the
old internalist model the question we asked was how we could find further propositional
evidence for those beliefs arising from conscience. On this analysis the concept of conscience was useless. On the new externalist model we ask if we have good reason for taking conscience to be reliable. Once we ask that question, the answer is obvious. For the
Christian theist the answer clearly must be yes. Conscience is a God-given capacity; it is a
constituent part of our nature given by a gracious and loving God. Hence, other things
being equal, conscience is a reliable medium of moral knowledge. It is this simple and revolutionary notion which makes manifest the extraordinary epistemic significance of conscience. Prima facie, conscience is to be trusted to yield knowledge because it is a basic
competence given to us by God. 19
A consequence of this analysis is worth noting. On the internalist account of knowledge, one can only know something if one also knows how one knows. Thus I know p, if
and only if I believe p, if p is true, if p is justified, say, by q, if I know q, and if I know that
q justifies p. The obvious problem with this analysis is that it eliminates a host of things
which most normal people would insist they knew. For instance a child can know that it
is raining, or my dog can know that she is about to go for a walk without satisfying such
stringent conditions. On the externalist account one knows p if one has arrived at p
through a reliable process. It is not at all essential that one also know how or why the
process is reliable, although clearly knowing why the process is reliable may enhance
one's epistemic status. It is precisely this feature of our externalist account of conscience
which shows why conscience has been taken so seriously in the Christian tradition. Even
the conscience of the unbeliever, that is, the deliberations of one who may explicitly deny
its divine origin, is to be taken seriously. The reason for this is that one may well know
moral truth even though one may not know how one knows such truth. Just as through
perception I may know immediately that it is snowing, even though I may not have a
clue how to defend the reliability of perception, equally through conscience I may know
immediatedly that it wrong to roast people for fun, even though I may not have a clue
about where my conscience comes from or why it should be normally relied on in my
moral deliberations.
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VI
In conclusion we can now connect this account of conscience to the empowering of
Christian minorities. We noted earlier that the concept of conscience has had a precarious
place in the moral theorizing of the last two centuries. As Newman rightly suggested, both
philosophical a nd popular conceptions of conscience in his day totally failed to convey
the full force of the idea as developed in the Christian tradition. Since then the situation
has not improved; on the contrary, the progressive secularization of Western culture has
made talk of conscience even more precarious than it was in the nineteenth century.
With the increasing secularization of the Church, it is now common to find the idea of
conscience treated as a hostile stranger even within its sacred precincts. As Christendom
collapses, and as mainline churches loosen their intellectual moorings from Scripture and
tradition, then those committed to talk of conscience and to its healing by the grace of
Jesus C hrist w ill become even more of a minority than they have been in the past. The
gap between the working conscience of serious believers and their neighbor is likely to
grow wider and wider.
In these circumstances retrieving the riches of the tradition buried in and around the
idea of conscience is a salutary exercise in at least two ways. First, it will help keep alive
the C hristian tradition in bleak and difficult times. One cannot take conscience seriously
without also taking seriously a whole range of theological themes and convictions which
naturally circle round it. Secondly, it will put heart into Christians as they live and witness
in a hostile environment. At one level a sound grasp of the nature and role of conscience
will give intellectual and spiritual protection from the moral degeneration wh ich is so
clearly visible in the world around us. At another level it will help Christians cultivate a
deep respect for the neighbor. On the reading of the human situation proposed here,
even enemies are to be respected and heard. Even though one's opponents may be radically different in outlook, even though from a Christian perspective they may be corrupt
in their conscie nce, and even though they may be totally opposed to a theistic account of
conscience, they are to be treated as agents made in the image of God who can always
be redeemed and transformed- or as Newman says, they are to be urged to obey their
conscience against all hazards. In the meantime Christians can draw on the full resources
of grace made available in the gospel and in the teachers and members of the church.
Among the latter I am pleased to acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor Robert
Lyon whose strong and sensitive conscience as a scholar, as a teacher, and as Christian
believer leaves so many of us in his debt.
NOTES
I. I limit my concern here to moral claims. Our question easily can be extended to encompass theological and other claims.
2. This is so much a part of the contemporary mainline academic scene that documentation
would be superfluous. It has become so embedded in some circles that merely to question the new
status quo will be seen in terms of backlash. See for example, Susan Thistlethwaite's "Beyond dualism: Rosemary Radford Ruether's New Women/ New Earth," The Christian Century (April 24,
1993): 339-402.
3. George Marsden's work on the secularization of the academy and on the history of fundamentalism are especially helpful treatments of aspects of this theme. See George M. Marsden,
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Refonning Fundamentalism: A History of Fuller Theological Seminary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987)
and George M. Marsden and Bradley L. Longfield, eds., The Secularization of the Academy (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992).
4. Note that I am using "intuition" here as almost a technical term in moral philosophy. I do
not mean by intuition some kind of non-rational hunch. On the contrary, intuition is intended to
signify the kind of rationality appropriate to morality.
5. John He nry Newman, Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered
(London: Pickering, 1976), pp. 246-26 1.
6. Ibid., p. 246.
7. Ibid., pp. 248-249.
8. Ibid., p. 249.
9. Ibid., p. 250.
10. Ibid., p. 259.
I I. Ibid., p. 26 I.
12. I leave aside for the moment any reference to empowerment.
13. Needless to say the account which follows will be much more Protestant in orientation and
content than what one will find in Newman.
14. Some modern Protestant treatments of conscience all too readily succumb to the implications of entirely secular, non-theistic conceptions of human agents at this point. See, for example, C.
Ellis Nelson, Don't Let Conscience Be your GUIde (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978),
15. This is beautifully captured in Romans 12: 1-4.
I 6. That we may be tempted to do this, that is, insist on one and only one source of moral
e nlightenment, in this case either conscience or Christ, is part of the legacy of standard
Enlightenment epistemologies, such as we find in Descartes, which posit one final, certain source of
moral inquiry. In a sense there is ultimately only one source for the theist, namely the creative activity of the living God. However, it is an elementary truth of Christian theology that the triune God's
creative activity is not confined to conscience.
17. John 1:9.
18. Newman, Difficulties, p. 248.
19. It is worth noting that Descartes makes exactly the same epistemic suggestion with respect
to ordinary perception. See for example his Meditations on First Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
1980), p. 94.

